

Religious experience : its nat

200.19 E93r

114202



Edward, Kenneth

Life Pacific College Alumni Library

DATE DUE

200.19

E93r

Edward, Kenneth

Religious experience


LIFE Pacific College

Alumni Library

1100 West Covina Blvd.

San Dimas, CA 91773

DENCO



THE KERR LECTURESHIP.

THE "KERR LECTURESHIP" was founded by the TRUSTEES of the late Miss JOAN KERR of Sanquhar, under her Deed of Settlement, and formally adopted by the United Presbyterian Synod in May 1886. In the following year, May 1887, the provisions and conditions of the Lectureship, as finally adjusted, were adopted by the Synod, and embodied in a Memorandum, printed in the Appendix to the Synod Minutes, p. 489.

On the union of the United Presbyterian Church with the Free Church of Scotland in October 1900, the necessary changes were made in the designation of the object of the Lectureship and the persons eligible for appointment to it, so as to suit the altered circumstances. And at the General Assembly of 1901 it was agreed that the Lectureship should in future be connected with the Glasgow College of the United Free Church. From the Memorandum, as thus amended, the following excerpts are here given :—

II. The amount to be invested shall be £3000.

III. The object of the Lectureship is the promotion of the Study of Scientific Theology in the United Free Church of Scotland.

The Lectures shall be upon some such subjects as the following, viz. :—

A. Historic Theology—

- (1) Biblical Theology, (2) History of Doctrine, (3) Patristics, with special reference to the significance and authority of the first three centuries.

B. Systematic Theology—

- (1) Christian Doctrine—(a) Philosophy of Religion, (b) Comparative Theology, (c) Anthropology, (d) Christology, (e) Soteriology, (f) Eschatology.

- (2) Christian Ethics—(a) Doctrine of Sin, (b) Individual and Social Ethics, (c) The Sacraments, (d) The Place of Art in Religious Life and Worship.

Further, the Committee of Selection shall, from time to time, as they think fit, appoint as the subject of the Lectures any important Phases of Modern Religious Thought or Scientific Theories in their bearing upon Evangelical Theology. The Committee may also appoint a subject connected with the practical work of the Ministry as subject of Lecture, but in no case shall this be admissible more than once in every five appointments.

IV. The appointments to this Lectureship shall be made in the first instance from among the Licentiates or Ministers of the United Free Church of Scotland,

The Kerr Lectureship

of whom no one shall be eligible who, when the appointment falls to be made, shall have been licensed for more than twenty-five years, and who is not a graduate of a British University, preferential regard being had to those who have for some time been connected with a Continental University.

V. Appointments to this Lectureship not subject to the conditions in Section IV. may also from time to time, at the discretion of the Committee, be made from among eminent members of the Ministry of any of the Nonconformist Churches of Great Britain and Ireland, America, and the Colonies, or of the Protestant Evangelical Churches of the Continent.

VI. The Lecturer shall hold the appointment for three years.

VII. The number of Lectures to be delivered shall be left to the discretion of the Lecturer, except thus far, that in no case shall there be more than twelve or less than eight.

VIII. The Lectures shall be published at the Lecturer's own expense within one year after their delivery.

IX. The Lectures shall be delivered to the students of the Glasgow College of the United Free Church of Scotland.

XII. The Public shall be admitted to the Lectures.

RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE:
ITS NATURE AND TRUTH

RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE:

ITS NATURE AND TRUTH

BY

KENNETH EDWARD, M.A., D.Phil.

(THE KERR LECTURES)

Edinburgh: T. & T. CLARK, 38 George Street

1926

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY
MORRISON AND GIBB LIMITED

FOR

T. & T. CLARK, EDINBURGH

LONDON: SIMPKIN, MARSHALL, HAMILTON, KENT, AND CO. LIMITED

NEW YORK: CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS

73r

L.I.F.E. College Library
1100 Glendale Blvd.
Los Angeles, Calif. 90026

TO
M. B. L. E.

PREFACE

THE lectures contained in the present volume were delivered to the Glasgow College of the United Free Church, under the Kerr Lectureship Trust, in the winter of 1923. They are now published substantially in the form in which they were delivered, with the exception of Lecture III., in which I have gathered together the scattered references to Otto's work in the original course, and expanded the treatment of them in a separate lecture, which was therefore not delivered in its present form. In Lecture VII. I have adapted a few paragraphs from an unpublished thesis on Schleiermacher's Theory of Religion.

I have endeavoured to acknowledge my more direct debts in the text and footnotes. I should like especially to mention *The Philosophy of Religious Experience*, by Professor E. S. Waterhouse, which came into my hands just before the lectures were delivered, and in view of which I have in some points modified my treatment. In the revision of my work it has been of the very greatest help.

I gratefully acknowledge my indebtedness to the Rev. W. F. Boyd, B.D., D.Ph., of Melrose, for his help in the revision of the proofs, and I desire to thank the Rev. J. H. Leckie, D.D., Clerk of the Kerr Lectureship

Committee, for his kindly and helpful interest in the progress of the work. Nor can I refrain from expressing my grateful thanks to the Principal and Staff of the Glasgow College for their cordial welcome, and for much help and encouragement received from them during my visit to the College.

KENNETH EDWARD.

PEEBLES,
December 1925.

CONTENTS

LECTURE	PAGE
I. TOWARDS A DEFINITION	1
II. THE PLACE OF EMOTION	26
III. THE CATEGORY OF THE NUMINOUS	56
IV. THE RELIGIOUS SENTIMENT AND OTHER FACTORS IN DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE . .	95
V. THE INFLUENCE OF SUGGESTION	136
VI. THE FALLACY OF PSYCHOLOGISM	166
VII. RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE AND ITS VERIFICATION .	195
VIII. THE TASK OF THEOLOGY	224
INDEX	247

RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE: ITS NATURE AND TRUTH

LECTURE I

TOWARDS A DEFINITION

DURING the first quarter of the present century, a vast amount of work has been done in the psychological study of religion. James's Gifford Lectures on *The Varieties of Religious Experience* marked an epoch in the history of modern thought, and the direction and impetus imparted by that work to subsequent investigation are operative still. A vast literature upon the subject has grown up, both in book and periodical form—a literature so extensive, so varied, and so continuously expanding, that the individual student experiences difficulty in keeping pace with it. All this industry is to the good, and has already contributed in a marked degree to a better understanding of the nature of the peculiar experience of religion. Amid much conflict of opinion we can at least discern a certain clearing of the ground. Some definitions of religion which were possible last century, and which were offered and largely accepted then, are now no longer admissible. There has, I think, been a certain clarifying of conception with regard to the distinctive nature of religion, and its place in human life and experience.

But at the present time it is being increasingly felt

by many that the investigation must be carried a step further if it is to issue in a real understanding of religion. We owe a debt to the patience and enthusiasm of the psychologist, and we can honour that debt in no better way than by carrying with us the results of his labours, as we pass on to the consideration of questions which lie outwith the bounds of pure psychology. The modern science of psychology is one of the most powerful instruments of investigation yet devised, but just as we begin to use it with growing confidence and increasing comprehension, we are compelled to recognise more fully its instrumental nature. In the study of religion, while we cannot ignore the contribution of psychology, just as little can we accept its account as full and final. It has greatly aided our understanding of religion, but it has not answered, and cannot answer, our deepest questions concerning it. Psychology is a young science, and it is probable that its exponents have in the first flush of success in the thoroughgoing application of its methods to the religious consciousness sometimes tended to confuse rather than to elucidate the main issues, by transgressing the limits which are inevitably set for the science by the nature of its own method. For all the most important and engrossing questions regarding religion concern its truth. The religious consciousness itself invariably assumes the reality of the objects to which it refers, an assumption in which it is by no means uniformly followed by the psychologist of religion. So far as concerns pure psychology, this aspect of the matter is in the main immaterial. It cannot be wholly immaterial, for there is a distinct psychological difference between a consciousness which believes itself grounded in truth, and one which is content with the realm of fantasy. But psychology

has done its duty when it has admitted in evidence the fact that religion *believes* itself to be true, and has taken due cognisance of the bearings and consequences of that belief upon religious consciousness and behaviour. It does not undertake to discuss the fundamental question whether that belief can be justified.

Now it is just this further question which is again pressing upon the consciousness of our time. For a number of years the psychological point of view has been predominant. But the old questions will not be silenced, and again ultra-psychological considerations press themselves upon us. It is not too much to hope that the psychological investigations pursued for many years, and still going vigorously forward, may have contributed something to our understanding of religion which may help us as we resume the further quest. That further quest is rendered inevitable by the temper of the time, for it is thrusting itself ever more insistently upon the minds of thinking men. And the moment that quest is entered upon it becomes clear that the study requires to be carried a stage further than that at which psychology must lay it down. We admit that the psychological discussion is necessary; we deny that it is sufficient. In the light of the knowledge we have gained of the nature of the religious consciousness as a part of human experience, we are compelled to seek anew to construe that consciousness in another order lying outwith the scope of psychology. We are compelled to ask the question whether that consciousness may not bear the construction which religion has always put upon it, and which is bound up in the very nature of the consciousness itself, namely, that it bears a real objective reference, that it presents to us a world of spiritual reality with which it is our point of contact.

We cannot escape the question, suggested by the very nature of the religious consciousness which psychology displays, whether that consciousness may be not only a human experience, but a divine revelation as well.

It is in view of this necessity that I propose in these lectures to discuss :

Religious Experience : Its Nature and Truth.—It will be my endeavour in the first place to sum up the simple and leading facts which modern psychological discussion has brought into clear light concerning the general nature of religion, and then to pass to a discussion of the truth of religion—the witness which is borne by the distinctive religious experience to a world of reality with which it believes itself to be in communion.¹ In doing so, I shall endeavour especially to meet any objections to the possibility of such a trans-subjective reference which may seem to arise from within the psychological discussion. For the second part of our investigation is rendered all the more necessary by the fact that the limitations of the psychological method have not always been clearly recognised. It has sometimes been assumed that the psychological account of religion is a sufficient account, and that in proportion to its success it disposes of the necessity for any further interpretation of the religious experience. The fallacy of this assumption it will be one of our main objects to demonstrate.

The subject of our study, which I have endeavoured shortly to outline, is one which I conceive to be central to that group of studies which are cultivated in this place. It is one which is at the present time demanding and receiving a growing attention, and towards which

¹ Those lectures were delivered under the title of *The Nature of Religious Experience and the Validity of its Witness*.

every student of religion, theology, and philosophy must orientate his thought. If I can in any measure assist you in that endeavour, I shall have in the same measure achieved the object of this course.

It may be asked, What is the precise nature of the study? or, in other words, within what branch of theological investigation shall we be moving? I am afraid that its exact location within the theological encyclopædia is at present somewhat uncertain, and that not so much because of any vagueness in its frontiers, as because it marches with so many important fields of thought. It may perhaps best be described as a branch of the philosophy of religion; and, indeed, one issue of our study will, I hope to show, constitute a challenge to general philosophy to give a less restricted and grudging consideration than has sometimes been its wont to the deliverances of religious experience.

The close relation of our subject to Psychology is obvious enough, and the first part of our course will be largely of a psychological nature. The science of Psychology is still young enough to give interest and a sense of adventure to a psychological treatment of any aspect of experience—and the vast activity to which I have already referred is no cause for surprise. Nor will it seem strange to any one who has formed a just estimate of the importance of religion in the human story, that religion should have compelled the interest of the psychologist to a degree which is nothing short of a fascination. This activity is to be welcomed rather than feared by the friends of religion. The co-operation of the psychologist and the theologian is one that holds promise of fruitful results.

Again, our subject might be described as theological prolegomena, for its issues have a close bearing upon

many theological discussions, and indeed raise fundamental questions as to the nature and aims of theology itself, and the methods by which these aims may best be accomplished. And, lastly, it is from the point of view of the student of theology, of great *apologetic* interest. The storm-centre of Christian apologetics has moved somewhat of late. Not so long ago the battle raged along two fronts: the line formed by the attack of naturalistic philosophy, and that created by the disconcerting advance of literary and historical criticism. To-day the defence and vindication of Christian thought and practice finds its most vital questions urged upon it from these three directions—first, the challenge on psychological grounds to the validity of religion's interpretation of its own experience; second, the challenge to the validity and absoluteness of Christianity coming from the comparative and historical study of religions; and third, the threat to Christian ideals of life and conduct from the rise of a neo-Pagan standard of ethics. Upon the first of these our study bears directly; and, indeed, my main interest in what I shall have to put before you is to demonstrate that the place of religion in human life is as little shaken by the results of psychological science as it was at an earlier period by the seemingly threatening advances of astronomy, geology, and biology. Nor need I hesitate to state that in defending religion, it is the Christian religion which I have in mind. Religion reaches its height and culmination in Christianity, and I do not think it necessary, in any supposedly scientific interest, to conceal my conviction that it is because of the greatness of man's spiritual heritage in the Christian religion, that religion retains for us the significance which it undoubtedly does continue to hold, and compels the

interest of all serious-minded men. I do not hesitate to affirm that it is in very large measure because of the content of the Christian faith, the fine flower of the Christian life, and the great creations of the Christian spirit in the corporate life of mankind, that men of each new generation feel the incumbence of the task of vindicating religion to the thought of their time as bestowing upon man the greatest and most real of his possessions. I take no shame that my work is in the line of Christian *apologia*.

A precise definition of the terms "religion" and "religious experience" must not be looked for at the outset of our inquiry. In so far as we are to be engaged upon the study of the nature of religious experience, it is obvious that our investigation will be of the nature of a search for such a definition. All that can be offered in advance is such a preliminary definition as will satisfactorily delimit the range of experience which we shall admit for discussion. And it will be profitable also to consider at an early stage what *kind* of definition will be useful.

As the type of study in which we shall be engaged received its initial impetus very largely from Schleiermacher, it may not be out of place to make our starting-point a consideration of his well-known definition of religion. The early sections of his *Glaubenslehre* are a study of the nature of religious experience, and these sections are but a re-editing in more scientific language of the position already advanced in the early *Speeches on Religion*. In the *Glaubenslehre* his view is set forth in two leading propositions. They are as follows: "Religion" (Frömmigkeit, piety, inner religion, religious experience) . . . "in its essential nature is neither a form of knowledge nor a form of activity, but a deter-

mination of feeling or of immediate self-consciousness.”¹
 “The common element in all the varied utterances of religion, that which immediately differentiates it from all other feelings and constitutes the invariable essence of religion is that in it we are conscious of our absolute dependence, or in other words, of our relation with God.”²

It is difficult to say whether, in view of subsequent thought, we are more struck by the value or by the shortcoming of this description. As a definition it is in several ways open to criticism. In the first place, accepting the common tripartite division of conscious processes into thought, feeling, and will, it seeks to ground religion especially in one of those, namely, in feeling. This is what demarcates the religious sphere and gives it a characteristic place of its own; this is the *differentia* which defines religion and distinguishes it from all other human interests and activities. It is well to remember the immediate motive of this part of Schleiermacher's work. He delivers a vigorous polemic against the attitude of his time which would make religion either a branch of philosophy or a handmaid to ethics. Religion is not in any sense subsidiary. It is, in its essence, neither a scheme of thought nor a giver of sanctions to morality. It exists in its own right, reigns in a realm of its own, makes an independent claim upon the human spirit, and founds that claim upon no subservience to any end beyond its own. Hence the author's natural endeavour to sever it sharply from thought and will, and ground it in the remaining realm of feeling. And we must also remember that Schleiermacher expressly guards himself against the interpretation that the religious psychosis is one of isolated feeling. He is, of course, aware that a state of feeling

¹ *Glaubenslehre*, § 3.

² *Ibid.* § 4.

by itself is impossible, and as he further urges, it is the fact that thought and will are inextricably intermingled with the element of feeling in which religion lies, that enables religion to be unified with the rest of our spiritual life, and gives religion the influence and power over our whole life which it undoubtedly possesses.¹ Nevertheless, it is in the element of feeling that religion is distinctively grounded, and it is by virtue of that fact that it is an autonomous activity of the human spirit, separate in nature and end from those which are grounded in thought or will.

Even after the safeguards which Schleiermacher introduces have been allowed full value, however, it remains that this is an unsatisfactory psychological ground in which to seek for the basis of religion. It is at once too narrow and too wide. It is too wide, because if its foundation in feeling is the sufficient criterion whereby we judge whether a state of mind is religious or not, then every feeling should be religious in quality. This is not, as at first hearing it may sound, a frivolous objection. So great is its logical pressure against Schleiermacher's position that at one time he seriously held that all feelings which were not pathological were religious in character,² a logical and extreme position from which he again departed. But it is more important to point out that the ground is too narrow. To ground religion in a single mental function to the exclusion of all others is to assume that religion is of a simple nature. As a matter of fact it is exceedingly complex, and requires a very full psychological groundwork if it is to be adequately treated. There are indications throughout

¹ *Glaubenslehre*, Einl., §§ 3, 4.

² Namely, in the Second Edition of the *Reden*. Cf. *Reden*, Pünjer's Edition, p. 57.

Schleiermacher's work that the force of this objection has been felt. In the *Speeches* he departs, in the course of his treatment, from the single term "feeling" and associates with it another, and the combination "feeling and intuition" (*Gefühl und Anschauung*) is used almost as if it were a hyphenated compound term. Now "intuition," in whatever way we define that faculty and whatsoever place we assign to it in the contents of consciousness, manifestly has some sort of cognitive reference, and the author therefore indicates by his use of the term that he finds feeling by itself inadequate to describe the essential nature of religion. And if we turn to the later statement of the *Glaubenslehre*, we find the feeling of absolute dependence described alternatively as a feeling of our "relation with God." But the idea of God, thus surreptitiously introduced, is emphatically an idea. It is, psychologically considered, a highly developed and complex idea, the legacy to us of the accumulated experience and thought of ages. It is emphatically not a *datum* of feeling alone, nor an inference from feeling alone. Surely only the security of our tenure in the idea of God, the familiarity arising from the inevitable place of that idea in our universal view, could blind a philosopher and theologian of Schleiermacher's vigour of thought to the fact that such an idea is grounded in a very comprehensive experience, and can by no means be given in a pure feeling, however emotional be the consciousness which surrounds it. Schleiermacher simply cannot proceed with his exposition without drawing upon other elements of experience than those which pure feeling supplies. In fact, the search for the defining qualification of religion in any single mental function involves a false simplification, and the attempt to define religion by such a method is one which we must abandon.

Religion more than any other human concern engages the whole mind and the whole man. Schleiermacher would doubtless have agreed with this statement, but the criticism which I desire to make is that his definition is none the less incompatible with it.

It is partly for this reason that I have taken his definition as a starting-point. It is useful to have it made clear at the outset that it is an unfruitful method, leading to much confusion of thought, to attempt the definition of religion by delimiting it to any mental sphere, or any particular element of consciousness. It is a method which at first glance seems to be in line with modern tendencies, in that it is a psychological definition. But this is a specious recommendation, for it is evident that most of all for a psychological treatment of the subject the definition is inserviceable, for it surely *assumes* a proposition which it ought to be the concern of a psychological treatment either to establish or to refute. For a psychological discussion a preliminary definition will be of far greater usefulness which shall be stated in terms more real and concrete.

This is my main criticism of the definition before us, but it may not be out of place at this point to indicate further, that the *content* of religious experience is hardly exhausted in the sense of absolute dependence. It is of far richer content than that, as Schleiermacher's own exposition of the Christian faith abundantly demonstrates. If we stretch the meaning of the words somewhat, they may be made to serve, and this Schleiermacher perhaps desires to do when he equates the phrase with the more general one—"relation with God." But I cannot help feeling that there is at least a tendency in his use of the equation to narrow the latter phrase to the meaning of the former rather than to expand the former

to the meaning of the latter. I prefer the fuller and more general second alternative—"relation with God"—and I shall ask you to incorporate it in the provisional definition of religion which we shall adopt for the purpose of the present study.

It may seem that the foregoing is a somewhat destructive criticism of the effort which is recognised to be both the starting-point and the inspiration of most modern work upon the subject. What, then, is the positive contribution of Schleiermacher which makes his treatment classical, the abiding result surviving the criticism of method and detail to which we have seen that his discussion is open? It must be answered that Schleiermacher does achieve a great part of his main object, namely, the establishment of the autonomy of religion. His main interest was the independence and immediacy of religious experience. The subjectivity with which his conception is tainted is no essential part of it. It is against that strain of subjectivity that our criticism has been directed, but that criticism does not invalidate his contention for the immediacy of religious experience. It has been increasingly recognised since his time that religion in its true form is such an immediate experience as he stated it to be. All modern religious psychology treats it as such. And with this point of view has come a growing willingness to recognise that autonomy of religion for which he witnessed against the culture of his time. It is no longer possible to regard religion, in the way in which it was regarded by Schleiermacher's contemporaries, either as a branch of philosophy or as a handmaid to ethics. It does not require to look to an end extraneous to itself. Whether, with Schleiermacher, we look upon it as an essential part of human life or not, it is at least a distinctive part.

And the more clearly we recognise religion's autonomy the more readily shall we be inclined to take with Schleiermacher the further step of accepting it as an essential part of a complete human life. To recognise that religion occupies a place all its own in human life, not to be confused with that of philosophy, or ethics, or any other realm of spiritual experience, and finding no adequate substitute in any of these, is to draw very near to the recognition that it is an integral part of life, and that without it any life is incomplete. And I believe that it is largely due to Schleiermacher and the movement of thought which he inaugurated that such a view of the essential place of religion in life is now so much more generally accepted.

We must also recognise, even while we reject Schleiermacher's definition, that it points the way to the truth. More than that, it marks a great discovery. Those permanent contributions to the understanding of religion which we have just noted, are made possible by Schleiermacher's grasp of the nature of religion. The discovery which he has made and which his definition of religion shadows forth, is the discovery that religion is a concern which dwells in the deep places of man's being. It cannot be exhausted by any intellectual statement. It cannot be equated with morals or moral sanctions. It is vitally related to the intellectual and moral life, but it cannot be substituted by either, or both together, nor can it be completely expressed in their terms. There is an element in religion which has been emerging into ever clearer recognition since Schleiermacher's time, an element which we may term feeling, but for which a less restricted term is desirable. Modern psychology, following essentially in the footsteps of Schleiermacher, directs attention to that which it calls the non-rational

element in religion. So long as the specialised meaning of the word is kept in mind, we need not object to the term. The deepest things in human life—and the fundamentals of religion are surely among the deepest—are rooted beneath and beyond the intellect, in the instinctive and emotional nature which is the very groundwork of human life and experience. It is an error to seek to *confine* religion to this emotional element ; it is a discovery of the first magnitude to have realised how great a part it bears in the constitution of our religious experience.

We shall have to revert to this aspect of religion in our subsequent discussion, and I need not therefore dwell upon it here. But it is well to note that almost all the most fruitful discussion of the nature of religion from his day to our own is directly or indirectly inspired by Schleiermacher.

The discovery that religion furnishes its own values, distinct from and independent of those provided by the intellectual and moral life, was for Schleiermacher himself nothing short of a revelation. It dominated his thinking. It is, indeed, the outcome and the expression of his own deep religious experience, the depth and riches of which he knew to overflow and escape all intellectual statement. From within the deep piety into which he had been initiated in his sojourn with the Moravian Brotherhood, he had learned to appraise the barren intellectuality of his time. In the *Speeches on Religion* he burst upon the age of the *Aufklärung* rather as a prophet than as a theologian. In an age in which "enthusiasm" was a term of opprobrium, he summons the "cultured despisers" of religion to abandon the shallow rationalities which are their flimsy substitutes for true religion, and to accom-

pany him in a voyage of adventure—an exploration of the significance of simple piety. He would have them know that their conception of a religion in nature purely rational is a chimera of speculation, that it is strictly no religion at all. The falsity of that conception is, indeed, reflected in the whole philosophy of which it forms a part. It is a narrow intellectual schematism, which achieves an apparent completeness and sufficiency by leaving out of its reckoning all that is of deepest import.

The fallacy of intellectualism is perhaps inevitably the besetting sin of the philosopher, and though it may not be so dangerous in a time like the present, when thought tends to swing to the opposite extreme, and psychology is insisting with ever-increasing emphasis upon the predominant place of the non-rational in human life, we ought still to be on our guard against its dangers. Every thinker is essaying a paradoxical task. He is endeavouring to rationalise an experience which is, partly at least, non-rational. And while the necessity to rationalise our experience is insistent, we shall only escape the fallacy of intellectualism by continually carrying back the constructs of the intellect to the test of experience. Schleiermacher achieved his unique place in modern theology through a wonderful combination of great intellectual power with a singularly deep religious experience.¹

The influence of Schleiermacher is reflected in the fact that the whole meaning and content of the term “philosophy of religion” has changed. At one time

¹ One is reminded of the words of Denney: “If kings were philosophers or philosophers kings, we should have the ideal state, according to Plato. If evangelists were our theologians or theologians our evangelists, we should at least be nearer the ideal church.” Denney, *The Death of Christ*, Preface.

it was practically synonymous with a "natural theology" which was very largely in meaning and intention an intellectual substitute for religion. It was a *scheme of thought*, using terms indeed largely borrowed from religion, but seeking to establish by argument from extra-religious premises the reality of those quasi-religious objects for which it took these terms to stand. It essayed to prove the existence of God by ontological or cosmological arguments. It prided itself upon being grounded in Reason, which it deemed so much more secure a foundation than Faith. It was in no small degree responsible for the continuance of the antagonistic claims of Faith and Reason. The scheme of thought within which it moved was, therefore, very similar to that which Schleiermacher so vigorously combated. It was the lineal descendant of the Eighteenth Century Enlightenment. For under such a scheme it was not only possible but almost inevitable that Faith should come to be held a more primitive and lower stage than Reason, that Reason should be regarded as an emancipation from Faith, that the natural theology or "religious philosophy" which Reason built up should be expected, as culture advanced, to supersede the simple faith of the unlearned, until at last an edifice of metaphysic should occupy the site in Mansoul upon which the temple of religion once had stood. It should be obvious that at this point we emerge into absurdity. Metaphysics cannot supersede religion. A philosophy cannot act substitute for an experience. A theology exists by warrant of the religious faith which it endeavours to express.

And so we find that "philosophy of religion" has changed its denotation. It no longer essays the hopeless task of demonstrating the objects of religious faith from

premises which exclude them. The premises from which it starts, the materials with which it works, are those supplied by the religious consciousness itself. It makes philosophy instrumental to religion, to elicit religion's meaning and to discover its contribution to the spiritual heritage of man. It makes psychology and anthropology its servants, it lays history and biography under contribution, it searches the scriptures of the ancient faiths and reads with a new interest the diaries and confessions of the seekers after God from age to age. It endeavours to be a true philosophy of religion. Religion itself is its subject-matter, and the bringing of the objects of the religious world into focus with each other and with the rest of experience is its concern. I do not say that this point of view has been completely achieved or universally adopted, but it is becoming increasingly characteristic of contemporary religious philosophy, and represents an advance both in aim and method.

Now the movement of thought which is indicated by such a change finds its source in Schleiermacher. If religion be granted the autonomous place which he claimed for it, then it no longer exists on sufferance of a philosophy built upon the non-religious aspects of experience. And the autonomy in which he established religion is due to his discovery of the nature of religion. For while his limiting of religion to feeling may be held to be an accident, his positing of it as an immediate experience, unique, genuine, irreplaceable by any other, was a discovery and a liberation. That discovery does not stand or fall with those well-known portions of his thesis which we have found reason to criticise. And so, passing over his definition of religion as a mode of feeling, I am inclined to look to his incidental description of it as a "relation with God" as pointing to a less ambitious

but more adequate and truer definition. I should be content to describe the religious experience as *an experience of God and of our relationship with Him*. It is a less ambitious definition in that it does not seek, at the outset of investigation, to define religion by assigning it to any particular psychological ground, but rather by description of its essential content. I take that to be a sound method. A definition may be too abstract to be useful, and the fault is accentuated if the abstraction involved beg any question at issue. We must not delimit from without what the psychological place of religion shall be, and proceed to study it under the limitations we thus set upon it. We must accept it in the fulness of the concrete fact, and from study of that fact as it actually occurs, discover its psychological ground. To define it by its general content as I have suggested seems to me to be the first step in such an empirical method. In studying the nature of religious experience we shall be studying that part of our experience which is concerned with God and our relationship with Him, in studying the validity of its witness we shall search into the grounds we have for believing that experience to be truly transitive to reality, so that in it we enter into relationship with a source of spiritual life and power beyond ourselves.

I take it, too, that such a definition by content is truly scientific, inasmuch as it goes straight to the heart of that which differentiates its subject from all else. It is because of that with which it is occupied that religion possesses its peculiar quality. To many it seems, for instance, that religion is fundamentally a specific attitude towards life. But that attitude is the direct outcome of that with which it is concerned. The religious attitude is unique because we must needs take

up a distinctive attitude towards objects so entirely *sui generis* as those which engage us in religion. From the nature of those subjects springs the nature of religion, on those its distinctive characteristics depend. It is religion's concern with God that makes it what it is.

I have devoted some time to the definition of the term "religious." It may be suggested that the term "experience" does not stand without the need of definition. As experience is, for the individual experient, all-inclusive, it is not really definable. Yet experience as a term in practical use, assumes restricted and sometimes highly specialised senses. I confess that I am accustomed to use the term in a sense which is practically identical with "religious consciousness." I mean by religious experience, religion as a personal possession, an inward fact, as distinguished from its more outward, corporate, or institutional manifestations. I note, however, that there is a tendency to use the terms *religious consciousness* and *religious experience* as distinguishable terms, and I am glad to find in Mr. Thouless's recent *Introduction to the Psychology of Religion*, a book characterised throughout by great precision, a real attempt to make clear an often accepted distinction. "The religious consciousness is that part of religion which is present to the mind and is open to examination by introspection. It is the mental side of religious activity. *Religious experience* is a vaguer term used to describe the feeling element in the religious consciousness—the feelings which lead to religious belief or are the effects of religious behaviour." To make things yet clearer he goes on to give examples. "Examples of what is meant by *religious experience* are: The sense of the presence of God described by the mystics, which also is not very

uncommon amongst other people ; the feeling of peace after prayer or sacrament ; and the less intense, hardly perceptible, emotional undercurrent which accompanies ordinary religious life.”¹ This is excellently clear, and defines the author’s usage, and possibly a fairly general usage. It will be evident that it is not a usage which I intend to employ. It would be impossible to speak of religious experience as offering witness, valid or otherwise, if this meaning were accepted. “The feeling element in the religious consciousness—the emotional undercurrent which accompanies religious life”—these do not witness to anything but their own existence, and that of the experience which they accompany. They bear no witness to anything, beyond that experience. To them the predicate of validity is inapplicable. Nor do I see any very good reason why the wide and comprehensive term *experience* should be narrowed down to this highly specialised and restricted meaning. I may say that I select the term experience because of its breadth—because I require a term that should be not narrower but wider than “religious consciousness,” a term that should include the whole personal religious life, including its activities, its beliefs, its thoughts as well as its feelings. I wish to use the term as meaning simply “personal religion”—Schleiermacher’s *Frömmigkeit* in its fullest comprehension. A term of the kind is necessary. It fills a place which we require some term to fill. And it works usefully against the tendency to set up the deliverances of religious experience as in any way rivals to those of reasoned belief. Religious experience is no magical source of underived and unrelated knowledge. Its deliverances are as much subject to processes of verification as those of

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 5.

all other experience are, else it becomes completely subjective, and is liable to all the vagaries of individual caprice. I can discern, for example, no good reason for excluding religious thought from religious experience.

If this be held to blur a useful and necessary distinction, I would plead that we at least keep ever before us the close relation between religious thought and religious experience, and so frame our definition of the latter as not to sever the tie that binds the two together. Our religious experience to-day is conditioned not only by the thought of our time, but by the heritage of the thought as well as the experience of the past. Our distinction between experience and reflection upon experience is, after all, a mere utilitarian distinction. We must be on our guard against making it anything more. If experience determines thought, thought continually directs and remoulds experience, and in our own subject we must bear in mind these forms of religious experience in which reflection holds a prominent place. There is, in fact, no more characteristic and inevitable outcome of religion than theology. Every living religion theologises energetically. It is one of the surest signs of a vital religious experience. A living experience *believes*, and says so vigorously. The theologian's motto is: "I believed, and therefore have I spoken." Many speak glibly of *dead* theology, scarcely veiling the innuendo that theology must needs be dead. There are dead theologies, just as there are dead languages. Both are among the most precious *reliquiæ* in human possession, of a life that was. "Dead" is not synonymous with "inanimate." To be dead implies to have been alive. We hear much of dead creeds. To one who has the historical sense, the phrase sounds

curiously self-contradictory. *Credo* is one of the most vivid words in human speech. Dead creeds would cease to annoy us if we possessed the vigour of religious life which would produce a live creed of its own. Dead theologies would fall into their place, and that place not one of dishonour, if our religious experience, by its own *elan vital* should precipitate itself into reasoned expression. There is, I believe, that close connection between religion and theology which makes it impossible to study religion successfully without taking into account the influences of thought and belief. Nor can we leave out the religious activities—the whole realm of religious behaviour. General psychology now refuses to study experience as a thing apart from behaviour. We may well take the hint. Religion is conative through and through. It is a creative energy. You cannot study religious experience and refuse to mark what it does. We have not heard the last of the Epistle of James. "Faith, if it hath not works, is dead."

Hence I have elected to take "religious experience" not as indicating "the feelings which lead to religious belief, or are the effects of religious behaviour," but as a comprehensive term for the whole field of personal religion, including that belief and that behaviour, as well as the feelings, which are their accompaniment.

It may be asked, in conclusion, whether our definition covers all manifestations of religion. Can it be said that "an experience of God, and of our relationship with Him" is found in every religion? That is a question which is all-important and which deserves most careful study. It has, however, been discussed very pointedly in a recent work—*The Philosophy of Religious Experience*, by E. S. Waterhouse—and it is not necessary for

me here to do more than refer you to that writer's survey of the question. He raises the matter in connection with Durkheim's attempted definition of religion without any reference to sacred beings. "A religion," says Durkheim, "is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden, beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church all those who adhere to them."¹

After pointing out that the definition is particularly applicable neither to the earlier forms of religion in which in most instances it would be difficult to discover a "unified system of belief" or a "single moral community called a Church," nor to such a highly developed religion as Christianity, which could hardly be held to be concerned with "things set apart and forbidden," Waterhouse goes on to ask why the reference to sacred beings is omitted. Durkheim gives two reasons. First, "there are great religions from which the idea of gods or spirits is absent, or at least where it plays only a secondary and minor role." Second, even in religions where the idea of God or of gods is present, there are many rites which are completely independent of all idea of gods or spiritual beings, such as interdictions and cults in which the god is unnamed. With regard to the first reason, Waterhouse points out that the only three examples that can be quoted—Buddhism, Jainism, and the atheistic forms of Brahmanic philosophy—do not really support the contention. The last-named remain within Brahmanism and may therefore be discounted in any enumeration of atheistic religions, while the former two do not in practice carry out the atheism of

¹ *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, English trans., p. 47. Quoted by Waterhouse, *op. cit.* pp. 12-13.

their theory. Buddhism, in particular, has developed "largely by the addition of extraneous elements which supplied those religious characteristics that were lacking in the philosophical system the Buddha preached."¹ With regard to the second of Durkheim's reasons, Waterhouse argues with good reason that it is far more probable that rites which seem to be independent of all idea of spiritual beings, are in reality survivals from a more primitive time in which they were so connected, than that they are evidence of a religious cult existing without gods. These reasons seem, therefore, of far too little weight to set aside the universal evidence we have from all other forms of religion from highest to lowest, that some idea of gods or of God is central and essential to the religious experience.² I have gladly availed myself of the short but vigorous argument of Professor Waterhouse, of which the above is but a bare outline, as that argument seems to me to dispose of the most representative and outstanding example of the attempt to define religion without reference to God. I am glad also to find that Professor Waterhouse adopts a definition which is very close to that which I have proposed. "In the most general sense," he says, "religion is belief in a more-than-human order, and an attempt to establish harmonious relation with it."³ I have not used the term "belief," because I wished in the definition to avoid as far as possible identifying religion with any of its aspects, though I have endeavoured to make clear how essential an element belief provides in the total religious experience. And Waterhouse, in his definition, brings out clearly enough that religion is more than a belief, or system of beliefs; it has an all-important conative element, namely, "the attempt to

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 14.² *Cf. op. cit.* p. 15 ff.³ *Op. cit.* p. 16.

establish harmonious relations with " the power which is regarded as divine.

Our definition has one very obvious and practical advantage, in that while it covers religion at all stages of development and is therefore of scientific value as a general definition, it does so without encouraging any attempt to explain the higher in terms of the lower, for it gives scope for an ever-developing conception of God, and of the sort of relationship with Him which His worshippers will seek and find.

LECTURE II

THE PLACE OF EMOTION

I HAVE indicated in the first lecture that psychological considerations will demand a full proportion of our attention. Not only has religion become in our day a subject of thorough and specific psychological investigation, but there are also matters arising out of recent tendencies in general psychology, both in method and result, which have a determining influence upon any modern study of religion, and which demand our interest at the outset. We need not at this stage discuss the question whether the approach to religion from the point of view of general psychology has proved in every respect a fortunate one, or whether there are not, on the contrary, aspects of the peculiar nature of religion which tend to be obscured by this method of approach. Be that as it may, the work of the psychologist, viewing religion as one of the activities of man, entirely in line with the processes and experiences found outside it and essentially the same as they in its texture, must be closely reviewed, that we may observe the results he has obtained by working from this point of approach, and may endeavour to estimate the effect of these results upon our study, and the extent to which they truly display the real nature of the specifically religious experience.

I wish to refer in this connection to the study recently given to instinct in man, to the investigation

and grouping of the emotions and sentiments, to the attention bestowed upon suggestion, to the paramount place accorded to conation in human consciousness, and to the study of social and group psychology. The net result of most of this work is to emphasise anew the largeness of man's inheritance from his animal ancestry, and to show that the real motive forces of human life lie very deep in these primitive and elemental factors.

Let us consider first the prominence given in modern psychology to instinct and emotion, and before we proceed to discuss the matter in relation to religion let us examine shortly its bearing upon the study of experience and behaviour in general. Man's emotional and instinctive nature is found to be the deepest thing in him, and the prime factor in the origination of all his activities and interests. In this recognition psychology is perhaps departing from a long prejudice of philosophers, but it is not enunciating anything startlingly novel to common sense. The philosopher, regarding logical reason as the ideal ground of human thought and action, and indeed as the necessary ground of all belief that is to be true and all action that is to be right, tends to the conviction that human beliefs are, in fact, held, and human actions committed, exclusively upon grounds of reason, it may be good or bad, false or true. But worldly wisdom, natural shrewdness, and common sense have never lost sight of the powerful factors, apart from logical reason, which continually operate as motives of human conduct. The practical man, who has dealings with his fellows in many relationships, and who is called upon to estimate character and to judge action, soon learns to place these factors in the forefront of his consideration. No lawyer would characterise human life as a tissue of intelligence. It is, indeed,

probable that this difference of relative estimate is sufficient to account for the low esteem in which the philosopher has occasionally been held by the man of affairs, as a guide to the meaning of experience.

It is not to be denied that philosophers have always recognised that a hindering prejudice may cause the rejection of truth, even in the face of demonstrative proof. But there has existed a tendency to regard this prejudice as merely a contrary and inferior reason, a false opinion, and hence of similar intellectual constitution to the better reason which is advanced for its supersession. If this were a true account of it, then it ought to vanish with logical inevitability when confronted with the truth. The fact that it does not, should bring home to the intellectualist that at least *one* factor other than reason enters into the field of human motivation, namely, pure "cussedness." And the shallowness and inadequacy of such a conclusion should lead him further to question whether he has not from the first entertained a false conception of the nature of prejudice itself. Prejudice or bias may be much more than a mere false opinion, a habit of unthinking credence. It may be the sounding of an instinct more deeply rooted in human evolution than the intellect itself, the deliverance of an elemental emotion which logic cannot silence, philosophy sophisticate, nor reason drown. In every generation of history it is true that unreasoning prejudice has operated deplorably against the acceptance of new truth. But intellect itself is also not infallible, and there have been instances not a few in which an instinct-laden bias, unreasonable only in that it could not cast its full weight into the form of argument, has withstood the plausibility of a theory or practice, seemingly well-reasoned but incorporating a specious

and undiscovered fallacy, and has delivered men from the threatened dominion of an intellectual error.

The recognition of grounds of belief and motives of action which are of an unintellectual origin and nature, the admission that prejudice or bias may sometimes be of an entirely different character from the mere hard crust of intellectual convention which it often is, introduces us to a new range of considerations of the utmost importance. For among those ultra-intellectual grounds and motives there may be some that go very deep indeed. Instinct and emotion are, from the point of view of evolution, prior to intellect itself. They constitute an inheritance which, however it may have been modified by the supervening of a highly developed intellectual equipment, is one which we nevertheless derive from an animal ancestry, and share with the animal creation. It is, therefore, that part of human nature which lies deepest, and its operations are the most fundamental and most ineradicable element of our nature. They are the material of life's very foundation. The fact alone that they have survived, accompanying and underlying the supervening intellectual powers, woven inextricably into the web of all human experience, suggests, from an evolutionary point of view, that they possess a "survival value" of a nature which demands our earnest consideration when we come to survey our experience in our philosophy. We are not entitled to the assumption that they provide us with no point of contact with reality, and are irrelevant to our conception of the universe. The various kinds of philosophy which have from time to time been branded as intellectualistic have committed the fallacy of ignoring their existence.

Psychology itself had not always in the past been

free from a similar intellectualistic bias, and the liberating of the study from such a bias has been the most conspicuous achievement of the "new psychology" in its various forms. In nothing is this more marked than in its concern with the place of instinct and emotion in human life. For here is found a very large element of the "non-rational" which every surveyor of human nature must take into his reckoning. Here, as I have already hinted, the psychologist is but bringing into the clear light of investigation what the common sense of mankind has always recognised. We certainly are not always conscious of the extent to which our thoughts and actions are influenced by non-intellectual, emotional, or "sentimental" determinants, but we do recognise such determinants, at least in the conduct of others, in cases where the resulting course of action appears unreasonable, that is to say, when it comes into actual conflict with the course which reason would dictate as right or prudent. That is fundamentally what we mean when with a fatalistic shake of the head we say of some course of behaviour, "Ah! it is human nature." We imply that there are courses of action which are determined otherwise than rationally, and against which it may be very difficult to bring reason to bear in such a way as to inhibit or even to modify the intended action.

This is, of course, to take a case in which to the dispassionate observer there is a discrepancy between the course of action determined by impulse, and that which would be prescribed by reason, and it is common knowledge that examples are quite numerous. Apart from such cases, however, our action is very commonly prompted by non-intellectual motives, and is not observed to be so, because no such contradiction is set

up between instinctive and emotional impulse and that which reason would dictate. It is only in cases of such contradiction that the non-rational element becomes so conspicuous as to come to light. It is surprising, if not alarming, to one brought up in the rationalistic tradition of the older psychology, to find to what an extent our conduct and belief are motivated irrationally, and how little the worse they ordinarily are for the fact. The fact is hidden from us by reason of our habitual assumption—itself unreasoned—that, if a course of action is good, judged by our standards of goodness, it has necessarily been adopted by an act of deliberate and purposive adherence to those standards. Only if, for some reason, we condemn it, do we inquire at all particularly where its springs lie. If we agree with an opinion, we commonly assume it to be rationally grounded. If we differ from it, we search for the deflecting prejudice which has made it appear plausible to those who hold it. But in any case, whole tracts of our life are lived and whole blocks of opinion firmly held without conscious reference to reason at all, and the fact does not make the behaviour necessarily bad nor the opinions essentially false. Unreasoned action and belief are not *ipso facto* unreasonable. What recent psychology has made plain is that those non-intellectual factors are operative throughout, and are not exemplified only in beliefs which are logically unsound and actions which are ethically indefensible. So far indeed to the contrary, we occasionally find upon self-examination that the cases in which we do search for and produce an array of excellent reasons for any proposed course of action, are precisely the cases in which the contemplated action stands greatly in need of explanation both to ourselves and others. The action—though it may yet be inhibited or modified by the reasoning process—is

already being determined upon, the reasons are *ex post facto*. It is, as a general rule, only in case of conflict between duties or beliefs that we make serious and conscious reference to the judicature of reason. Instinct, emotional impulse, and sentiment control large areas of our life.

I have purposely stated the case strongly, and I am conscious that modifying factors come into the situation. One of these is, of course, that the emotion of wonder and the instinct of curiosity provide, from the very midst of those dynamic, instinctive, emotional forces whereby our activity is motived, an impulse towards explanation and discovery which is the prime motive of all intellectual effort. Paradoxically, but I think truly, stated there is among those "irrational" forces which move us to action, a motive to the exercise of reason. This conative factor is, indeed, the very foundation of the intellectual life.

This motive is, as we have seen, very often in abeyance, but it is not negligible. My reason for emphasising other factors, is that this one, so far from being neglected, has been, by what we may term a philosopher's fallacy, assumed to be continuous in its functioning. This, as we have seen, is very far from being the case. To come to a very practical consideration we have not time continually and completely to rationalise our conduct and our belief. We have to proceed by quicker and more primitive and, on the whole, more effective methods. James has a famous chapter on the mental wear and tear which is saved us by habit. Similarly instinct, emotion, and sentiment, guided by that for which I can find no better name than intuition—a suspect term to the meaning of which I shall revert later—save us from continual dependence upon the slower reason, and make

life practically possible. We must do more than think out courses of action, we must act. The same is true of belief. We must make up our minds.

But beyond all this, and the consideration is one of still greater importance, even where reason is in full operation, selecting, weighing, judging, its operation is rather directive than dynamic. It functions in close co-operation with the system of emotions, instincts, and sentiments which are so fundamental to our life. It restores the balance between competing motives, recalls emotion to the aid of threatened ends, selects ideals around which powerful sentiments may gather, and by whose power they may prevail. There is no such thing as a coldly and barely intellectual view. The man of science has his joys and triumphs, his glory in the discovery of truth, the excitements and disappointments of his quest, his pride in work well done.

Our existence is emotional through and through, compact of instinct and sentiment, and no part of our life—not our intellectual life itself—escapes the influence of these factors of consciousness. To read human life in terms of intellect alone is to do it violence. And, if those other elements are more primitive than intellect, linking our intellectually advanced age with earlier and less sophisticated times, and man himself with his pre-human ancestors, our recognition of the potency of those elements by no means compels us to a low view of man. It is one of the wonders of this study that it brings home to us the gradual sublimation of instinct and emotion to ever higher ends as they interact with reason in man's long growth and the upbuilding of his spiritual kingdom.

If instinct, emotion, and sentiment play so great a part in human consciousness and behaviour in general, it will require no demonstration that they are of funda-

mental importance when we turn to the study of an interest of the human spirit so deeply rooted as religion is. And two considerations, emerging from the foregoing discussion, will here demand our equal attention. On the one hand, we must give full value to those primitive but powerful factors of our consciousness which we may sum up here as the emotional life, realising without reserve the implications of our language when we claim for religion that it is among the "deepest" of human experiences. For all our "deep" experiences spring from those hidden wells of our conscious and unconscious psychical life. They are grounded in those elements of our being which in other connections we should unhesitatingly call primitive. We should be prepared to find, then, that the instinctive-emotional elements are not less but even more in evidence in our study of religious experience than they are in our survey of the general consciousness.

On the other hand, we must not allow this fact to cloud our observation of the part played by reason, in interaction with and modification of that large contribution of the non-intellectual factors. Instinct and emotion are not in the human what they are in the animal life. Nor do they remain, in the higher reaches of man's spiritual life, what they were in his first dim and unguided responses to the claim of the Unseen. The emotions have been immeasurably refined in the course of man's expanding and developing experience, and the instincts have suffered a change which makes their discovery and analysis in the consciousness of the more advanced religions a difficult and thorny task. These transformations have taken place in conjunction and in harmony with the development and refinement of man's religious conceptions and aims. As God is

more clearly and worthily revealed in human experience, man's entire response to that revelation is altered in conformity with it.¹ The "primitive" elements in the religious experience are not superseded, but as they are linked to ever higher conceptions they are "sublimated" to ever higher ends. The intellectual and imaginative powers are inextricably linked with the affective and conative in the entire process, guiding and refining the latter by providing them with and attaching them to those higher values which lend them a new nobility. Thus the rudimentary powers from which man can never shake himself free are transmuted in the higher spiritual life into a golden inheritance. They make life exceedingly complex and sometimes very difficult, but they make it also inexhaustibly rich.

Before passing on to the consideration of the place of instinct and emotion in the specifically religious consciousness it will be well to observe a little more closely the place given to those elements by modern psychology in the general consciousness. It seems to me that a great deal of useful and suggestive work here has been accomplished in the realm of general psychology, and students of religion must orientate their thoughts with regard to it. And as we study the subject along these general lines, we shall observe how factors emerge, the consideration of which is of the utmost importance to our conception of the religious consciousness. The best of this work has contributed substantially to a real understanding of human nature, and some of it conveys an impression of reality and vitality often absent from

¹ If any reader is unable to accept, at this stage, the concept of "revelation" (the discussion of which will be taken up at a later stage), he need not find the argument here invalidated by its use. The idea of a growing revelation is correlative to that of man's developing experience, and the latter is sufficient for our present purpose.

psychological analyses. These qualities are pre-eminently characteristic of such a work as Shand's epoch-making *Foundations of Character*, which is a determined effort to lay the foundations of a science of character upon a study of those fundamental forces which underlie it. McDougall's *Social Psychology* (which, as the author points out, is really of the nature of prolegomena to Social Psychology) is an illuminating discussion of the same fundamental forces, and its wide popularity can readily be understood in view of the unique degree in which the author combines an easy style, an interesting subject-matter, and a thoroughly scientific treatment.

I propose to adopt provisionally from the latter work McDougall's definition and enumeration of the instincts and emotions. An instinct is defined as "an inherited or innate psycho-physical disposition which determines its possessor to perceive, and to pay attention to, objects of a certain class, to experience an emotional excitement of a particular quality upon perceiving such an object, and to act in regard to it in a particular manner, or, at least, to experience an impulse to such action."¹ More generally, it is stated that the terms "instinct" and "instinctive" are used by the great majority of psychological writers "only to denote certain innate specific tendencies of the mind that are common to all members of any one species, racial characters that have been slowly evolved in the process of adaptation of species to their environment and that can be neither eradicated from the mental constitution of which they are innate elements nor acquired by individuals in the course of their lifetime."² The instincts and primary emotions are found to be so closely connected that they are

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 29.

² *Op. cit.* pp. 22-23.

enumerated together. An emotion is, in fact, the affective aspect of the working of an instinct. This involves a restriction in the use of the term emotion and the exclusion from his list of the primary emotions of certain affective states which have commonly been regarded as emotions, such as joy and sorrow, but the usage is one which proves, in the author's hands, of great service in bringing some order into a subject which has hitherto proved somewhat difficult to treat scientifically. McDougall then enumerates as the principal instincts and their corresponding primary emotions: the instinct of flight and the emotion of fear, the instinct of repulsion and the emotion of disgust, the instinct of curiosity and the emotion of wonder, the instinct of pugnacity and the emotion of anger, the instinct of self-abasement (or subjection) and of self-assertion (or self-display) and the emotions of subjection and elation (or negative and positive self-feeling), the parental instinct and tender emotion. He adds to this enumeration other four instincts of less well-defined emotional tendency, namely, the instinct of reproduction, the gregarious instinct, and the instincts of acquisition and of construction.¹

It is only, however, when we take account of the extraordinary complications which are introduced into the working of these instinctive processes in man in the course of intellectual development, their modification by experience and their adaptability to man's circumstances, that we perceive both the difficult and the rich possibilities of the subject as revealing to us some of the most essential factors of human experience itself. Apart from the considerations that those instinctive tendencies and reactions show themselves capable of being induced

¹ It is to be noted, however, that the list of instincts and emotions varies with almost every writer on the subject.

not only by "the natural and native excitants of the instinct, but also by ideas of such objects, and by perceptions and ideas of objects of others kinds," and that also "the bodily movements in which the instinct finds expression may be modified and complicated to an indefinitely great degree,"¹ two further and very far-reaching complications must be observed. In the first place, "owing to the complexity of the ideas which can bring the human instincts into play, it frequently happens that several instincts are simultaneously excited; when the several processes blend with various degrees of intimacy."² This blending of the instinctive processes with one another, involving the fusion of various primary emotions together, to form secondary or complex emotions, is of the utmost importance, as several of the complex emotions resulting from this process are among the most potent forces in man's psychical life. Some of man's highest spiritual powers are in part conditioned by their operation, and we shall observe in the sequel that they bear an important part in the religious consciousness. In the second place, "The instinctive tendencies become more or less systematically organised about certain objects or ideas."³ This seems to me to be one of the most fruitful discoveries of modern psychology, and one which furnishes us with a powerful instrument of construction in all our dealing with the complexities of man's emotional life. The resultant conjunction of certain ideas or objects with a group of emotional-conative tendencies is called a "sentiment." Whether we accept in full McDougall's treatment of the sentiment, or the somewhat different account of it given by Shand,⁴ who first introduced the conception into

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 32.

² *Op. cit.* p. 32.

³ *Op. cit.* p. 32.

⁴ A. F. Shand, *The Foundations of Character*.

psychology, we are bound to recognise that in some form it will be indispensable to all future constructive work in the psychology of man's emotional life. The close relation between the conception of the sentiment and that of the "complex" elaborated and effectively used by investigators of the psycho-analytic school in the treatment of morbid neuroses has been pointed out by McDougall,¹ and it is striking that conceptions so nearly identical should have been almost simultaneously arrived at and should have proved, each in its own sphere, indispensable. We shall take up consideration of the conception of the sentiment in a subsequent lecture. In the meantime, we shall turn to the process of fusion whereby the secondary or complex emotions are formed, and in doing so we may confine our survey to those emotions which have a prominent place in the religious consciousness, or are nearly related to the religious emotions.

The simplest emotion of this kind is *admiration*. When we examine it we are led at once to perceive that

¹ "I have been gratified to find that the workers of this important school, approaching psychological problems from the point of view of mental pathology, have independently arrived at a conception which is almost identical with my notion of the sentiment. This is the conception of the 'complex' which now occupies a position of great importance in psycho-analytic literature. Arrived at and still used mainly in the attempt to understand the processes at work in the minds of neurotic patients, it has been recognised by some recent writers on mental pathology (notably Dr. Barnard Hart) that the 'complex' or something very like it, is not a feature of mental structure confined to the minds of neurotic patients, and they are beginning to use the term in this wider sense as denoting those structural features of the normal mind which I have called sentiments. It would, I venture to suggest, contribute to the development of our psychological terminology, if it could be agreed to restrict the term 'complex' to those pathological or morbid sentiments in connection with which it was first used, and to use 'sentiment' as the wider, more general term to denote all those acquired conjunctions of ideas with emotional-conative tendencies or dispositions, the acquisition and operating of which play so great a part both in normal and morbid mental development." *Op. cit.* Preface to Fourteenth Edition, pp. viii-ix.

even the simplest of the complex emotions is exemplified only in a fairly high state of mental development. We reach a stage in the emotional life which is characteristically human. While, therefore, the instinctive-emotional life of man is continuous with that of the animals, in its more complex reaches it transcends the latter. It is not alone in the possession of intellect that man excels the brute. Within the emotional life itself there are complexities and refinements which clearly mark the human consciousness. McDougall analyses admiration into a compound of the two primary emotions of wonder and of submission or negative self-feeling,¹ an analysis which will be generally confirmed by introspection and observation. He calls attention also to the important and interesting consideration in this connection that the latter of those two emotions, that of negative self-feeling, is essentially social, and its presence in the complex emotion of admiration imparts the social reference into the latter emotion. He contends that in admiring a work of art, or an impersonal product of skill, such as a machine, there is always some reference in the mind to its creator. What, then, of admiration which is called forth by natural objects? Here, the author holds, as no known person is called to mind as the object of our admiration, we are led by the personal and social character of our emotion to postulate a creator of the object which calls it forth. "Hence in all ages the admiration of men for natural objects has led them to personify the power, or powers, that have brought those objects into being, either as super-human beings who have created, and who preside over, particular classes of objects, or as a supreme Creator of all things; and, if the intellect rejects all such con-

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 129.


ceptions as anthropomorphic survivals from a ruder age, the admiration of natural objects still leads men to personify, under the name of Nature, the power that has produced them." ¹

If the relevance of much of the foregoing discussion to the specifically religious experience has not been immediately obvious, the bearing of the present matter upon our subject will at least be plain. For we have here, arising out of a general discussion of one of the simplest of the secondary emotions by an author whose attitude towards religion is at most neutral, considerations having a most important bearing upon our view of the genesis and nature of religion. Indeed, so much is founded upon the statement of the social character of the emotion, that with an author less careful of statement we should have been tempted to question whether he had given due consideration to the implications of the argument. For, drawn out in full, the argument surely amounts to this, that the emotion of admiration evoked by natural objects, being of a social character, demands a personal reference. It produces the same general feeling of personality in the background which belongs to the emotion when evoked by the works of man. This stimulates the imagination to postulate such a personality, and the idea of God or of gods arises. The argument raises more questions than it answers, and perhaps it is unfair to press it too hard, as it is not put forward as a complete account of the genesis of the idea of the superhuman. But it does make a very large claim for the part played by emotion not only in religious experience in general, but also in the genesis of religious *ideas*. The root idea of religion is God, and if that idea is produced by the imagination in response to the

¹ *Op. cit.* pp. 130-131.

demand of a social instinct-emotion for a missing person to which to attach itself, the fact is certainly important and will demand our attentive consideration in the sequel.

In the meantime let us follow the further complications of the emotions. The object of our admiration may be of a mysterious or threatening nature, such as to excite fear in addition to the emotions already conjoined in admiration. We then have the emotion of *awe*, in its "many shades, ranging from that in which admiration is but slightly tinged with fear to that in which fear is but slightly tinged with admiration. Admiration is, then, a binary compound, awe a tertiary compound."¹ Still further complication arises when the object of awe is regarded as also beneficent. Awe then becomes compounded with gratitude—itself a binary compound of tender emotion and negative self-feeling—and *reverence* is produced. Reverence, McDougall declares rightly to be "the religious emotion *par excellence*." Few human powers are capable of exciting it, and those human beings who inspire it usually do so in so far as they are regarded as "ministers and dispensers of Divine power." It may be of service to schematise the very highly complex religious emotion of reverence, according to this analysis, as follows :



It will not be necessary for us to follow the subject into the analysis of the other complex emotions. There are many others which might be enumerated, but their

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 131.

treatment in detail belongs to general psychology. Those already mentioned will serve to show the lines of analysis, and they help us in our particular task, as they are, of all the complex emotions, those most nearly connected with, and those most characteristic of the religious life. It is true that others of the complex emotions, such as joy, sorrow, shame, resentment, pity, and so on, may enter into the highly complex religious experience in various proportions. But it will not be necessary for that reason to examine them in particular. Their presence in the religious psychoses simply points to the closeness of religion to the other various interests of human life, and also emphasises anew the fact that the psychological constituents of the religious life are not in the main diverse in kind from that of the general consciousness.

The latter consideration is one that becomes more and more obvious the more carefully and fully we study religion on the psychological side. It must be clear, for example, from the foregoing treatment of the primary and the complex emotions, that those which lie at the basis of religion are continuous with the entire general emotional life. So far as its emotional tone is concerned, there is no element which is unique in the religious experience, unless we regard reverence as being so, and reverence is regarded as a complex of primary emotions exemplified in many types of consciousness besides the religious. This fortifies the conclusion we reached in the first lecture that the presence of emotion does not in itself constitute the differentiating characteristic of religion. And it is doubtful if the highly complex emotion of reverence can be held to be characteristic of religion except in its more highly-developed forms. Indeed, it could scarcely be experienced except as the

accompaniment of a conceptual consciousness of some degree of elaboration. The idea of God must be somewhat fully developed, as McDougall notes, before such an emotional response could be evoked.¹

Now this plain fact, that the instinctive-emotional element exemplified in the religious consciousness is in no way unique, in the sense that it must be psychologically explicable in terms of known mental function, is one which we must bear in mind in our religious discussions, if we would avoid expressions which confuse ourselves and discredit those discussions before the scientific mind. The term "religious instinct," for example, is certainly not new. In time past, it has occasionally been used to indicate some sort of unique faculty, exemplified only in religion, for which large powers have been claimed. Indeed, the supposed existence of such an instinct has sometimes been held to place the facts of religious experience outside further discussion or criticism, and to entrench religion itself beyond the reach of intellectual assault. It is a position which will not be so readily advanced to-day, when all special faculties invoked for special purposes are suspect, but something akin to it, perhaps more or less modified or disguised, is not even yet unknown in the popular treatments of the subject. It cannot be too clearly laid down that any such conception belongs to an entire mental outlook which the modern mind can no longer receive. The attempted defence of religion which has

¹ "The history of religion seems to show us the gradual genesis of this highly complex emotion. Primitive religion seems to have kept separate the superhuman objects of its component emotions, the terrible or awe-inspiring powers on the one hand, the kindly beneficent powers that inspired gratitude on the other. And it was not until religious doctrine had undergone a long evolution that, by a process of syncretism or fusion, it achieved all the elements of the complex emotion of reverence." *Op. cit.* p. 135.

been founded upon it, falls with the assumption upon which it is based. The universal distribution of religion has naturally led to the belief that it must be founded in man's instinctive nature. That inference is in the main correct, as our discussion so far goes to show. But we have also seen that the connection of religion with that instinctive life is a far more profound and complicated one than is set forth by the theory we are now reviewing. According to that theory religion is founded in a *special* instinct, exemplified only in the phenomena of religious experience, and assuredly in no way kin with the instincts we share with the animals. On the contrary, it is a peculiar endowment of man's higher nature, distinguishing him more than aught else from all lower creations. Modern psychology has no place for the conception of such a peculiar instinct. Indeed, the theory requires an entirely different definition of instinct from any which is used in psychology or which the psychologist could possibly accept. The instincts which psychology recognises are those which are common to the whole field of our life, and are indeed, in their primary elements, shared with the animal creation. The instincts and their accompanying emotions, it is true, reach a complication and variety in man which far surpasses that of their beginnings in the more elementary psychical forms, and are especially greatly modified, and indeed transformed, in the higher reaches of our life, but they are not different in kind wherever they are formed. If we are to speak of religious instincts, therefore, we are to seek them among those instincts which we recognise as common constituents of human life, or rather let us say we shall find in the constitution of our religious experience those emotions which we have already recognised as the conscious

centre of human instincts. And, when we go back to the concrete fact of religious experience, as we decided at the outset to do, and examine and analyse it in the light of our growing knowledge of human nature, we do find clearly recognisable emotions playing a great part in it. In the consciousness of God, and of a whole world of sacred objects therewith connected, we discern the features of some of those human emotions which we have encountered in our survey. These may not exhaust that consciousness, but they take their part in its constitution.

Another line of approach to the subject, much used of late in conjunction with the psychological, is the historical. The study of the elemental emotions of religion has been helped and forwarded by a corresponding study of the early and simple forms of religion. Such a study may be of great use in helping us to observe and analyse religious experience. It shows us that experience in its simple, primitive forms, and enables us to recognise its processes in some respects more clearly than we can in more complex manifestations. It is impossible here to enter at all adequately into such an enormous field of investigation, or to summarise, however scantily, its results.¹ But one cannot but be struck by the coincidence of many of the results of such study with the results of the psychological analysis. The characteristic emotions we have already seen to be so closely connected with religion, are observed in operation from the first, and are seen to be main determinants in religious evolution.

The old saying that fear made the gods is, like all

¹ Some of the considerations arising from this field of study have been summarised and skilfully used by E. S. Waterhouse in his *Philosophy of Religious Experience*, a work which must be read by every serious student of the subject. Cf. Part I. A., Sections I.-IV.

sweeping statements of the kind, only very partially true. But we have already observed the place of awe and of reverence in the religious consciousness, and of these complex emotions into which fear enters as a constituent, there may be very various forms, according as fear is more or less predominant. When we study religion historically, we find that the results of our investigation very largely corroborate those reached by the psychologist. And I think it may be taken as established, that in many of the more primitive forms of religion the emotion called forth by the religious objects approximates very closely to simple fear. It is probable that even in the most primitive forms, the emotion is a complex one in which wonder has a place as well as fear, and therefore that the emotion of awe is present from the beginning, else the characteristically religious attitude of *approach* to the supernatural being—the beginnings of worship—could not appear. Fear is the emotion which corresponds to the instinct of *flight*—not of approach—and were fear entirely dominant the religious attitude would not yet be present. That attitude would seem to require that some degree of wonder be superadded to fear, that in the resultant psychosis the flight-instinct pure and simple be so far inhibited that the desire and the effort to enter into some sort of relationship with the sacred powers should be established. It would be more near the truth in that case to say that wonder made the gods, as it would appear that only when wonder supervenes upon fear can the characteristically religious attitude be constituted. Nevertheless, there may be many stages or grades of a complex like wonder, varying from states in which wonder greatly predominates over fear to stages in which fear almost overshadows wonder, and probably

in many primitive forms of religion fear does hold a very marked place.

But we have to note that we are here dealing not only with a statement concerning religion when it is actually in being, but also with a theory of its origin. Such a statement as that "fear made the gods" not only finds fear to be characteristic of man's attitude toward his divine beings, but assigns to fear a creative place in the mental state which gives rise to the conception of such beings. Here, again, we find psychology and the history of religion, at least in the theories formed by many of their exponents to account for the facts, corroborating one another. On the other hand, I have already drawn attention to a statement of McDougall's which amounts to the assertion that admiration made the gods. Each theory points to a partial truth, and indicates an element which has entered into human religion and borne a part in the creation of the religious attitude. And every such statement but serves to emphasise how impossible it is to attribute that creation to any one such simple factor of human consciousness. But in the meantime let us note that the two attempts indicated by the one and the other of these two statements, though attributing the rise of religion to two entirely different emotions, do coincide in their general attitude toward the question. They each attribute the origin of religious ideas—of primitive conceptions of deity or of supernatural beings—to the presence in the human mind of certain fairly simple emotions evoked by natural phenomena of an unusual kind. They not only assert these emotions to be present in man's attitude towards supernatural powers, they assert that these emotions being present in man's consciousness of the world about him, and evoked by some of the objects he encounters in that world, do

actually in some way cause him to create for himself the ideas of supernatural beings and powers to account for those objects of fear and admiration.

It can, indeed, hardly be doubted that awe before certain manifestations of natural power is a large factor in the awakening and development of the idea of divine beings. The unusual, the supernatural in man's experience perhaps evokes first fear, then awe, and the latter emotion, enfolding in it wonder, awakens thought and imagination, and powers are invoked beyond the overt inexplicable happenings of the natural world, as an explanation of their occurrence, though how the mind leaps to just this idea of a supernatural power the theory does not explain. It seems, too, as if from the first, the aim and purpose of religion were practical, namely, to establish those harmonious relations with the divine beings which shall make life safe in the midst of its mystery, and in the face of its threatening aspects. Thus belief in divine beings and an endeavour to get into right relations with them are present in religion from the first, and they are called out by man's feeling of necessity in the face of all that is mysterious and fearful in the world in which he lives. But it can hardly be assumed straight away that any such derivation of religion from natural emotions of fear, wonder, awe, and the like, gives a complete account of the matter. Current psychology and history of religion tend to regard the derivation as complete, but while we recognise the light which such studies have thrown upon the investigation of religious experience, we reserve a fuller treatment of the fundamental question involved to the next lecture, in which it will be considered in the light of a rival theory of religious origins.

Now the student of the history of religion is com-

mitted to the attempt, if he is to look upon his task as more than a mere enumeration of observations—a simple natural history of religion—to give some explanation of the rise of man's religious ideas. And, moreover, his attitude as a scientist binds him to what we may call a natural explanation of such origins. He is dealing with a field of human experience and behaviour, and his co-ordination of the facts must be completed within that field. We can perceive, then, why at this point he becomes a psychologist. He seeks to display the religious life of primitive man as his reaction to certain features of his environment, and his religious ideas as the product of that reaction. We may, still keeping within the limits of scientific study, criticise any given attempted explanation, such as those indicated above, as being inadequate to the complexity of the facts—a criticism which I should certainly be disposed to advance. But that does not affect the principle of explanation. Within its own “universe of discourse” its relevance and its usefulness are established.

It will, however, be necessary to revert to the matter again at a later stage, in considering how the question of the truth or validity of religion is affected by such explanations of the origin of its characteristic ideas. Here other considerations come into view, and must be dealt with. In the meantime, it is sufficient that we observe, and especially necessary, if our main interest be religious rather than scientific, to bear in mind that there is nothing surprising in the fact that the scientific student of the history of religion should attempt a natural explanation of the origin of the supernatural, nor anything necessarily calamitous for faith in the event of his effort proving successful. For the truth of religion is a further question, which remains uncompromised

by the scientific historian's previous essay in genetic explanation.

In thinking of the contribution of the history of religion we ought also to notice, as an element to be reckoned with not only in the early stages of religious development where it is very conspicuous, but throughout the course of religious history, the very strongly marked social character of religion. In primitive forms, religion is closely related to, and indeed inextricably bound up with, tribal custom and morality. This is but part of the larger fact that primitive culture, compared with later forms, is, as we should expect, very largely undifferentiated. We can, for purposes of clearness and utility, mark off and define religion, morality, science, art, and so on, as separate though related fields of experience. We must, however, bear in mind that these various activities are not yet differentiated in the more primitive stages of human culture. The account already given, for instance, of the rise of conceptions of the divine, reveals a stage of development, in which science and religion are not yet distinguished from one another. The gods are, partly at least, an explanation of otherwise inexplicable phenomena. I feel convinced that, even in the earliest stages, they are more than that, but they are also that. And the *deus ex machina* was a long-enduring device. It was comparatively late in the story that the scientist discovered that within his own sphere he had "no need for the hypothesis" of God. The scientific and religious activities of man were only gradually disentangled from one another. They spring from a common root in the wonder which inspires both religious desire and scientific curiosity. And, similarly, we note here that religion and morality were in their beginnings inextricably bound up with one another.

Family and tribal duty were religious in their nature and sanctions. Religion itself was tribal. It was not until a comparatively late stage of religious and ethical development that the obligations of religion or morality were recognised as extending beyond the limits of the tribe. Universality is a late growth. One of the greatest studies in the entire history of man's religion is the growth of universality within the period of the Old Testament. Religion, because of this early and long-continued connection with tribal custom and morality has always been among the conservative forces of history. Its sanctions and its sanctities have helped to create and to preserve the hard crust of custom and convention both in creed and practice. No serious student of history, however, finds himself able to join in the general senseless railing against such convention and tradition, as if it were an undiluted curse. Such railing is itself in our day a conventional fashion, and is probably in the main a mark not so much of native stupidity as of arrested education in those who practise it. In any case, it finds little countenance in history. How the gains of any period of culture could have been otherwise consolidated and conserved than by their crystallisation in creed and custom it is difficult to perceive. And the power of sacred sanctions as such a conservative force in human affairs has been an incalculable gain—a force indeed in the absence of which the story of the spiritual pilgrimage of mankind would never have required to be written. No man can write the history of chaos.

The beneficence of this conservative element in religion has, of course, come to be so often misprized because of the repeated conflicts with the spirit of progress in which it has involved religion. Each new

age has had to dethrone the reigning customs and creeds. "Time" has "made ancient good uncouth." And the sacred sanctions of religion have on every such occasion been arrayed in all their panoply of power on the side of the old against the new. But religion cannot be simply condemned out of hand because of this conflict. For the conflict takes place within religion itself, which must ever take new birth with the dawn of each new age. There is another and equally characteristic feature of religion, which has constituted it again and again the champion of young liberties and hopes. It contains an individual as well as a social element. We have seen that religion is a social phenomenon from the earliest times, and it is that feature which has bound it up from the first with social custom and usage. But the individualistic element must also have appeared very early in its course, else progress in religious conceptions could never have begun. Such progress has always sprung from the presence of individual initiative and spiritual originality within the religious community itself. The conflict between the forces of progress and retrogression is not a simple contest between religion and an ultra-religious enlightenment, else religion would have died when progress won its first battle. Most especially is this true of the earlier stages of the conflict, when there was no power or party outside the religious community from which the impulse to progress could have come. The conflict must needs be within the religious community, for there was no community outside the tribal religion. But even in later stages the contention still holds. Over and over again emancipation in every sphere of human life has taken its inspiration from religion, and religion has also from time to time successfully incorporated elements of

progress pressed upon it from the direction of other human interests and activities.

It is, moreover, this characteristic of religion rather than the former which calls for our attention in a study of religious experience. For experience is personal and individual, and its study brings these factors into prominence. It is impossible to ignore the other aspect, for so much of the environment and, indeed, the very material of personal religion is socially conditioned and mediated that we can give no coherent account of personal religious experience unless we allow due place to the consideration of the social factors. In religious as in general psychology we recognise more and more clearly that we can attain no true results by regarding the individual as a self-contained unit. Religion is a social phenomenon simply because human life is social life. But religion is also one of the greatest influences tending to liberate the powers of the individual spirit, and our further study of religious experience will amply show its inward and personal character.

In these latter considerations we have, of course, departed somewhat from the study of the purely emotional element in religion, and indeed it is impossible for long to retain any single element of consciousness, least of all the emotional, in isolation from the others. And the matter is one which is at least closely bound up with the emotional life, and which also strikingly exhibits the confluence of the two lines of study arising from psychological and historical investigations. It is of value, however, that we should thus early see that however large and influential be the place we accord to emotion in religion, the latter can no more than any other spiritual activity of mankind be regarded as purely emotional. The relation of emotional to cog-

nitive and intellectual factors falls for later consideration. Meantime we pass, in the next lecture, from matters arising out of modern investigations in general psychology which we have seen to have a fundamental bearing upon religion, to the consideration of a recent study of the specifically religious consciousness which is of the utmost interest and importance for our inquiry into the nature of religious emotion.

LECTURE III

THE CATEGORY OF THE NUMINOUS

DR. RUDOLPH OTTO'S book entitled *Das Heilige* is probably at once the most significant and the most provocative work on religion which has appeared in our generation.¹ It will be well to consider its argument at this stage, as it is closely related to those aspects of our subject reviewed in the last lecture, though approaching the subject of religious emotion from an entirely different angle, and reaching results widely different, at least in their points of emphasis. The author sets out from much the same starting-point as we found to be thrust upon our attention by the main trends of modern psychology, the distinction, namely, between rational and non-rational elements² in the content of our religious experience. He draws attention in the first place to the rational element in our religious ideas, taking as his example the Theistic conception of God, and safeguards himself in his entire subsequent argument from many misunderstandings which might otherwise naturally arise from his treatment of the subject, by his emphatic declaration of the real and essential place

¹ R. Otto, *Das Heilige*, Breslau, 1917. An excellent English translation has been made by Mr. John W. Harvey, from the Ninth German Edition. *The Idea of the Holy*, Oxford Univ. Press, 1923.

² "Rational" and "non-rational" are here used in their psychological sense, in which "rational" is equivalent to "conceptual." Otto in his first chapter defines his meaning so. Cf. also an amusing paragraph on the confusions of usage current with regard to the term. *The Idea of the Holy*, p. 60.

of such conceptual knowledge in religion.¹ We necessarily predicate of God such attributes as Reason, Purpose, Goodwill, Selfhood, and others of a like nature, and these attributes constitute concepts—they can be grasped and defined by the intellect. But “so far are those ‘rational’ attributes from exhausting the idea of deity, that they in fact imply a non-rational or supra-rational Subject of which they are predicates.”² These attributes are, he holds, predicated of a Subject which “in its deeper essence is not, nor indeed can be, comprehended in them; which rather requires comprehension of a quite different kind.”³ This error of supposing the essential nature of deity to be given in its attributes he regards as widespread and misleading, and it points us to the real *differentia* between Rationalism and vital religion. His work is an attempt to apprehend and bring into the light the essential and non-rational element in the idea of the divine, and this he endeavours to do with respect to the category of the holy or the sacred. The holy is a “category of interpretation and valuation peculiar to the sphere of religion.”⁴ Like the fundamental category of æsthetics—the beautiful—it is inexpressible and incommunicable because it cannot be rendered in concepts. It is the fundamental, non-rational element in religious experience. It is thus evident that the author is using the term “holy” in a specialised sense, quite distinct from the meaning usually

¹ “We count this the very mark and criterion of a religion’s high rank and superior value—that it should have no lack of *conceptions* about God; that it should admit knowledge—the knowledge that comes by faith—of the transcendent in terms of conceptual thought. . . . Christianity not only possesses such conceptions, but possesses them in unique clarity and abundance, and this is, though not the sole or even the chief, yet a very real sign of its superiority over religions of other forms, and at other levels. This must be asserted at the outset and with the most positive emphasis.” *The Idea of the Holy*, p. 1.

² *Op. cit.* p. 2.

³ *Op. cit.* p. 2.

⁴ *Op. cit.* p. 5.

conveyed by the term in general, and even in ordinary theological usage. It is, indeed, a main part of his endeavour, to point out that the ordinary usage, which takes "holy" as meaning "absolutely good" ethically, employs the word "holy" in a derivative sense which is, in fact, a late acquisition to its meaning, and in contradistinction to that general usage it is his purpose to indicate and isolate its prior and essential significance. Even within the ethical usage we feel that there is something more intended by the term than simply moral perfection—a "clear overplus of meaning" which is indeed the original and characteristic element in that meaning, which we must strive to isolate. This elementary meaning of the term, standing as we have seen for a "moment" which cannot be conceptualised, we need not be surprised to find negatively described rather than positively defined. We receive hints of its meaning in the very recital of the more ancient words, of which "holy" is our translation—*ἅγιος*, *sanctus*, *sacer*, and above all the Hebrew *qādōsh*. Indeed, it is familiar to the Old Testament student, who would reject the rendering of *qādōsh* by "good" as a mistranslation.¹ However, if the holy cannot be defined it can be suggested, and the better to do so the author coins a word for the category which it represents, and calls it the category of the *numinous*.² He speaks of a "'numinous' category of value" and of a "'numinous' state of mind which is always found wherever the category is applied." This mental state is primary, elementary, unique, and irreducible to any other.

¹ Cf. A. B. Davidson, *The Called of God*, p. 192.

² From Latin, *numen*. "Omen has given us *ominous*, and there is no reason why from *numen* we should not similarly form a word '*numinous*.'" *Op. cit.* p. 7. The usage is a happy one, and would seem to supply a want. It has, in fact, already met with a considerable measure of acceptance.

It is perhaps a little disconcerting, after this strong assertion of the primary and irreducible character of the numinous experience, to find the immediately following chapter entitled "The Elements of the 'Numinous'"—to find, in fact, a series of chapters devoted to the elucidation of these various elements. But let us follow the analysis. We are asked to exercise our introspection in the discovery of the various elements in question. We are invited to take such a state of mind as that of solemn worship, for example, and to direct our attention to those features which are unique in it, rather than those which it bears in common with other states which more or less resemble it. Such feelings as those of "gratitude, trust, love, reliance, humble submission, and dedication" which are met with in the worship-experience, the author rejects as being also met with elsewhere, and constituting no part of the special and incomparable feeling-content of the experience of worship. The first element which he finds to mark the latter experience as unique is that which Schleiermacher isolated and named "the feeling of dependence." But both the name given and the treatment accorded to it by Schleiermacher, our author regards as open to criticism. The name used may cause the unique feeling of religious dependence to be confused with the purely natural feeling of dependence, which may arise in other connections, such, for instance, as being determined by circumstances and environment. These natural feelings may serve as an indication and analogy to the religious feeling, but the latter is quite distinct from them. Again Schleiermacher further confuses matters by making the distinction between the feeling of religious dependence and other feelings of dependence merely a distinction between feelings of "absolute" and

“relative” dependence—a difference of degree only, whereas it is actually a difference of intrinsic quality. Schleiermacher, in Otto’s view, has failed to realise that in using the name “feeling of dependence” he has used only a natural analogy to indicate a distinctive religious experience—a practice full of danger and confusion until the merely analogical and approximate nature of the term be fully recognised. Otto cites as an example of the feeling the words of Abraham on the occasion of his pleading with God for the men of Sodom: “Behold now, I have taken upon me to speak unto the Lord, which am but dust and ashes.”¹ “There,” he says, “you have a self-confessed ‘feeling of dependence,’ which is yet at the same time far more than, and something other than, *merely* a feeling of dependence.” He proposes to rename it *creature-consciousness*, or creature-feeling. “It is the emotion of a creature, abased and overwhelmed by its own nothingness in contrast to that which is supreme above all creatures.”²

Now, in dealing with the psychological questions raised by this argument we cannot fail to recognise the extreme difficulty of the effort required in making the fine discriminations involved, and in arriving at an assured conviction with regard to the author’s main contention. It seems to me that that contention resolves itself into the claim that this creature-feeling takes its place among the primary human emotions. How are we to determine its status in this respect? Otto regards his claim as immediately attested by introspection into the state of mind in question. In criticising Schleiermacher’s distinction between religious and other feelings of dependence he says: “What he overlooks is that, in giving the feeling the name ‘feeling of

¹ Gen. xviii. 27.

² *Op. cit.* p. 10.

dependence' at all, we are really employing what is no more than a very close analogy. Any one who compares and contrasts the two states of mind introspectively will find out, I think, what I mean. *It cannot be expressed by means of anything else, just because it is so primary and elementary a datum in our psychical life, and therefore only definable through itself.*"¹ It is with some diffidence that one questions the confidently expressed finding of a psychologist so gifted with the power of introspective observation as Otto undoubtedly is. But the analysis of emotional states is admittedly a difficult field, and a highly complex and derivative emotional state may often have so unique and unde-rived a "feeling" as to disguise its complex nature. The emotion of "awe," for instance, is one which has a highly peculiar feeling, entirely unlike any other state, and certainly so different in subjective tone from pure fear that it might quite well be taken for a unique and distinctive constituent of consciousness. But we have already seen good reason to accept its derivation from the primary emotions of fear, subjection, and wonder. And when we encounter an emotional state such as creature-feeling, which in every feature and in every circumstance of its arising predisposes us to find in it a complex product of our emotional life, we must pause before accepting an account of it which makes it so primary and elementary as to be "definable" only "through itself."

In the first place, there is a strong presumption against the discovery of any primary emotion which comes into existence comparatively late in the development of consciousness, so late indeed, according to the hypothesis, as on the emergence of religious relations and the

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 9. Italics mine.

formation of religious ideas. Late-appearing emotions are complex, unless they are but old primaries reappearing in a new connection and perhaps renamed. In the second place, this emotion of creature-feeling if it is "something more" than a mere feeling of dependence is surely already declared to be complex. The "natural feeling of dependence" is, of course, nothing other than the primary emotion of subjection which was enumerated with the other primary emotions in our last lecture. The whole question for the determination of the nature of creature-feeling, then, seems to be: What is the "something more"? For it is quite possible to regard the emotion of creature-feeling as a peculiarly religious state—a complex emotion in which simple subjection or negative self-feeling is combined with some other distinctive emotion. The line of thought represented by Otto contends for a specific "numinous feeling" which gives to the religious experience its distinctive tone. In contrast to the school represented by McDougall it would hold that the "natural" emotions of subjection, fear, wonder, awe, etc., are distinct from the "religious" emotions of subjection, fear, wonder, and awe, and are not to be reduced to the latter. Religion, that is to say, cannot be analysed in the terms merely of natural emotion. We must recognise that Otto's work states a position which is contradictory to that of the current psychology in this matter. Indeed, a great part of the significance and importance of his work consists in the challenge which it issues to the naturalistic account of religious experience which psychology has hitherto given.

It will be well, therefore, before further considering the question of the nature of creature-feeling as an emotion pure and simple, to pursue Otto's discussion of it in

a second and even more important objection which he raises to Schleiermacher's formulation of the matter. According to Schleiermacher's theory the religious emotion of dependence is, our author finds, "merely a category of self-valuation, in the sense of self-depreciation." From this particular sort of self-consciousness, a feeling of self in a certain relation, we must pass, in Schleiermacher's account of the matter, in an indirect way to the fact of God. This fundamental fact of the religious consciousness is, therefore, reached by some sort of inference. We find God by reasoning to a cause beyond ourselves to account for the feeling of dependence. "This," Otto contends, "is entirely opposed to the psychological facts of the case." This criticism, of course, traverses not only Schleiermacher's statement, but also all such accounts of the origin of religion and of religious ideas as those dealt with in our last lecture, which find such ideas to arise from man's fear, or admiration, or wonder before natural objects. The radical nature of the contention thus becomes obvious. All such accounts of religious genesis seek to explain the rise of religious ideas and feelings in terms of the emotions aroused before natural phenomena of some kind, particularly such as evoke feelings of wonder, or fear, or are in some way regarded as mysterious. Otto holds such a naturalistic account to be incomplete and misleading. There is something present in the religious consciousness which is not enumerated among its alleged natural antecedents and constituents. On this view the current psychological account, no less than that of Schleiermacher, unduly subjectifies religion, making the idea of the divine a deduction of some sort from the emotional states called forth by natural objects.

Let us revert, for instance, to the account casually

given by McDougall of the place in the evolution of religion taken by the emotion of admiration of natural objects, an account referred to in our last lecture. I take the example as typical of a general tendency. The emotion of admiration, McDougall states, being of a social character, demands a personal reference. It evokes a general feeling of a personal agent in the background, and tends to the positing of such an agent, comparable to the human agent who is present to the mind when admiration is felt for some of the works of man. Thus the idea of God arises. Now such a process is, of course, not one of complete and formal inference. It is rather one of association. But the principle is the same. If the human mind does not *infer* the divine, in this case, it at least "jumps to the conclusion" of divine beings, or a divine being. God is reached, it may be, by a leap of the imagination. But the point is that the idea is subjectively produced from the emotional state. Now it might be contended that this account makes too many easy assumptions. It might be argued, for instance, that the invariably social character of admiration requires to be much more closely scrutinised and much more firmly established before such a far-reaching conclusion is founded upon it. And, again, objection might be taken to the enumeration of admiration as a characteristic religious emotion at all. But the attack of Otto upon the position is much more radical than those. He contends that by no such process of natural transition can you ever constitute the religious consciousness. There is an element in that consciousness which this account of its origin simply fails to observe.

Or take again the very similar theory, also mentioned in the previous lecture as arising from both the psycho-

logical and historical line of investigation, that religion is a resultant of the feelings of fear, wonder, and awe awakened in primitive man by the fearsome and inexplicable in nature. Powers are invoked to account for the latter, and the idea of gods finds birth. Here, again, the idea of the divine is a conclusion, and the origin of religion a subjective process. Again Otto's theory is in opposition, positing an element in religion which is here ignored. He regards all such reaching out for a cause of subjective emotional states as an entirely insufficient ground for religion. He does not in the passage in question discuss such accounts of the matter as I have here instanced, but his criticism of Schleiermacher's leap from the subjective feeling of dependence to the objective idea of God, condemns in principle all such attempts at explanation. What, then, is the factor which has been overlooked, which constitutes the typically religious experience ?

In Otto's own words it is stated thus : " Rather, the ' creature-feeling ' is itself a first subjective concomitant and effect of another feeling-element, which casts it like a shadow, *but which in itself indubitably has immediate and primary reference to an object outside the self.*"¹ This is the cardinal position of the author. This " object " is none other than the " numinous," and we are to mark that while the numinous experience is of a highly emotional character it contains a definitely *cognitive* element. It contains an objective *datum*. It is, therefore, a form of *perception*. The numen is felt as objective and outside the self.

Over against the current psychological account of religion, this position is revolutionary. It constitutes a challenge alike to the conclusions of the whole American

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 10. Italics mine.

school of religious psychology from Hall and James to Leuba and Pratt, and to those of the current general and social psychology in its dealing with religion, as exemplified in McDougall. It demands a definitely religious factor for the adequate treatment of religion, irreducible to and underivative from the contents of the non-religious consciousness.

Otto has a very important footnote in which he quotes a passage from James which is strikingly confirmatory of his position, and is all the more remarkable as coming from a psychologist who in the main employs the method of analysis which Otto criticises. James, in speaking of the origin of the Greek representations of the gods, says : " As regards the origin of the Greek gods, we need not at present seek an opinion. But the whole array of our instances leads to a conclusion something like this : It is as if there were in the human consciousness *a sense of reality, a feeling of objective presence, a perception* of what we may call '*something there,*' more deep and more general than any of the special and particular 'senses' by which the current psychology supposes existent realities to be originally revealed."¹ This is, in fact, a full admission by this writer of a distinctively religious content, a presentation of a simple and primitive character, the presence of which constitutes and distinguishes the specifically religious experience. Although James makes no use of it, and although it is opposed to his main theory, he asserts here under a safeguarding " as if " the existence of a general, objective apprehension which is identical in principle with Otto's numinous element. And if James's phrases seem a trifle nebulous and vague, we have already seen that the numinous is

¹ James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 58. Quoted by Otto, *op. cit.* p. 11. The italics are James's own.

in the nature of the case as incapable of precise description in terms of anything not itself as any other simple and original *given* must be, and to me it is doubtful whether the vague terms of James—"a sense of reality," "a feeling of objective presence," "a perception of something there"—may not better serve to indicate the existence and nature of this "moment" of consciousness than the more elaborately developed analogies of Otto himself.

It is this apprehension which is simple and primary, and it is not necessary to maintain, as Otto tends to do, that the various emotions which are associated with the numinous one are also primary and underived from similar emotions aroused by the non-numinous. The primary nature of the numinous perception itself is all that is required for his theory. It is in this way only that we can resolve the contradiction already noticed between his strong assertion of the primary nature of the numinous and his subsequent treatment of the "elements" in the numinous. That treatment, in fact, consists of an enumeration and description of certain emotional states within which the numinous can be detected as an element, to which in fact it gives rise.

It does not seem to me that this claim regarding a definitely religious factor in consciousness, is necessarily contradictory of the contention which has been stated in an earlier lecture that psychology must deal with religion in terms of the elements of consciousness known to it. For the claim advanced is not a claim to any preternatural gift, incommensurate with the factors of consciousness which psychology recognises. Psychology recognises, as a matter of course, states of mind which are cognitive or afferent in character. The numinous state is claimed to be such a cognitive state. It is claimed

to be a state of immediate apprehension. Its content is entirely distinctive and is, therefore, apprehended in a distinctive way, with a feeling which characterises it alone and which is recognisable though naturally not describable in terms of any other content of consciousness. Hence the insistence throughout Otto's work of the "unspeakable" nature of the numinous experience, an insistence echoed in every mystic. It is to be hoped that the continual reference to it as incommunicable and ineffable may not produce an unwarranted opposition to its acceptance. Whether Otto's account of the matter succeeds in establishing itself or not, this is not a score on which it ought to be condemned. Every simple apprehension is unspeakable. All the ultimate data of experience, even the sensory data, are unspeakable and incommunicable in terms of anything else. It is quite as impossible to describe "green" to a man born blind, as to convey the sense of the numinous to one who has not experienced it.

Let us revert now to our attempted analysis of the "creature-feeling" which Otto finds characteristic of the numinous experience. He declares it to be "something more" than mere dependence or subjection. Is this "something more" not simply the apprehension of the numen itself, which being an apprehension of a unique and underivative kind has its own peculiar and intimate feeling, a feeling which is incorporated into the emotions which it evokes, giving them their distinctive quality? I find difficulties in Otto's treatment of the religious emotions which, it seems to me, would be removed by the consideration that the distinctive element in such emotions, the factor which makes the difference in feeling between natural fear, awe, wonder, for instance, and the religious counterparts of these natural emotions,

is simply the tone which they receive from the distinctive quality of the numinous element itself. Otto, in his anxiety to convey by analogies that which cannot be communicated directly, has run the risk of having the numinous element itself misunderstood, confounded with its analogies, and dismissed as itself a complex of natural emotions.

Let us now follow the author into his treatment of some of these determinate emotional states in which the numinous apprehension is reflected. "The deepest and most fundamental element in all strong and sincerely felt religious emotion" is one which he characterises as *mysterium tremendum*.¹ This he proceeds to analyse, taking the adjective first. "Tremor" is, in the first instance, simply the natural emotion of fear. But here, Otto contends again, as in the case of creature-feeling, it means in the religious connection, "a quite specific kind of emotional response." It is analogous to natural fear, but quite distinct from it. A great deal is made of this peculiar religious fear as a mark of the presence of the numinous. Some languages, the author points out, have certain words which are peculiarly charged with this type of emotional connotation. He instances, among other examples,² the English words "awe," "awful," which approximate closely to the required meaning. "Awe" he equates with "religious dread." Its antecedent stage is "dæmonic dread," and a per-

¹ *Op. cit.* cap. iv. The author is fond of a Latin nomenclature which may be irritating to some readers, but which is doubtless intended to isolate his definitive terms from confusing usages and associations in ordinary language and particularly from "natural" or non-religious applications.

² Hebrew, *higdîsh* ("hallow") for example. Cf. also the *emâh* of Yahweh ("fear of God"), and the *δῆϊμα πανικόν* of the Greeks. The early Christians, it is pointed out, could not allow that the title *σεβαστός* (*augustus*) could fittingly be applied to any human being, even to an emperor. Also English "aghast."

verted off-shoot of it is the "dread of ghosts." "It first begins to stir in the feeling of 'something uncanny,' 'eerie,' or 'weird.' It is this feeling which, emerging in the mind of primeval man, forms the starting-point for the entire religious development in history. 'Dæmons' and 'gods' alike spring from this root, and all the products of 'mythological apperception' or 'fantasy' are nothing but different modes in which it has been objectified." ¹

We fail to understand the full significance of this derivation of all ideas of gods and dæmons from the stirring of religious dread in the soul of early man, unless we perceive that it is a rival and entirely different account from that which is intended when the same ideas are derived from the fears aroused by natural objects. Natural phenomena may indeed be their occasion, but Otto can see no way across from purely natural fear to the idea of god or dæmon, with the entirely unique feeling with which these ideas are accompanied. All such naturalistic explanations of the rise of such ideas seem to him wholly inadequate to account for the rise of the peculiar experience in question. He clearly differentiates his theory from the similar but really contradictory theory that "fear (of natural phenomena) made the gods," and from any theory which would ground religion, as so many students of comparative religion have done, in animism. Religion is grounded in the immediate apprehension of the peculiar "numinous" something, which itself gives rise to the peculiar emotion of "religious dread" in which its apprehension is embedded. "All ostensible explanations," he says, "of the origin of religion in terms of animism or magic or folk psychology are doomed from the outset to wander astray and miss the

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 15.

real goal of their inquiry, unless they recognise this fact of our nature—primary, unique, underivable from anything else—to be the basic factor and the basic impulse underlying the entire process of religious evolution.”¹

The analysis of Otto has certainly a great deal to commend it to the minds of all inquirers who feel, as he feels so strongly, that there is something missing in the account of religious experience rendered by the current psychology and by animistic and naturalistic accounts of the genesis of religion. And that something is felt to be just the feature which constitutes religion what it is. There is something lacking to make these theories even an adequate analysis or a complete explanation of the facts. Were the gods nothing else but man's early attempt to explain the inexplicable happenings of his world, and the counterpart of his natural fears of those happenings, the idea of the divine would have passed away with the resolution of those fears and the natural explanation of those seemingly strange phenomena. We spoke, in the last lecture, of a time when science and religion had not yet become differentiated from one another, when the religious ideas of mankind served also as his explanation of the unwonted and otherwise inexplicable. Such a time there was, because those ideas of supernatural powers did serve as explanations of the kind implied. But man's ideas of gods or dæmons, we may hold in accordance with Otto's account of them, while they were that, were also and were primarily something more than that. In leaping from the strange events of nature and the natural fears which they aroused to the idea of divine powers behind them, the naturalistic theory gives no explanation of how it was that man everywhere made substantially the

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 15.

same inference or leapt to the same conclusion. Otto's theory offers the missing step. The ideas of gods did not, according to his account of the matter, originate as explanations at all, nor did they spring in some unaccountable way from the fears aroused by the inexplicable; they originated in a perception, vague perhaps but powerfully felt, of a "something there," of something beyond sense, which, once grasped and differentiated and envisaged as god or dæmon, became afterwards, in some sort, an explanation of the unwonted and strange. This numinous element, which Otto's analysis unveils, has still perhaps to establish itself as an authentic element of experience, and only through study and investigation of the whole field in the light of it can it be so established. But it cannot be too strongly stated at the present stage that the alternative and more usual analysis leaves one with an impression of inadequacy which Otto's theory does much to meet.

It will be well, before passing from this part of the subject, to consider Otto's use of the emotion of "awe" as compared with the account of it given by a psychologist like McDougall. There was, of course, in McDougall's analysis of that emotion, referred to in the last lecture, no hint of anything corresponding to the numinous in Otto's work. Yet Otto quotes it as a word which is, to some extent at least, numinously charged. McDougall regards it as a compound of the ordinary primary emotions of fear, subjection, and wonder. Otto does not state his attitude toward such an analysis. But he tends to regard the emotion as distinctly religious. He speaks of "religious dread" or "awe," seemingly equating awe to dread, plus a specific numinous element. McDougall's analysis is a useful one, and ought, I think, to be retained as fully descriptive of an emotion perfectly

recognisable and not necessarily of a religious nature. If we accept this, what is the *differentia* of religious awe? Is it not, analogously with our analysis of creature-feeling, this same emotion of awe tinged or toned by the peculiar feeling-content of the numinous perception itself? It is simply awe in its contact and fusion with that experienced element of the numinous, which is charged with that feeling of the "uncanny" or mysterious which gives its feeling tone to the whole psychosis.

On one point Otto speaks with great decision. The distinction between natural and religious dread is not one merely of degree. "Any one who is capable of more precise introspection must recognise that the distinction between such a 'dread' and natural fear is not simply one of degree and intensity. The awe or dread *may* indeed be so overpoweringly great that it seems to penetrate to the very marrow, making the man's hair bristle and his limbs quake. But it may also steal upon him almost unobserved as the gentlest of agitations, a mere fleeting shadow passing across his mood. It has, therefore, nothing to do with intensity, and no natural fear passes over into it merely by being intensified. I may be beyond all measure afraid and terrified without there being even a trace of the feeling of uncanniness in my emotion."¹

The feeling of "dæmonic dread," and probably that of the "uncanny" or "eerie," are characteristic of the cruder and more primitive forms of the numinous experience; but, as Otto points out, they are not entirely superseded at later stages of development by the more refined and highly developed forms of that experience. The cruder forms may break through in something of their original power. And not only so, but even in

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 16.

those more highly developed forms themselves, this element of numinous dread remains, characterising the experience in all its forms from lowest to highest. It becomes ennobled and refined to a marvellous degree in the highest worship, where it appears as a quality of exaltedness before which the worshipper prostrates himself in awe, and it then evokes that creature-feeling to which we have already adverted. It appears in this form in the "Holy, holy, holy" of Christian worship, and finds expression in all hymns and prayers of adoration. In no sense, then, is this quality of the awe-inspiring superseded even in the highest and purest worship, rather does it remain throughout one of the most characteristic and unmistakable marks of the essentially religious attitude.

There are two further elements or "moments" which the author discovers in the numinous experience, and which take their place in his explication of the *tremendum*. The first he calls "*majestas*," a sense of "overpoweringness," closely related with the sense of creaturehood already mentioned, and strongly marked in the self-depreciation of the mystic before the transcendent, and the second is the element of *urgency* or *energy* in the numinous, a feeling of the vitality, power, and activity of the divine, features which "are typical and recur again and again from the dæmonic level up to the idea of the 'living God.'" Again, as in the "moments" already analysed, these emotional states may well prove, on analysis, to be more complex than they seem, but this will hardly affect their status as experiences in which the numinous perception is embedded and which receive their characteristic quality from its presence. With regard to the latter of the two, the author finds in the feeling of "energy" the

nerve of the religious man's refusal of the "philosophic" God of rational speculation. His God is a living God, and he will not be put off with a concept. The religious idea of God is rooted in this non-rational, numinous *datum* of the specifically religious consciousness, and however useful rationalising concepts may be in seeking to explicate its content, they cannot pass as substitutes for its essential and immediate quality.¹

So far, the author has been endeavouring to elucidate the import of the adjective in his original phrase *mysterium tremendum*. Now he turns to the more difficult substantive idea, *mysterium*. One has the sense that the author is here labouring under considerable difficulty to find suitable expressions to suggest his meaning. He is, of course, fully aware that in seeking to convey a conscious datum which is of the simple, underivative kind which he claims for this, it is only by a method of analogy and suggestion that he can succeed. In the first place, he requires a word to convey or suggest the mental reaction peculiar to the perception of the genuine *mysterium*. He finds the appropriate word in "stupor." *Stupor* is different from *tremor*. "It signifies blank wonder, an astonishment that strikes us dumb, amazement absolute."² We may again recall here McDougall's

¹ "For their part the philosophers have condemned those expressions of the energy of the numen, whenever they are brought on the scene, as sheer anthropomorphism. In so far as their opponents have for the most part themselves failed to recognise that the terms they have borrowed from the sphere of human conative and effective life have merely value as analogies, the philosophers are right to condemn them. But they are wrong, in so far as, this error notwithstanding, those terms stood for a genuine aspect of the divine nature—its non-rational aspect—a due consciousness of which served to protect religion itself from being 'rationalised' away." *Op. cit.* pp. 23–24.

² *Op. cit.* p. 26. The author acknowledges that "stupor," like the other terms he is compelled to use, is strictly applicable only to a "natural" state of mind, and can here be used only analogically. He elucidates the connotation of stupor by citing also the Greek words *θαμβος* and *θαμβεῖν*,

analysis of awe, which he considered a constituent of religious emotion, into fear, subjection, and wonder. As we encountered the first two again in the tremor or dread and in the creature-feeling of Otto's analysis of the element signified by *tremendum*, now we meet with a counterpart of the third in the stupor which is equated with blank wonder. At the same time, though the phrases quoted above, "blank wonder," "astonishment that strikes us dumb," "amazement absolute," seem to indicate an *excessive degree* or extreme intensity of the emotion of wonder, the author's intention is to indicate (just as in the similar case of *awe* or *dread* already treated) an emotional state which is not only different in intensity, but different in quality from "natural" or non-numinous stupor or amazement. And he would hold equally in this case as in the former that the one cannot pass over into the other. He allows that by association this peculiar feeling may attach itself to or be indirectly aroused by objects which are already of a puzzling or astounding character upon the "natural" plane, but here, he strongly contends, we have a case of association between things essentially different. By no process of transmutation or enhancement can the one pass into the other. McDougall's analysis, therefore, though it has points of contact and resemblance with Otto's, is really opposed to it. No complex of "natural" emotions would be held by the latter writer to yield the religious.

Turning from the nature of the mental reaction peculiar to the reception of the *mysterium*, to the latter category itself, the author states its essential nature to be—in its religious use—"the 'wholly other'

and by allusion to Mark x. 32. ("And Jesus went before them; and they were amazed [*καὶ ἐθαμβοῦντο*]; and as they followed, they were afraid.")

(θάύρον, *anyad*, *alienum*).” It is “that which is quite beyond the sphere of the usual, the intelligible, and the familiar, which therefore falls quite outside the limits of the ‘canny’ (*heimlich*), and is contrasted with it, filling the mind with blank wonder and astonishment.”¹ The purely “natural” meaning of the mysterious is that which is not comprehended or explained—the inexplicable—and though something of that purely negative significance may cling to the words in which the author seeks to lead us, by suggestion, to the religious use of the word, he nevertheless wishes to bring out the positive nature of this experience of the “wholly other.” And here he regards himself as more fortunately circumstanced than in some other parts of his endeavour, inasmuch as the word “mysterious,” though employed in a natural and negative usage, has still something of the numinous feeling clinging to it and surrounding it. It would seem, indeed, to be not so much a natural word which we have to bend to a new purpose in the exposition of the numinous, as a numinous word which has come to be employed in natural usages. That negative meaning conveys nothing of the positive content of the feeling. The author insists, it seems to me none too strongly, on this positive quality of the actually experienced mystery. We can only *state* mystery in negatives—the numinous sense of mystery, the apprehension of something “other” than ourselves in quality, belonging to a different world of reality, is intensely and completely positive. I do not think there is any point upon which a careful and unprejudiced introspection will more clearly and unmistakably bear out the author’s contention than this. The mysterious, negative as it may be in conceptual expression, is, in the act and fact of being experienced,

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 26.

full of positive quality. So clear and outstanding is this deliverance of introspection to myself that I should be inclined to place it in the very forefront of the exposition and let it bear a considerable part of the weight of Otto's entire construction of the religious consciousness. I should be inclined to set forth the numinous element in experience as *the direct and positive perception of the mysterious*.

Here, again, Otto's analysis comes into conflict with and definitely negatives any attempt to explain religion as arising from man's observation of the mysterious in the sense of the merely inexplicable. As we have already seen, religion may have served man in early days to all the explanation he sought or required of the inexplicable and unwonted, but if it did so that was a very secondary aspect of it. And had this been all, it would have passed away as knowledge grew and natural explanations were forthcoming. Some thinkers, holding some such view of religion, have contended that it should have passed away, that it belongs to the infancy of the human race, that its day has gone by. But religion continues to live, as an independent interest and activity, with a standing in its own right, because it is grounded in a positive basal experience.

Similarly, the author definitely rejects the derivation of religion from Animism, in words which are so elucidative of his entire position that I take the liberty of quoting them at some length. "What is really characteristic of this (the earliest) stage is *not*—as the theory of Animism would have us believe—that men are here concerned with curious entities, called 'souls' or 'spirits,' which happen to be invisible. Representations of spirits and similar conceptions are rather one and all early modes of 'rationalising' a precedent experience,

to which they are subsidiary. They are attempts in some way or other, it little matters how, to guess the riddle it propounds, and their effect is at the same time always to weaken and deaden the experience itself. They are the source from which springs, not religion, but the rationalisation of religion, which often ends by constructing such a massive structure of theory and such a plausible fabric of interpretation, that the 'mystery' is frankly excluded. Both imaginative 'Myth,' when developed into a system, and intellectual Scholasticism, when worked out to its completion, are methods by which the fundamental fact of religious experience is, as it were, simply rolled out so thin and flat as to be finally eliminated altogether.

"Even on the lowest level of religious development the essential characteristic is, therefore, to be sought elsewhere than in the appearance of 'spirit' representations. It lies rather, we repeat, in a peculiar 'moment' of consciousness, to wit, the *stupor* before something 'wholly other,' whether such an other be named 'spirit' or 'dæmon' or 'deva,' or be left without any name. Nor does it make any difference in this respect whether, to interpret and preserve their apprehension of this 'other,' men coin original imagery of their own or adapt imaginations drawn from the world of legend, the fabrications of fancy, apart from and prior to any stirrings of dæmonic dread."¹

The positive character of the original impression and feeling of the mysterious is pursued into its characteristic appearances in Mysticism. Mysticism reveals a tendency to over-stress the non-rational elements in religion which we have been reviewing. So here, it emphasises to the last degree the contrast noted between the numen as "wholly other," and ordinary experience,

¹ *Op. cit.* pp. 26-27.

until it sets the former over against all Being, as simply *nothing*. This nothing is simply the limiting conception of the "wholly other"; it is the opposite of everything that is. At the same time, this is not the pure negative in Mystical feeling that it is in conceptional expression. It remains in the former a vivid positive, which the mystics have continually sought to convey in their confessions, while acknowledging and indeed protesting that its essence is ineffable. The same positive element of feeling-content which is present in the "nothingness" of the Western mystic is manifest also in the "void" and "emptiness" of the Buddhist mystics. These words, "nothing," "void," "emptiness" are but "ideograms," representing something which words will not convey. The desire for the states which they represent is unintelligible, is in fact mere nonsense, to the man who has no clue in experience to the positive feeling-element which lies behind the negative expression.

To one other element in the author's development of the content of the numinous experience we must still give attention. This he describes as the element or "moment" of *fascination*. The close combination of this characteristic with that of fearfulness is a noteworthy paradox of all religion. There is something in the numen that "captivates and transports." In its most intense degree this issues in the ravishments of the more extreme mystical states and the intoxications of the corybantic forms of religious excitement. "It is the Dionysiac element in the numen."¹ In all its forms it represents the numen as the object of desire or yearning. It is again "something more" than is indicated in man's expectation of divine aid either in the natural world or in the ministrations of divine

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 31.

Love, Pity, or Comfort. The numen has a value of its own and is an object of search for its own sake. This is the foundation of that human desire, expressed and exemplified so invariably in every religion that we found it necessary to incorporate it in our provisional definition of religion, the desire to discover and maintain a right relationship with the divine. For though the fearful aspect of the numinous may have been the first to hold the mind of man, and that desire for a right relationship may therefore have originated in the effort to appease the wrath of the numen in some attitude of propitiation, yet this other element must also be intrinsic to the numinous experience, for the former could not have developed into the latter. The feeling of "positive self-surrender to the numen" is grounded in the desirability of the numen in itself. Like the other elements which we have considered, this too is capable of development, and appears in the highest and purest forms of religious worship. The "Life in the Spirit" and all forms of mystical beatitude exemplify it.

It is under this aspect, too, that the feeling of the mysterious attains some of that positive content which we have seen to be its main characteristic as a religious experience. And here as before we may note the difficulty, nay, the impossibility, of giving expression to its positive character. Some of the most moving passages of religious testimony are conveyed in a series of expressive negatives, but the secret of their inspiring quality resides in their positive deliverance. Their negative aspect goes no deeper than their mere grammatical texture: they are charged with the "Yeas" and "Amens" of an affirmative experience, and winged with the strong asseveration of faith. Our author has no more telling illustration than his profoundly apposite quotation in this connection

of the apostolic words: "Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, the things which God hath prepared for them that love Him."¹ "Who," he asks, "does not feel the exalted sound of these words and the 'Dionysiac' element of transport and fervour in them?"² And yet, how many, we may ask again, of the countless numbers who have felt that thrill, and heard in the words the sounding of the deeps and the singing together of the morning stars, have even so much as observed that those mighty chords, so far as concerns their expression in human speech, are swept upon the strings of "not" and "neither." The negative semblance of the words is a matter of grammar, their substance is a soaring affirmative.

The element of fascination, of loveliness, of infinite desirability and value in itself, finds expression in every high and intense form of religious experience. It is a major element in all experiences of Salvation and of beatitude, whatever their particular form, and it is almost invariably manifest in experiences of conversion. And wherever it is present it appears, in our author's words, "as a strange and mighty propulsion toward an ideal good known only to religion and in its nature fundamentally non-rational, which the mind knows of in yearning and presentiment, recognising it for what it is behind the obscure and inadequate symbols which are its only expression. And this shows that above and beyond our rational being lies hidden the ultimate and highest part of our nature, which can find no satisfaction in the mere allaying of the needs of our sensuous, psychical, or intellectual impulses and cravings. The mystics

¹ 1 Cor. ii. 9.

² *Op. cit.* p. 34. Cf. the entire paragraph, a passage of profound insight.

called it the basis or ground of the soul.”¹ In these words the author reveals his own ultimate finding concerning the value and significance of this numinous datum of consciousness, which he has laboured to bring to the introspective observation of his readers. So far, he has merely sought to establish the *existence* of such a unique element in experience, and to reveal it as in fact the groundwork of religion. But even as he did so, his estimation of it as a *value* has been such that it shows through all his exposition. He now declares it “the ultimate and highest part of our nature,”² and proclaims it not only, as hitherto, *distinct from* but “*above and beyond* our rational being.”³

This leads straight to ultimate questions concerning the truth and value of religion. In my first lecture I alluded to the necessity for carrying the question a stage further than the psychologist could take us, and inquiring into the truth or validity of those experiences of which the psychologist merely examined the operations. And I indicated that this was all the more necessary at the present time, as the account of these experiences given by the psychologist might seem to explain them naturally and completely, without according to them any further significance at all. These reflections arise, of course, from the consideration of the procedure of that type of psychology—a type which is at present in the ascendant—which sets out to derive the religious experience from the common elements of consciousness, and correlate it in every possible way with the rest of our experience. And as a great part of our religious experience *is* capable of being rendered in such terms of our general consciousness, I still hold it a useful and

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 36.

² “Ein Letztes und Höchstes unserer Natur.”

³ “Über und hinter unserem rationalen Wesen.”

necessary task to point out, and indeed to emphasise, in the interest of religion as a distinctive and valid spiritual activity, that such a rendering is not the last word upon the religious consciousness, but that, on the contrary, the validity of that consciousness remains an outstanding and unprejudiced question after psychology has done its work upon it. I do not think that such a position is untenable or that we can afford, if we prize religion, to retreat from it. But what we have to note concerning Otto's work is that, with regard both to the uniqueness and the value of religion, he endeavours to set up a line of defence within the borders of psychology itself. His position is *not* that religion can maintain its values and stand in its own rights independently of the results of psychological analysis, however psychology may seem to naturalise its contents, but that any psychological investigation of religion which reduces its processes and contents to terms of those of the non-religious consciousness errs from the start, and fails even in its strictly psychological task of displaying the religious experience in its essential nature. From a psychological point of view, this is so radical a position that some time must elapse, and much consideration be given to it in all its bearings, before it can be finally determined how far it is scientifically acceptable. It is certainly put forward as a correction of a scientific procedure which the author considers to be faulty as science, quite as much as a vindication of a unique ground for religion in human consciousness.

And however radical the position may appear in the light of current psychological method, it cannot be said to be revolutionary from the point of view of religious experience itself. The whole work has, indeed, an air of freshness and originality, an aspect of creative-

ness, which marks it as a great book. But when it is thoroughly examined there is really no single item of its analysis which could be looked upon as a new discovery to the religious consciousness. Its value and its originality alike lie in the faithfulness and the urgency with which those aspects of consciousness which religion itself at its deepest has always emphatically proclaimed as uniquely characteristic of its own peculiar experience, are set forth as the very essentials of religion, which no scientific investigation of its nature can overlook or dissipate without falsifying its results and discrediting its procedure. One is tempted to say that the features which make the work outstanding in the field of religious psychology are the intimacy and the authority with which the author is able to set forth the findings of religion upon its own experience. For not only has he beyond most men of his time an accurate, intimate, and sympathetic acquaintance with many religions, and a mind steeped in the classic religious literature of ancient and modern times, he is a psychologist of a rare gift in fine and discriminative introspection, and possessing the superlative advantage, if I may say so without throwing stones at any one else, of a first-class religious experience of his own upon which to introspect.

We need not be surprised to find, then, that though the naturalistic psychologist may be startled and perhaps scandalised by the contentions of the book, the religious reader and the careful student of religious literature may lay it down with the remark that it reveals to him nothing entirely new. It is, indeed, curious to find, *after one has read the book*, how numerous are the anticipations of it in previous writers, without, however, any direct anticipation of its importance to the theory of religion. The Old Testament student, for example, is,

as I have already pointed out, perfectly familiar with the category of the numinous, as he must needs be if he is to penetrate to the meaning of *qādōsh*. Old Testament exposition is everywhere occupied with the ideas which circle round it.¹ But apart from that, and its

¹ I instance the following, taken almost at random from G. A. Smith. It occurs in his exposition of that *locus classicus* of numinous experience, the sixth chapter of Isaiah. "What, in the first place, is HOLINESS? We attach this term to a definite standard of morality or an unusually impressive fulness of character. To our minds it is associated with very positive forces, as of comfort and conviction—perhaps because we take our ideas of it from the active operations of the Holy Ghost. The original force of the term *holiness*, however, was not positive but negative, and throughout the Old Testament, whatever modifications its meaning undergoes, it retains a negative flavour. The Hebrew word for holiness springs from a root which means *to set apart, make distinct, put at a distance from*. When God is described as the Holy One in the Old Testament it is generally with the purpose of withdrawing Him from some presumption of men upon His majesty or of negating their unworthy thoughts of Him. The Holy One is the Incomparable: *To whom, then, will ye liken Me, that I should be equal to him? saith the Holy One* (Is. xl. 25). He is the Unapproachable: *Who is able to stand before Jehovah, this Holy God?* (1 Sam. vi. 20). He is the Utter Contrast of man: *I am God, and not man, the Holy One in the midst of thee* (Hos. xi. 9). He is the Exalted and Sublime: *Thus saith the high and lofty One that inhabiteth eternity, whose name is Holy: I dwell in the high and holy place* (Is. lvii. 15). Generally speaking, then, holiness is equivalent to separateness, sublimity—in fact, just to that loftiness or exaltation which Isaiah has already so often reiterated as the principal attribute of God. In their thrice-repeated *Holy* the seraphs are only telling more emphatically to the prophet's ears what his eyes have already seen, *the Lord high and lifted up*. Better expression could not be found for the full idea of Godhead. This little word *Holy* radiates heaven's own breadth of meaning. Within its fundamental idea—distance and difference from man—what spaces are there not for every attribute of God to flash? If the Holy One be originally He who is distinct from man and man's thoughts, and who impresses man from the beginning with the awful sublimity of the contrast in which He stands to him, how naturally may holiness come to cover not only that moral purity and intolerance of sin to which we now more strictly apply the term, but those metaphysical conceptions as well, which we gather up under the name 'supernatural,' and so finally, by lifting the Divine nature away from the change and vanity of this world, and emphasising God's independence of all besides Himself, become the fittest expression we have for Him as the Infinite and Self-Existent." (*The Book of Isaiah*, vol. i. pp. 63–65.) This passage shows a clear insight into the nature of the numinous, as developed by Otto, and richly illustrates it from the Old Testament. If the writer clings to a

occurrence continually in devotional and confessional literature, one comes upon hints and anticipations of Otto's use of the category in many thoughtful writers who have kept close to the actual testimony of religious experience.

There remains, however, the radical diversity of Otto's results from a great deal that passes current in the psychology which has hitherto held the field, and if Otto's contention is to stand we must orientate our conception of religion anew with regard to it. It will, I think, have been plain in our following of Otto's analysis, that if there is such an immediate and unique datum of experience as he alleges in the numinous element, it is extremely difficult to isolate and to present in clear consciousness. Its introspection is attended with more than usual difficulty, and its direct description is, alike by the author's admission and the consensus of religious confession, impossible. These circumstances add a practical difficulty to the study of the subject, but they should not be held to make the existence of the numinous datum less probable. Any immediate deliverance of consciousness is intrinsically irreducible to terms of any others.

A large field of study is opened up in the investigation of the processes whereby this special element enters into combination with the other contents of consciousness in the manifold workings of the religious life. Innumerable writers from Schleiermacher onwards have emphasised the fact that in religion the whole man is occupied, that religious experience is coterminous with the whole mental and spiritual life of the subject. It *negative* acceptance of the term "holiness," he does so from the conceptional standpoint. Its positive content he acknowledges by implication: "it radiates heaven's own breadth of meaning"—"What spaces are there not for every attribute of Godhead to flash?"

may be grounded in an essential distinguishing factor such as Otto seeks to isolate and to bring to clear consciousness, but the more orthodox religious psychology has this truth upon its side, that religion at least incorporates and builds up into the fulness of its life many "natural" elements of consciousness, emotional, conative, cognitive, intellectual; and this concrete fulness of the religious life must be studied, as it has been by many of those who in recent years have given their attention to the psychological study of religion. Otto fully admits on his first page, for instance, that religion adopts, nay for its fullest perfection demands, conceptual expression. In some of those respects, however, he has left his work incomplete. This is not said in criticism. The impression given by the book is rather of a wonderful thoroughness and exhaustiveness of treatment within the limits the author sets himself. But the relation between the "non-rational" element of the numinous, and those rational elements which the author admits that a complete religion may and must possess, and also with any other "natural" elements which may be incorporated into its complex and comprehensive life, he has not made at all clear. We have not by any means traversed the whole course of his argument in the foregoing study. The author goes on to important developments of his theory, notably in a very characteristic epistemology of religion, while our résumé has been confined to the more elementary psychological analysis. But the field is scarcely more than opened up, and it seems to me to hold great promise of fruitful investigation.

It may be well, before passing to other aspects of our subject, to enter a *caveat* against any possible anticipation of too easy a passage from the author's psychological position to any immediate and incontrovertible demon-

stration of the essential truth of religion's central convictions. It may seem, at first sight, as if the establishment of a "numinous sense" (using sense in the most general way for the receptive process, whatever it be, whereby the numinous content is directly apprehended) in immediate contact with a numinous object which that "sense" gives directly to consciousness, should put the religious object beyond the reach of dispute or denial. Is it not straightway placed on a footing with the *sensa* which give us the objective material world? Does the spiritual world of religion, then, not become a world of as completely assured objective truth and validity as the material world of sense?

Such a conclusion must be approached and examined with extreme caution. One learns to doubt all easy leaps to certainty. Past experience discourages the expectation that we shall ever be able with a facile stroke to cut the knot of faith's ultimate question. It is impossible to circumvent the necessity for faith, and to put in its place an apodictic certainty. In the present instance there are many considerations which must give us pause. In the first place, just as *sensa* do not give us the material world, so the numinous does not give us the spiritual world. The vague, undifferentiated apprehension of something which to describe is already to rationalise, can be but the most rudimentary groundwork in consciousness of that world of articulated reality which faith inhabits and reveals. All such ideas are grounded in it in so far as they remain "religious." But the idea, the myth, the image, the symbol, are outcomes of it, more or less highly rationalised expressions of it, and in estimating the truth of religion, or seeking to gauge the validity of the results of the complex processes of religious experience, we cannot go behind those processes

themselves, and assert without further ado that the immediacy of their fundamental datum guarantees the structure and closes the inquiry.

I lay little store by the argument that the reality of the spiritual world does *not* carry that immediate certitude in the minds of all men which marks their acceptance of the reality of the material world. It is at least conceivable that that may be either the misfortune or the fault of those who have not achieved such certitude rather than a valid argument against the reality which they hold in doubt. Whatever we may take to be the test of reality, it assuredly is not the consensus of certitude. But there is matter for our consideration in view of the present question, in the fact of the manifold diversity of religious belief and practice among mankind. We have at least to clear our minds as to what it is that we are to regard as attested in the fundamental religious experience. Man has had many thoughts of God and of that beatitude which fellowship with him confers. Man has held many diverse truths to be divine revelations. We can only retain the idea of revelation at all by conceiving of it as a growing revelation. If we are to centre our defence of the truth of religion and the validity of its experience upon the immediate nature of its most elementary and undifferentiated datum, we are limiting our task to the validation of those aspects and elements of religion which its most highly developed forms share with its earliest and crudest expressions. It is a far more comprehensive task than that, which the religious apologist dares to essay. He looks upon the course of religious development—a development which has taken place within the growing and deepening experience of religious men—and he would seek to vindicate it as an increasing and deepening insight into

an unfolding reality. We cannot stake that issue upon the immediate "givenness" of its most rudimentary element. We cannot, I repeat, go behind that complex process of experience through which that rudimentary element has been wrought into a spiritual world. Does that world reveal reality? Is that process of experience justified of its child? These are the questions which the apologist of faith needs to ask, and dares to answer.

But I would not be deemed to hold, on the other hand, that the position with which we have been concerned in this lecture is one of no apologetic significance. The establishment of a specific and immediate element in religious experience, of the kind set forth by Otto, would place that experience at a much greater advantage than a theory which looked upon that experience as wholly derivative and secondary. It does place the religious experience more nearly on an equal footing with the experience of the material world as regards its objective status. There is a close analogy between the *sensa* on which the experience of external reality depends, and the *numina* which are here found to lie at the basis of religious experience. The immediacy of the numinous perception cannot incontrovertibly guarantee the entire construct of the religious world, but neither can the first and simple deliverances of the senses guarantee the world of science or even of common sense. But in each case the primary and immediate nature of these elementary data, the fact of their simple "givenness," the impossibility of imparting them where they are not given, incline us irresistibly to accord to them the character of a *knowledge*, bringing us into touch with an object not ourselves, and justifying us in regarding the world which is built upon their groundwork as being objective to us.

In each case—that of the material world and that of the world mediated in religious experience—the first step from the immediate givenness of the original data to their objective reality is not so short and so self-evident but that it is open to conceivable doubt. Very many not only doubt it but entirely discredit it in the case of religious experience, and in the case of the experience of the sense-world it has at least been made the subject of philosophic question by thinkers who are otherwise considered sane. It is not a step which, in any case, we can take with an apodictic certainty, and in that admission lies the acknowledgment of the place of faith at the very basis of all knowledge whatsoever. For that step involves a postulate of faith, the postulate that what appears in our consciousness with the felt attributes of “givenness” *does give* something and is not merely a freak of our mental constitution. It involves the belief that there is not a hopeless and incurable discrepancy between the mind’s receptiveness and the realm of “otherness” which it seems to receive. There can be no beginning of real knowledge, no experience which carries us out of the circle of ourselves, unless the felt difference between an imagination and an apprehension is a real difference, a difference which justifies us in accepting the content of the latter as a *datum*, a communication of some aspect of the world over against us. I will not allow myself to be drawn here into the epistemological labyrinths of the discussion of the nature of error. I desire merely to point out the general and basal postulate without which the experience of any world beyond ourselves becomes a dream, and in the absence of which the very word “error” ceases to have any meaning. We assume that the constitution of our minds is such that our powers of apprehension are truly trans-sub-

jective, and that their data are communicative of reality. It is an assumption which cannot admit of any direct proof, but the discredit of which involves common sense, science, philosophy, morality, and religion in a common ruin. It is the ultimate postulate of all knowledge. And it is a postulate which involves the general attitude which we call faith.

Now Otto's analysis of the religious experience has as its basis an apprehension, the content of which is a simple *datum*. The true apologetic value of such an account of the fundamental nature of religion resides in the recognition that the single step from the discovery of such a *datum* in consciousness to the acceptance of a reality which it conveys and reveals, is an entirely analogous step to that which must be taken in every realm of knowledge. To this extent then, it transfers the weight of the argument for the objectivity of religious experience from the fact of its being grounded in faith to the question of the existence of the datum itself. It is true that without faith religion cannot exist. But an enhanced value belongs, from this point of view, to the reply often advanced, though not always in accents of complete assurance, that faith is necessary in order to live or think at all. Many philosophers have admitted the basal resemblance of the ultimate philosophic postulate to the attitude of religious faith. Many have detected the element of faith that lies at the root of all enterprise whatever. The position we have been reviewing in this lecture adds strength to all such considerations as vouchers for the attitude of faith which is fundamental to religion. For in claiming that the divine may be revealed in human experience, that those hints and intimations of "something there," of a reality beyond ourselves and different in nature from the com-

munications of sense, do reveal a world, we ask only that a definite experience of the human mind be seriously taken for what it presents itself as being. The experience itself is not so universally assertive as the data of sense, in many it would seem to be so weak as to attract no attention, but where it is present in strength its acceptance as indicative of some objective presence involves no act of faith which is entirely without analogy in our dealings with the rest of our experience. The circumstance that it is grounded in a postulate of faith does not of itself vitiate religion's invariable construction of its own experience as a revelation of the real.

We dealt in a former lecture with the idea of a religious instinct, conceived as dwelling in all men, giving rise to the common religious experience of mankind, and in some sense vouching for that experience. We saw that in view of the results of psychological investigation into the nature of instinct, that idea was no longer tenable. The position we have been investigating is in a sense a substitute for that discredited theory, avoiding its mistakes, but standing for the maintenance of that invariable and deep-rooted religious interest which the older theory sought in erroneous fashion to express. It finds the spring of that characteristic which has made religion one of the most distinctive traits of human life, not in the realm of instinct which man shares with the brutes, but in a characteristic feature of human consciousness, an experience embedded in the life of feeling, but with a further significance and meaning—a cognitive or revelatory aspect which gives promise of that increase and development by which it has passed from the early beginnings in a vague awareness, to all the riches of the higher spiritual life in which the religious experience of man has culminated.

LECTURE IV

THE RELIGIOUS SENTIMENT AND OTHER FACTORS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF RE- LIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

So far we have been dealing with the most elementary factors in religious experience. In the course of our treatment of them it has, I think, become evident that only the most general conclusions upon the nature of religion can be drawn from the study of those elementary aspects of it. The course of its development is one of increasing complexity and refinement, and a study of the history of religion displays such an advance from the first crude and comparatively simple manifestations of its activity to its culmination in the purified ethical content and high spiritual tone of the great faiths of mankind, that the end can scarcely be recognised, except by the close student of the course of development, as holding anything in common with the beginning. Common sense unites with good historical method in dictating that our judgment upon religion as a vehicle of high human values should proceed upon an estimate of its most highly developed and perfected forms. Any profitable inquiry into religious experience will necessarily be occupied, therefore, with the more highly complicated forms of religious experience which are characteristic of the higher stages of development. We have seen that the psychological and historical study of early religion have been of the greatest usefulness in

helping to locate and to isolate the elementary and basal factors of the religious consciousness, but the results of such investigation provide but the necessary groundwork for the study of the fully articulated experience which is found in the later stages.

The latter must be acknowledged a difficult and delicate task, and one which has not yet, with all the psychological activity which has distinguished recent study of religion, been very fully carried out. Much material has been collected, but most of the work on the subject has not extended much beyond the limits of a collation and comparison of "varieties of religious experience."¹ We require a more thorough treatment, not of varieties merely, but of the general and essential characteristics that run through and are exemplified in such varieties. And, above all, we require some account of the process of development in religious experience, the gradual complication, the intermingling of many factors drawn from every area of the conscious life, and the knitting together of these various components into the characteristic experiences of religion. I cannot here attempt such a task, and in the present lecture I shall endeavour only to indicate the beginnings and some of the more important aspects of that process of complication, and then to draw out what seem to me to be some of the more important general characteristics of the process of religious development.

At the outset, and at the risk of iteration, the well-worn precept must be borne in mind that the religious experience is a whole, and there is a sense in which it is indivisible if no violence is to be done to its nature. We must not allow the necessity of analysis for a psycho-

¹ The name of James's great work sets the method and the limits of most of the work which has been done on this part of the subject.

logical treatment to blind us to the integral nature of the experience we analyse. Elementary psychological factors are isolated merely for purposes of study, and our study itself will be falsified unless we remember that such factors or "moments" of experience are unreal abstractions apart from the experience itself which they constitute and which is the really occurring psychological fact which they are meant to elucidate. It has become an often repeated and axiomatic dictum that it is the "whole man," the unified consciousness in all its complexity, that operates in the religious experience. It is well that this should be steadily kept before us, and yet perhaps the very reiteration of the precept is an index of the danger that is felt that in the enthusiasm for psychological analysis the fact may be forgotten. We have, in previous lectures, isolated the element of feeling or the emotional factor, and we have, I think, seen good reason for accepting the strong tendency of modern psychology, to regard it as holding a most important place in, and indeed as being fundamental to, the religious experience.¹ But if so, it is fundamental to an experience which many other factors combine with it to constitute. It is equally important to discover the part borne by these other factors, and the manner in which they are wrought into the total complex experience, and it is only by giving attention to the manner and result of this process of complication that we can succeed in giving a just account of the nature of that experience as a whole. Until psychology has wrought out that process in greater detail, we must, in the meantime, at least bear in mind the existence of all

¹ One might go further and say that the tendency of modern psychology is to regard this element, in conjunction with the conative element with which it is inseparably bound up, as being fundamental to experience in general.

the factors involved, and in our study continually revert to observation of the integral experience itself, not allowing ourselves to elevate any partial analytic factor into an undeserved status of reality. I have endeavoured in our treatment of the more elementary factors of religious experience to acknowledge the fact that these were the results of an analytic process and could only form the beginnings of a real study of the complete experience. This in no way lessens their importance, as they are undoubtedly factors present in all experience of a religious nature. As must have been evident in the course of our last lecture, for instance, many of the examples chosen by Otto for the illustration of the primary element of the "numinous" were examples taken from religious experience of a highly developed and complex kind, within which the "numinous" element was enclosed. The more primitive elements in the religious consciousness have, perhaps naturally, received the more detailed study, but psychology cannot put off the fuller treatment of the relations of these elements to the other factors which occur characteristically in the more highly developed types of religion.¹ The latter is a far-reaching and a somewhat daunting inquiry, but much material has been already collected for it, and beginnings have been made upon it in several directions.

A very significant advance has been made in recent psychology in the study of the process of complication within the emotional life itself, by the discovery of the sentiment, and the use to which that psychological category has been so successfully put in the organisation

¹ The relation of the "non-rational" to the "rational" elements in religious experience is not so fully or so successfully dealt with by Otto for example, as his exposition of the existence and nature of these "non-rational" elements. Cf. Troeltsch, *Kantstudien* XXIII. (1919), pp. 65-67.

of the emotions into more or less complex systems. A sentiment may be most simply defined as an organised system of emotional dispositions centred about the idea of some object. Its nature must be firmly grasped if its operation is to be understood. It is not a fact or datum of consciousness like an emotion or an idea. It is not a mode of experience. It is rather a characteristic of the structure of consciousness than itself a content of consciousness. It may be described as a mental disposition to experience certain emotions when the object of the sentiment is in certain situations. The object or the idea of the object must be present to the mind before the characteristic emotions of the sentiment are called forth. But the sentiment itself consists in the mental disposition which connects together the idea and the group of emotions, and is persistent in the absence both of the idea and of the emotions grouped around it. A man may be said to have a sentiment with regard to a certain object of experience, even when in the absence of the object concerned he is experiencing no emotion at all in regard to it. It is the disposition to experience certain emotions when the given object is presented, which constitutes the sentiment.

Typical kinds of sentiments instanced by McDougall are love, hate, and respect. These possess the characteristics already mentioned. They are not emotions, but tendencies to experience certain characteristic emotions in regard to the objects of love, hate, or respect. Those emotions thus become organised around that object. Let us take, for example, the sentiment of love. The name "love" is often given to the emotion already named by McDougall, "tender emotion." It is well that the two should be kept distinct. "It is clear," as McDougall explains, "that one may properly be said to love or to

hate a man at the times when he is not at all present to one's thought, and when one is experiencing no emotion of any kind."¹ Tender emotion is but one of the emotions organised in the system of the complex and enduring disposition of the sentiment of love. Shand has shown, by extensive and apposite quotation from the dramatists and poets,² how various are the emotions which it displays. And these emotions, he shows, are not compounded together into a single feeling, as Spencer supposed,³ but combined in a dispositional system. "There is all the difference," the former writer insists, "between these two conceptions. The compound feeling, so far as its composition remains unchanged, acts in all times, places, and situations in the same way. However greatly the situation may change, it can only respond to this situation with the same behaviour evoked by its compound emotion. Such a theory cannot account for the great diversity of the behaviour of love in different situations, as well as the corresponding diversity of its emotions. Several of these emotions may indeed blend into one where the situation is such as to evoke them together; but how often do different situations evoke different emotions? For the situation of presence contrasts with that of absence, and prosperity with adversity, and love responds to the one with joy, and with sorrow and longing to the other. The anticipation of the future changes; and in correspondence with it, love is sometimes full of hope and sometimes sunk in despondency. The remembrance of the past changes; and responding to it, love is sometimes filled with thankfulness, and sometimes with remorse. The situation of danger contrasts with the situation of security, and,

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 123.

² *Foundations of Character*, bk. i. ch. v.

³ *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i. pt. iv. ch. viii. p. 487.

responding to the first, love feels anxiety, and to the second, confidence. The plots of enemies contrast with the help of friends ; and love responds in the one case with suspicion and anger, and in the other with trust and gratitude. The situation in which love is placed may be any one of these referred to ; and in the course of its history, it may pass successively through all of them. Love, therefore, cannot be reduced to a single compound feeling ; it must organise a number of different emotional dispositions capable of evoking in different situations the appropriate behaviour.”¹

The sentiment of love may be taken as typical of the nature of sentiment in general, and the account given of it in the words of Shand just quoted, indicate the theory of it which has gained acceptance. This particular sentiment is furthermore the most useful example to take for description as it appears in many forms, and many of the sentiments which control and largely constitute the higher life of man are, as we shall see, but variants of it. The conception of the sentiment is one the usefulness of which as a powerful psychological instrument for the investigation of the complex reaches of the most highly developed human consciousness becomes more and more evident the more we familiarise ourselves with it. “The growth of the sentiments,” says McDougall, “is of the utmost importance for the character and conduct of individuals and of societies ; it is the organisation of the affective and conative life. In the absence of sentiments our emotional life would be a mere chaos, without order, consistency, or continuity of any kind ; and all our social relations and conduct, being based on the emotions and their impulses, would be correspondingly chaotic, unpredictable, and

¹ *Op. cit.* pp. 55-56.

unstable. It is only through the systematic organisation of the emotional dispositions in sentiments that the volitional control of the immediate promptings of the emotions is rendered possible. Again, our judgments of value and of merit are rooted in our sentiments ; and our moral principles have the same source, for they are formed by our judgments of moral value.”¹ And Shand has similarly placed the sentiment at the very “ foundation of character.”

I have said that some of the sentiments which lie at the basis of the higher life of mankind are variants of the sentiment of love already described. For “ love,” as Shand points out, “ has not only different objects, but itself varies with the varying nature of these objects.” He instances the “ self-regarding ” sentiment, as well as a number of disinterested sentiments such as conjugal or parental love, filial affection, and friendship, and further such “ great impersonal sentiments ” as patriotism and the love for some science or art. “ There is finally,” he adds, “ a system of unique importance—very imperfectly developed in most men, and seldom attaining to the warmth and intimacy of love—which is known as ‘ respect for conscience.’ It is ever contesting both the supremacy of self-love and the attractiveness of the present inclination ; and in most men it is combined with the religious sentiment.”²

Now the sentiment last mentioned is one, the existence and the power of which is indubitable and it is in it that our interest centres in the present study. It is only mentioned in passing in Shand’s work, and is not treated of by McDougall, and in general its high importance has so far failed to be recognised by the psychologist of religion. In its nature it is one of those variants of

¹ *Op. cit.* pp. 159–160.

² *Op. cit.* p. 57.

the sentiment of love to which we have referred. Its distinctive nature takes its rise from the nature of the religious object. It deserves a far fuller treatment than we can accord to it in this place, and that treatment might be found to go far towards elucidating some of the most interesting and some of the most difficult problems of the study of religion. It is certain that the place and value of the sentiment in religion will be more and more clearly recognised. Thouless (among recent psychologists) has acknowledged it, although without giving it any specific and extended treatment in his account of religion. "On its mental side," he says, "religion is clearly a sentiment, it is a system of emotional dispositions organising in its system a variety of different emotions. It is therefore correct to speak of *the religious sentiment*. James, it is true, denies that there is any specific religious sentiment, but he is using *sentiment* loosely in much the same sense as we use *emotion*. He is not speaking of sentiment in the sense in which it is employed by Shand. Using sentiment in that sense, we may speak of the religious sentiment when we mean the system of emotional dispositions organised around the objects of religion."¹ And another recent writer has remarked and discussed with insight the bearing of the religious sentiment upon conversion and upon religious education and the development of religious experience in the individual.²

1. There are a number of features which characterise this conception of the sentiment which we must mark as having a direct bearing upon our study of religious experience, and specially upon the method of its development. In the first place, we must note that although

¹ R. H. Thouless, *Introduction to the Psychology of Religion*, p. 100.

² W. K. Wright, *A Student's Philosophy of Religion*, ch. xv.

in dealing with the sentiment we are concerned with the mental structure and organisation of the specifically *emotional* life, we find that that organisation is effected in the sentiment by the centring or polarisation as it were of the emotions in groups around an *idea* or a group of ideas. We are dealing, therefore, with a stage of conscious life at which the idea already plays an important part. In the simplest cases of love and hate, where these sentiments attach to other human persons, this may not necessarily indicate a highly complex stage of individual consciousness, or of social civilisation. But when we reach the stage at which sentiment is represented by any of the fundamental human or social loyalties, it is obvious that we are coming to those reaches of life and history in which somewhat complex and well-developed ideas are not only capable of being formed, but of becoming surrounded as it were with compelling emotions, and of ordering these emotions in systems with reference to those ideas themselves. And when we come to the religious sentiment, or to such a sentiment as that "respect for conscience" which Shand declares to be found usually in close conjunction with the former, we are compelled to realise that the formation of even more highly developed ideas must have preceded the emergence of such a sentiment—that indeed the intellectual life must have been fully awake and in active operation before the existence of such a sentiment would have become possible. The idea of God, in all the higher religions, is a somewhat fully articulated idea. I referred, in the first lecture, to the Christian idea of God, for instance, as an idea that embodies a whole spiritual history, and bears within it the implicit results of generations of human thought and experience. And if that idea becomes, as it does

become in Christian experience, the focal point of a great religious sentiment, centring and organising the emotional life of the Christian man, forming his character and directing his activities, then we have to do, in such a religion as that of the Christian, not with a mass of emotional conative energy only, but with an experience in which a great idea is not only present, and not only important, but in which it is central, indispensable, and dominant. The highly differentiated and richly connotative conception of God probably owes its power not to its being demonstrated to the intellect as a logically cogent or a philosophically self-consistent and satisfying idea, but to its being lodged in a powerful sentiment through which it in turn co-ordinates and stabilises the emotions which itself evokes. The God of religion is other than a philosophical tenet, not because it is something less than that, but because it is something more, not because religion is a mere mass of fleeting and incoherent emotional and conative impulses, but because it is a stable, unified, and clarified life in which the idea and the emotions it evokes are blent into a system wherein great conceptions are built into great life and character. The idea "comes alive" in its living union with the feelings which it both calls forth and controls, and the emotions are organised and made effective forces of the spirit by the idea in which they centre.

And in stages of religious culture and development far less advanced than the example we have just chosen, the same holds true. At whatever stage the religious sentiment emerges—and it is doubtless very early—there is some object to which it attaches. There is some conception of a being or beings around which the sentiment gathers. The conception may be exceedingly

crude and undeveloped judged by the standards of man's later faiths. It may be objected that in these early stages there was nothing present which is worthy of being regarded as an idea of God, but we have already noted Otto's contention, which I think is a just one, that in whatsoever way man envisaged the divine power—the something other than himself—whether as god, or “dæmon,” or “deva,” in whatsoever raiment of mythology he clothed his thought, the thought was present, the rationalising process was begun,¹ the idea of God was already being wrought. And around that idea, we may suppose, the appropriate emotions were being gathered and ordered into that sentiment, which, changing, growing, and being refined with the change and growth and refinement of man's advancing thought has developed into one of the most ennobling in the range of human experience.

There is a very real sense then in which the idea of the object of the religious sentiment is not only necessary to its existence, but holds a dominant place in it. We have already seen that the nature of a sentiment is largely determined by the nature of the object to which it attaches, and changes in accordance with changes in that object. Hence that side-by-side and equal growth of thought and feeling in religious history. The intellectual and emotional elements keep step in their development, each interplaying with the other through the agency of the sentiment in which they unite together in an integral mental function.

I am not sure that a good deal of Otto's analysis of religious experience could not be better expressed in terms of this exceedingly useful and illuminative con-

¹ Using “rationalise” according to Otto's practice as equivalent to “conceptualise.”

ception of the sentiment. The various emotions which he so well describes and which he seeks to educe as aspects or elements of an experience which is yet in some paradoxical fashion regarded as simple, primary, underivative, and irreducible, would then appear as representing some of the more intimately characteristic of these emotions which are linked in the religious sentiment with the divine object. Such a presentation of the matter would not, it seems to me, be destructive of the essentials of his analysis, and it would obviate a certain awkwardness in method of exposition which sometimes gives it an entirely undeserved semblance of unreality and strain. The essential point of his theory would remain, in that the "numinous" reality is the divine object itself, around the idea of which the religious sentiment gathers and to which the religious emotions are attached. Its "numinous" quality is reflected in the idea which embodies it, and which still arouses and attaches to itself the characteristic emotions of the "numinous" experience. If it be objected that the idea, as being a concept, is entirely diverse in nature from the direct feeling-apprehension of the "numinous," is, in fact, a "rationalisation" of it in Otto's sense of the word and as such unable to convey the real quality of the "numinous" as it occurs in direct experience, it may be replied that Otto himself instances many *words* as having a "numinous" feeling and content, that these *words* represent *concepts* or rationalisations of various degrees of completeness, and that therefore the possibility of the "numinous" groundwork of religious experience being embodied in and conveyed by the conceptions founded upon it is admitted. If that be so, it seems possible to regard the characteristic emotions of religious experience as taking their tone from the "numinous" content of the idea to

which they attach, and ultimately from the "numinous" nature of the object which that idea conveys, from which also the religious sentiment in which these emotions are co-ordinated also derives its characteristic nature.

Be that as it may, the conception of the sentiment is one of the greatest usefulness in elucidating the development of religious experience, and it is so especially in that it marks the central place of the religious idea in that emotional life itself in which so many have found the pre-eminent characteristic of religion.

2. Another point which we must notice is the elementary one already alluded to, that the sentiment is not a content of consciousness, but a feature of mental structure, a disposition to experience certain emotions on the presentation of certain ideas. The sentiment or disposition endures while the object of it is absent from our minds, and the emotions appropriate to it are not being experienced. This is, of course, of the nature of the sentiment as such, and is true of the religious sentiment in particular. The emotions of awe and reverence, which we found to be highly characteristic of religion, as well as those of love and gratitude, and many others which we do not attempt here to enumerate exhaustively, including in the higher religions some highly specialised and complex emotions corresponding to various aspects of the highly articulated conception of the divine, such as sorrow for sin, peace in forgiveness, joy in salvation, and the like, are centred around the main religious object, God, and around the world of religious objects associated with Him.

These emotions are not a permanent experience of the religious man. They come and go according as the religious objects are in our minds or not. Yet the religious sentiment forms a permanent disposition

toward these emotions. Many unnecessary religious anxieties and fears would have been saved had this been understood. Religious emotions fluctuate—become temporarily exhausted—the attention changes to other objects in the business of life, and with the absence of the religious objects the emotions appropriate to their presence is, of course, no longer felt, and earnest men have experienced unwarranted disappointment at what seemed to them their unfaithfulness and inattention to the claims of religion. But religion does not need to make any claim to permanent conscious presence in the mind. It is not an emotion which passes away when it ceases to be felt, but a sentiment which endures as a disposition when it is not actually in consciousness. Religion would, of course, be a luxury of the very few, if it required to demand uninterrupted occupation of the focus of attention. But it is surely common sense that a religious man is none the less religious when he is not thinking about the objects of religion, and hence experiencing none of the emotions which these objects evoke.

Thouless has, however, called attention to an important matter in showing that, although character is usually the resultant of a variety of sentiments, a particular sentiment may attain to a phenomenal predominance over all others. "It happens sometimes," says Thouless, "that one of the sentiments establishes itself so much in the predominant position that the emotional responses of the individual are called out from that one sentiment alone. An example of this is when the sentiment of love attains such a predominance temporarily. The sorrow felt at the absence of the object of love, is sufficient to counteract the joy which should have been produced by the action of the environment on the other sentiments; or joy at the presence

of the object of love prevents the appearance of sorrow when that would appear to be the natural response of the other sentiments to other elements in the situation. . . . When the religious sentiment attains such a predominance as has just been described for the sentiment of love, we have what is called *mysticism*. In the mystic, the religious sentiment has attained such predominance that the emotional responses of the mystic are called out by that sentiment alone.”¹

But religion may be quite as real and probably more healthy in the more normal form in which its sentiment does not hold such an exclusive predominance over all others. In such a case, as we have seen, the apparently intermittent occurrence of religious feeling does not necessarily indicate an intermittent religion. The religious sentiment which is the foundation of religious character, persists when the specifically religious consciousness is not operative. There is, as we shall see, a sense in which the religious sentiment, if at all strong, asserts a predominance over the entire life, but in the sense we are now considering, the understanding of the nature of the sentiment as such safeguards us from the false idea that religion comes and goes with the moment of its experience. It is much more deeply grounded in the character than that. The religious sentiment endures as a settled disposition even when other objects

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 101. This, though it is hardly a definition by fundamental characteristics, is descriptive of a prominent feature of mysticism. Otto finds the main characteristic of the latter in the over-emphasis upon certain aspects of the numinous. He instances the passage of the feeling of the mysterious or “wholly other” into that of the Beyond (nothingness, the void, the contrast to all Being whatsoever), and the passage of the element of fascination into the overbounding (Kenosis, “God all in all”). *Op. cit.* pp. 29–30, 37–39. The high stressing of those emotional aspects probably issues in the characteristic noted by Thouless. The extreme strength of the emotional experiences tends to the predominance over all other sentiments of the sentiment within which these emotions occur.

occupy the mind, and experience is stirred by other emotions appropriate to these objects.

3. A third consideration of the profoundest importance in regard to the sentiment is its place at the foundation of character. In its absence the emotional-conative life would remain a chaotic and unstable mass of feelings and impulses. The dominant purposes of a man's life are determined by his dominant ideas through the sentiments which range the emotions in systems around those ideas. The place and value of the sentiment in education and in the formation and maintenance of character thus become immediately obvious. The nature of the objects of the prevailing sentiments determines the nature and operation of the sentiments themselves, and thus lays down the lines upon which the character is moulded, and furnishes those predominant values and motives which issue in the characteristic appreciations and activities of the man.

Here lies the real crux of the ever-renewed controversy between Reason and Feeling as motives to belief and action, and as means of persuasion. It is questionable if the merely intellectual idea ever motives either action or belief at all, and if the merely intellectual argument in itself ever effects a change of mind. The idea which motives action and wins effective credence is the idea which attracts to itself a sentiment, or appeals to and ranges itself within a sentiment already present, and in either case becomes embedded in a dispositional system of an emotional-conative character. Of this system the idea becomes directive, and through it it becomes urgent, energetic, effective. It is no new and paradoxical theory that a man's real and effective beliefs, are not those to which he nods the intellect's assent, but those to which his life, his practice, and his

character show that he has accorded a deeper acceptance. He *feels* them to be true. They have organised a sentiment around them, and they have struck root deeply into his dispositional nature. Every real *credo* is something more than a deed of intellectual assent, it is a declaration of allegiance. I have raised a question whether a merely intellectual idea ever motives action or belief. Such an idea is not consciously and deliberately rejected against Reason. It fails, be it ever so logical, simply because it cannot find a place of abode. And the likelihood is, that striking with all its logical force against the sentiment-organisations already in possession, it will arouse a hostile sentiment of distaste which will create the worst possible conditions for acceptance. The force of the impact may possibly, in some instances, startle curiosity so as to awaken inquiry and result eventually in a reconstruction of sentiment in the matter, it may even result in a conversion, which is a revolution in sentiment, but in that case you are no longer dealing with a purely intellectual idea at all. But in general "the man convinced against his will" is the man who hears and cannot logically controvert an intellectual argument on behalf of some idea for which his already-formed mental dispositions have no use, and the proverb succinctly states the probable shallowness of the conviction effected. Cases in which intellectual argument produces real conviction and alteration of belief are those in which there is already present in the recipient the sentiment of the love of truth, one of the most powerful of all sentiments in those in whose mental constitution it has become engrained, but one not too frequently encountered. In such cases again the sentiment is present among the conditions which determine the course of action and belief.

But the light which is brought to bear by the doctrine of the sentiment upon the long controversy between Reason and Feeling consists in its convincing demonstration that the parties to the controversy are *not* Reason minus Feeling and Feeling minus Reason. It would be a far truer showing of the real state of matters to say that Reason simply cannot get rid of Feeling. Feeling *will* come into the situation. One is tempted to question whether a barely intellectual idea has any existence otherwise than as a psychological abstraction. The man who engages in an intellectual pursuit probably does so under the influence of a high and powerful sentiment, and the course of his quest will almost certainly be one that is not by any means devoid of emotional colour. He may conceivably have to desist from it at times in order to rest from its excitements and take refuge in the less exacting thrills of golf. It is probably true to say that every state of consciousness is a feeling-psychosis of greater or less intensity. A great deal has been accomplished toward the solution of the question between Reason and Feeling when we have recognised that in the sentiment the idea and its accompanying emotions are united in a complex operative unit of consciousness. In the last analysis it is true that the validity of our ideas can only be tested by the aid of intellectual scrutiny, but the education of *character* depends upon the building up of a healthy favouring sentiment upon and around the ideas which the reason approves. Such a sentiment transforms these ideas into ideals. They become the motives of our action and the ends of our purpose. They create and establish the very standards of value which the reason must use in its judgment of other ideas. Such a favouring sentiment is, as we have seen, some form of the sentiment of

love. It is literally true that we are saved and made by our worthy loves. The character is shaped by our unfeigned loyalties. Thinking of the revolutionary change in character and ideals which may be wrought by a deep religious experience, Thomas Chalmers spoke of "the expulsive power of a new affection." Nothing, it is true, will effectively displace a comparatively mean ideal entrenched in strong and perhaps lifelong sentiment, but the even stronger sentiment which the higher ideal is capable of evoking. The character which is secure is that which is grounded in principle. And we misjudge the very nature of principle if we mistake it for a cold adherence to the dictates of an abstract duty or an abstract truth. It is a passionate, unassailable loyalty. He was wrong who said that Virtue is Knowledge—how far wrong all deep spiritual experience attests. Virtue is Devotion, and the only explanation of the astounding misperception of Socrates is that for him the quest of knowledge was itself a "passionate pilgrimage."

Religion provides one of the highest and most enduring of the human values of which we have been speaking, and the sentiment in which that value is enshrined has been one of the great creative forces in the evolution of man's higher life. The religious life is the exercise of that sentiment. Worship is its outlet and expression. The activities and pursuits of human service which religion has at all times inspired and to which religious men have so freely given themselves are also its issue. The very creeds and theologies which have been so often despised (and never so heartily and unreasoningly despised as now) are the overflow of its abounding energies. And, above all, the character in which it issues marks it most of all as unique. The question

concerning character is not, as so many put it, whether a man may not be morally good in the absence of religion, but rather whether any other type of character achieves such fulness and harmony as the characteristically religious type. The latter question, which I cannot pause here to discuss in detail, is one to which very few moralists have even addressed themselves.

In order to understand the place and the power of the religious sentiment, in moulding character and in developing the religious life, it is necessary to recall two principles laid down by Shand as to the operation of the sentiment in general. The first is as follows: "*In the growth of character the sentiments tend with increasing success to control the emotions and impulses; in the decline of character the emotions and impulses tend with increasing power to achieve their freedom.*"¹ The powerful religious sentiment, when fully operative, is one of the strongest forces of control which can be brought to bear upon the emotions and impulses for the growth of character. The self-conquest which it enables its possessor to obtain, and his command over the resources of his own nature, are notable. The second of Shand's laws referred to above is of extreme importance.

"*Every sentiment tends to include in its system all the emotions, thoughts, volitional processes, and qualities of character which are of advantage to it for the attainment of its ends, and to reject all such constituents as are either superfluous or antagonistic.*" Shand adds the important proviso: "We do not assume that such an ideal form of organisation is ever in point of fact achieved, and least of all by the highest and most complex systems of the mind, the organisation of which is so much an

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 62.

acquisition and so difficult to achieve; but we do assume that every growing sentiment is, unconsciously at least, working toward its own more efficient organisation—that it tends to reject what it does not need, and to acquire what it does need—and that it is by this hidden fundamental law that its advance is governed.”¹ When the full bearing of this all-important law is considered, it will become obvious that the following further laws enunciated by the author are simple corollaries to it. “The qualities that a sentiment acquires for its own needs in becoming fixed, tend to qualify the character as a whole.”² And again: “The qualities of a man’s character, whether innate or acquired, hinder the development of all sentiments that need opposite qualities, but aid those that need the same.”³ And finally, “Every sentiment tends to form a type of character of its own.”⁴ From these principles the place of the sentiments at the foundations of character is easily discerned. Commenting upon them, Shand adds: “We can now see in a general way what are the dynamical relations in which a sentiment stands to the character as a whole. For, first, it consists in an organisation of a part of the character, which it exercises and strengthens. But, secondly, the rest of the character, which is outside of its system, does not remain unchanged. For in proportion as the sentiment becomes predominant, the emotional dispositions which it does not need, atrophy; and those which are hostile to it are suppressed; while the great multitude of its qualities, as we have just seen, tend to counteract the opposite qualities of other systems; and even its virtues and vices have a similar influence. Thus, although a sentiment is only an

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 106.

³ *Op. cit.* p. 122.

² *Op. cit.* p. 121.

⁴ *Op. cit.* p. 123.

organisation of a part of the character, it is in a dynamical relation to the rest, and gives a peculiar orientation to the whole.”¹

Now religion, in its fully developed form, such as we find in the higher religions, and especially in the Christian religion, is to be included among those “highest and most complex systems of the mind” to which Shand makes reference, and concerning which he reminds us that we must not “assume that such an ideal form of organisation is ever in point of fact achieved.” But it has been achieved to a wonderful degree of perfection by some in every Christian age (not to mention the examples which other faiths also provide), and the type of Christian character is perfectly well known and commands universal respect. And there is no type of character which more completely exemplifies the operation of a commanding sentiment in subduing to itself all the elements within the character, and producing a harmonious, consistent, and ordered whole. Every sentiment has its own peculiar and characteristic features, and tends towards its own particular type of character, and it would be an interesting and exceedingly profitable study to delineate in detail, with the help of suitable material gathered from religious literature and especially religious biography, what are the essential characteristics of the religious (and specifically the Christian) sentiment and character. We cannot here enter into any such exhaustive inquiry, but it is to be noted that the high ethical quality of the Christian conception of God, and above all the central and integral place within the Christian religion of the discipleship of Christ, have enshrined the highest type of moral idealism within the Christian sentiment, endowed that high

¹ *Op. cit.* pp. 122-123.

morality with the strongest religious sanctions, and conferred upon it that "numinous" quality—by transference from the central thought of a righteous and holy God and of Jesus Christ as the Son of God and the perfect exemplar of mankind—which has transformed the idea of moral evil into that of "sin" and of moral good into that of "holiness."¹ The religious sentiment, as exemplified in Christianity, acquires to itself that high ethic as part of the content which it needs for the attainment of its ends, and by the law of that dynamic relation of a dominant sentiment to the rest of the character, which Shand enunciates, it rejects and inhibits all that is antagonistic to it. A strong and growing Christian sentiment tends to subdue and conform the whole character to its own ideals. This process may be only imperfectly accomplished in any particular case, but the tendency is present, is recognised to be essential, and is consciously cultivated by the earnest Christian. It is by reason of this dynamical relation of the religious sentiment to the entire character that religion is so successful a force in "sublimating" the natural instincts and impulses, which might otherwise be directed to unethical and unsocial ends, to the higher uses and activities of the spirit. It is by reason of it also that the Christian feels himself enlisted in a "service which is perfect freedom," and ruled by a law which is a "law of liberty." He has his nature at command. He is freed from the enslaving tyranny of the meaner systems of his nature, by the dominant allegiance of his soul. He is no longer "conformed to this world," ruled by the dispositional systems of the conventional "worldly" life, but "transformed by the renewing of "

¹ It is only in a divine reference, and within a religious ethic, that those two "numinous" terms have meaning.

his mind,¹ swept into the circle of the interests and activities which forward the ends of the higher life. He is no longer "overcome of evil," because in his life evil is "overcome with good."² Evil loses its suggestiveness, it dies of ceasing to be interesting. It is a bold statement of the ideal perfection of Christian character to say, "Whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin . . . he cannot sin, because he is born of God,"³ But it is a state towards which Christian character approximates, and the statement has good psychological foundation.

The accusation made by some against the Christian, and in general the religious, type of character, that it is "other worldly," points to a feature of it which arises from its very nature as a specifically religious phenomenon. Every sentiment has its own peculiar character, as we have already noted, and we should expect a sentiment and a corresponding type of character which is religious in nature, which centres, that is to say, in the idea of One who is the Wholly Other than ourselves, which owns allegiance to "another king" and to a kingdom which is "not of this world," would take its tone from those origins, and would evolve an ethic of an "other-worldly" nature. I do not see how we could well expect the case to be otherwise. There have, doubtless, been one-sided and exaggerated manifestations of this feature which are worthy of deprecation, and which have given rise to the distaste for the characteristic in general, but there is obviously a sense in which the "other-worldly" ideal will always and necessarily be characteristic of religious character. If other-worldliness is in itself an objectionable feature, then religion stands condemned by its ethical products.

¹ Rom. xii. 2.

² Rom. xii. 21.

³ 1 John iii. 9.

But that is an extreme position which a fair judgment will hesitate to adopt. The other-worldly strain in Christian ethics has been in many ways justified of its children, whose character has conserved and enriched some of the most precious human values.

Nietzsche's scornful characterisation of the Christian type of character as a slave-type, and of Christian morality as a slave-morality, indicates, exaggerates, and misunderstands another outstanding feature of the character and ideal which issue from the Christian religious sentiment. It is not only an attack upon the entire ethic of meekness, forbearance, and mercifulness contained in the teaching and example of Jesus, and the whole ideal of Christian charity so characteristically manifested in the pages of Christian history, but against the root ideal of humility itself which is engrained in the religious attitude. Nietzsche and his followers have the perception to discern that this feature is rooted in the nature of the Christian religion. Again, it is an example of a fundamental idea of a religion, and a corresponding fundamental attitude towards God of His worshipper, working out through the religious sentiment into the entire life, conduct, and character of the religious man. Christian humility derives from that aspect of "*majestas*," which Otto has found to characterise the divine, and is a natural and inevitable attitude of the religious man. Nietzsche jumped to the conclusion that the relation between God and His worshipper is modelled upon that between tyrant and slave. That, of course, is a travesty, and betrays only the misunderstanding of the "natural" man before a type of experience with which he has no direct acquaintance, and his unwillingness to allow the propriety of an attitude which calls for any form of self-negation. Nietzsche's

perception is so far right that in this point also the religion and the ethic stand or fall together. The latter is organic to the former. Beyond this we need not discuss the matter here, further than to recollect that a consensus of enlightened ethical opinion would surely not regard the man who is incapable of humility as altogether an estimable character.¹

It is in the sense indicated in the laws of the operation of the sentiment which we have already enunciated, that it is true to say that religion demands a complete and all-comprehensive allegiance to its objects and ideals. We have already seen² that the very nature of the sentiment frees us from the supposition that religious earnestness and faithfulness demand that the objects of religion be unceasingly before us and its characteristic emotions be never absent. But in its operation the religious sentiment, if it is a strong and growing sentiment, does dominate the character and determine the action. Contrary sentiments, whose systems are disadvantageous to its own, tend either to be displaced by it or to displace it. Character tends toward stability. It refuses to strike a compromise between hostile sentiments. Religion becomes unreal and ineffective, and eventually disappears if sentiments contradictory to its system gain the mastery and develop into strength. On the other hand religion, if it be living and strong, casts out the opposing systems. "No man can serve two masters: for either he will hate the one, and love the other; or else he will hold to the one, and despise the other. Ye cannot serve God and mammon."³ Of two conflicting sentiments, the one destroys the other. "A

¹ For the discussion of many points relevant to the subject of Christian character, *vide* H. Rashdall, *Conscience and Christ*.

² Cf. pp. 108 ff.

³ Matt. vi. 24.

double-minded man is unstable in all his ways.”¹ A dominant allegiance, and all the other passions in harmony with it, these are needed for that unity of consciousness, that singleness of mind which stabilises character.

It is in view of this aspect of the sentiment that we can best understand these cases of religious and moral conflict, followed very often by a revolutionary change of sentiment in some form of conversion, which is so marked a feature of the religious experience of many individuals, and which has so frequently attracted the notice of psychologists. So important is the bearing upon such phenomena of the laws of operation of the sentiment, with which we have been occupied, that it is scarcely too much to say that the most useful line for further investigation of the conversion-crisis would be a reconsideration of the whole subject in the light of the theory of the sentiment.² When some religious impression is made upon the mind, some religious idea is implanted, by whatsoever means, and the appropriate emotions are aroused, a sentiment begins to form about the central religious idea or ideas, and its tendency towards dominance, towards exclusion of every contradictory thought, habit, and impulse, is very soon discovered. A conflict between the incompatibles takes place, and may rise to the acutest and sorest mental and moral struggle. In the period of adolescence, when the thoughts and the character are in course of formation, such an inward struggle is not uncommon. If definite bad habits have been formed, and lower impulses have been consciously indulged, these are perceived to be absolutely incompatible with the demands of the new ideals, and the

¹ Jas. i. 8.

² This has been attempted, very shortly, but suggestively, by W. K. Wright, *A Student's Philosophy of Religion*, ch. xv.

“sense of sin” enters into the case, making the struggle all the more acute and distressing. The point of decision or of “surrender” to the demands of the new system usually arrives sharply, but with permanent results upon character. The battle is fought, and the incompatible elements of the consciousness and character are disposed of. If the conversion be a real and natural phenomenon of the religious growth of the individual, and not merely an artificially induced crisis, such as is common at times of “religious revival,” it represents a deep-going and fundamental change, and establishes a lasting supremacy for the religious ideal. The change may proceed more quietly and unobtrusively, without any disturbing upheaval and crisis, but some form of mental unrest and a certain disquietude until the issue is settled, are likely to attend the first recognitions of the demand made by religion for a decisive and uncompromising acceptance.

From all that has been said concerning the place and power of the religious sentiment, it will be seen how great a factor it is among the mental forces which enter into religious development, both in history and in the religious education of the individual. We are no longer dealing with the elementary factors or momenta of religious experience, but with its upbuilding into larger and more complex wholes. We have seen how the sentiment not only includes and organises the emotions within its own system, but extends to the control—even to the allowing or disallowing, the passing or the censoring—of the impulses associated with other and competing sentiments, and how finally it accepts or rejects not only the emotional impulses concerned, but even the habits, the thoughts, and the activities as well. The systematised units which it builds up are therefore exceedingly complex

and influential. We have already noticed the double process of complication and refinement which is manifested in the course of religious history, and we can see how the religious sentiment with its extraordinary influence upon the whole content of consciousness becomes a main factor in that process. The complexity and fulness of the developed religious experience is largely due to the action of the sentiment in organising all the powers and activities of the mind under its system. The progressive refinement of thought and feeling can be traced to the same source. In the process, thought and feeling, and indeed all the mental powers, advance together, for they are interlocked in the system of the sentiment.

It may not be out of place, before we pass from the consideration of this aspect of our subject, to refer shortly to the evidential or apologetic value of the fact of Christian character itself. It has been many times remarked that a Christian is the final and sufficient voucher for Christianity. And even where all argument about Christian evidences may fail, the fact of Christian character stands clear. We have seen that the type of character is distinct, the unique religious sentiment which springs from the specific objects of Christian faith, and especially from the spiritual fact of Christ, issues in a specific and recognisable type of character, only a very few of the features of which we have tarried to delineate, but which is perfectly well known, and the excellence of which is very generally acknowledged. What real and serious apologetic value resides in this fact of Christian character? It furnishes an argument which apologists have not been slow to use, which has indeed been used by them from the earliest times. What is its real significance? It can, of course, furnish no demonstrative proof of the *truth* of the fundamental Christian con-

victions. The Christian ethics and the character in which it issues have indeed been accepted as good by many who reject the Christian doctrines, and who for that very reason draw a distinction between theology and life, between dogma and practice. And we can so far allow that what is established by the fact of Christian character is the validity and elevation, perhaps we might even go so far as to say the supremacy of the Christian ethic. It is an entirely valid procedure to judge an ethical system by what it produces. Of systems as of individuals, it is true that "by their fruits ye shall know them."

But though we may admit that this acknowledged fact of Christian character does not constitute a demonstrative proof of the validity of Christian belief, I think there are considerations which make towards a certain degree of general, and if we may call it so, of moral, proof. And that is the significance of the frequent use of this line of argument. The argument further is considerably strengthened by those features of Christian experience which we have been considering. For the sentiment most undoubtedly affords a vital link between faith and character. The nature of the religious object determines the nature of the sentiment which centres in it. The nature of the sentiment in turn determines the nature of the character which results from its operations. There is no break in the chain which binds together the object of religious faith and the quality of the character which is one of its most characteristic expressions. If the Christian faith, where it is most fully comprehended and most earnestly accepted, results in a character to which the Christian apologist can fearlessly, confidently, and proudly point, inviting the world to judge that faith by its outcome, then there appears to be large presumption at least in

favour of his argument. For the Christian character is not something extraneous to the Christian faith. It has in strict truth been produced by it. We cannot accept the one and reject the other, as if they were unconnected features which chanced to meet in the one individual. They are organic to one another. No one attempts to use the fact of the Christian character as a demonstration of the truth of any particular system of theology. Theologies and creeds alter and expand, as also, by the way, do moral ideals. But I speak of the general Christian conception which theologies and creeds strive to embody and express. The thought of God which Christian faith apprehends and seeks to explicate ; the love of God, the experience of communion, the reality of forgiveness, the awful sanctity of righteousness, the spiritual significance of Jesus, and, above all, the solemn meaning of the Cross, these thoughts and others of a like nature, which all Christian confessions and theologies seek to express in intellectual terms, find their practical embodiment and outcome in Christian life and character. That character is not an accident of the faith in connection with which it arises. These religious ideas characterise and constitute the religious object around which Christian sentiment crystallises, and through that sentiment they are wrought into the fabric of Christian character. That character would not have been produced in their absence. We have seen in one or two instances how the particular features of that character are directly traceable to the nature of the Christian conception of God. And the parallels could be greatly increased in number and detail. The Christian character is what the Christian faith has made it.

Even that, it may be objected, does not prove the latter true. The proof is certainly not demonstrative.

It lacks a premise. That premise must ever remain a postulate, but it is a postulate the denial of which involves a fundamental distrust of the universe. It involves the doubt of the unity of the world, the denial of any connection between goodness and truth. If the character, good or evil, high or low, be as we have seen reason to think a resultant of the faith to which we have given our hearts, have we not a right to assume that that faith which produces good is in some touch, at least, with reality? In point of fact, it was concerning means of discrimination between false prophets and true that our Lord was speaking when he uttered the words "By their fruits ye shall know them." This step in the argument, then, is one that we must take in faith. As we have already seen in another connection, so here again we have evidence that at every point and in every aspect, the object of religious experience is only reached by faith. There is no process of avouchment which can dispense with faith. It is in this case faith in the Universe, faith in the fundamental reasonableness of existence. Indeed, the implied judgment, namely, that that which issues in goodness is true is one which most men make so naturally that they do not notice that they have made any assumption at all.

We began this lecture with the observation of the long and wonderful course of continuous development in religious history which has from the simplest and crudest beginnings issued in religious systems of such complexity and comprehensiveness of content as now we know. And we have endeavoured to mark some of the processes of that evolution. And yet we have been occupied mainly in the consideration of processes operating not on a large social scale, but within the individual

consciousness. The expansion and development of the individual religious consciousness has kept pace with the growth of religion in social history. Not only so, but the latter is to a very great degree dependent upon the former. We have had occasion in a former lecture to observe that the individual element in religion is the progressive element. The development of religion has always depended upon its prophets. The forward step, the clearer grasp of truth, the finer feeling, the nobler ideals, have first been taken into possession by the spiritual pioneer, and through him made the property of his fellows.

Discoveries of fuller truth, influxes of new life, growth into purer and higher forms have always come by persons. The individual heresy of one age becomes the hardened and accepted belief and practice of the next. In the later stages of the process, when the individual counts for more in relation to the society, the contribution of the individual becomes more and more significant. Personal religion, which is the prime object of our study, is really a characteristic phenomenon of the later stages and the more highly developed forms of religion. And with the growing possibility of personal religion came the gradual modification of its early forms, the introduction of fuller conceptions of God and more refined ideas of the human relationship towards Him, and the manner in which such relationship was to be sought and found. With it came, too, an alteration even in the relative parts played in religion by the various emotions we have found to be involved in it. Reverence, which we have found to be a highly-characteristic religious emotion, becomes more prominent as the mere wonder and awe produced by the abnormal, fall into their subordinate places. The primal fear is more and more cast out

by love as more adequate thoughts of the divine nature are matured.

I would ask you, too, at this point to notice that great as is the part which we have found it necessary to assign to emotion in our account of religion, conception in some form is necessarily present from the first, and probably increases in importance to the last. In any account of the rise of religion, the *idea* of the divine takes its place. Religious experience has an object which is held in some form of thought. When we consider early man face to face with strange and awe-inspiring happenings of nature, we must suppose that at some point he passes over, before he can become religious at all, into the conception of *some one* who is the author of these happenings. He possesses, in some form, the image or idea of spiritual beings. Thought may be present only in its simplest, most rudimentary forms. But even in the rudest mythology there is some kind of acceptance of the *idea* of divine beings. Mythology is the beginning of theology. Throughout the process of man's religious evolution, conception and imagination interact with emotion until, later, reflective thought also takes its place. We have seen how each and all co-operate in the sentiment. It is by the progressive refinement of man's ideas of God that religion grows to meet man's growing needs. In all that I have said regarding the very large place of emotion in religion, I have not meant in any way to minimise processes of conception and reflection, but rather to emphasise the extent to which these processes are influenced by the emotions systematised in the religious sentiments, and the degree to which religious beliefs and practices are motivated by and expressive of these emotions. In the sentiment the feelings appear not as

rivals but as aids to the intellect. On the one hand, we must guard ourselves from the error of supposing that religious ideas are or must needs be constructs of pure reason if they are to be considered worthy of respect; on the other hand, we must beware of cutting ourselves off from the possibility of demonstrating the reasonableness of these same beliefs. Religious thinking is essentially emotional thinking, but that does not make it false thinking. Beliefs which are satisfying to the religious sentiment, and are held largely because they are so, are not *ipso facto* unsatisfactory to the reason. It would be foolish to deem them unreasonable until they are shown to be so. Why should we assume a cleft in human nature between the deliverances of a fundamental and universal sentiment on the one hand, and these of reason on the other? And it would require very strong conflicting evidence indeed even to arrest our attention on behalf of the objection, should the deliverances of the religious sentiment pass the severe test of not only raising no conflict within our experience, but of actually shedding light upon it, and filling it with meaning and value. There is a true sense in which "the heart has reasons"—not in asserting a realm of belief belonging to itself, into which we cannot allow reason to pry, but in furnishing us with a kingdom of truth which satisfies the needs of our deepest nature, and which we may dare, if need be, bring to this point of empirical verification, that so far from introducing confusion into our whole experience it actually brings light into our dark places.

And it is further significant that those very emotions and instincts which we have admitted to play an important part in religion, have been by religion more than by any other power ennobled and humanised. If

we may borrow a term from psycho-analysis, religion has been the greatest influence in the sublimating to the highest ends of human life those parts of our nature which bind us kin with our pre-human ancestry. Religion need not be ashamed of those primitive factors which analysis displays, for she has redeemed them to the noblest and purest uses.

There is one particular aspect of man's religious evolution to which I would especially draw your attention. It is a development which we might call the transference or sublimation of wonder. It must have occurred to you, as we surveyed the probable course of the process wherein the wonder and awe aroused by the supernatural issued in the idea of divine beings and the desire to placate these beings, that there was such a dissimilarity between the situation there described, and the conceptions and attitude of the Christian religion—there was such a gap between the beginning and the end of the course—that such a description of religious first beginnings brought little or no help to the understanding of our own religious life. The thought of God is so far advanced beyond these first conceptions, the needs which are satisfied by that thought so different from these early fears and wonders, the idea of placating so far removed from our desired attitude towards the divine, that we hardly recognise the first and last stages as belonging to the same series. And yet they represent the terminal points of a continuous process of growth. It would take a course of lectures in itself to display the stages of that process. It is a fascinating story. It is the spiritual history of man. This aspect of it, however, I would ask you to mark. Take the awe of early man before the mysterious. His wonder is very largely mixed with fear. It is most often in connection with

a material object that his emotion is elicited. It is a material danger which he would seek in his cult to obviate. His fear reaches out to the supernatural, and he worships in a wonder which is almost swallowed up in dread. In course of time the wonder increases, the mere dread recedes. The thought arises of a divine being to whom gratitude is due. Gradually reverence dawns. The thought of divine caprice fades out. Man worships a God who is thankworthy. His goodwill towards His worshippers becomes reflected in their love toward Him. As love grows, harsh fear dies. As man attains to moral maturity, his idea of God is moralised. The thought is reached of an ethical God who asks for moral perfection in His worshippers. Gradually the aspects of life which suggest divinity have changed from material catastrophe to the unseen realities of the spiritual life. God has correspondingly grown from a being of capricious vengeance to one of love and ethical perfection. His demands upon His worshippers have altered from the meaningless performance of meaningless deeds which please the deity, to the observance of a moral commandment which reason and conscience endorse. The endeavour after right relations with God has changed correspondingly. Fear has given place to love and trust and confidence. Growing and expanding conceptions have kept pace with a changing sentiment, until at last in the fulness of time man learns his greatest lesson in the nature of the divine by looking upon a human life, showing powers and possessing qualities than which man can conceive no higher. From Jesus Christ mankind learns to call God Father, in Him it learns of a divine pain for man's blessing, a divine self-sacrifice for man's salvation. Mankind can figure no better relation to God than relationship with this

One in love and trust and obedience. In the beginning of the process the supernatural is the catastrophic and the uncanny in the material world, and salvation is safety from its menaces. In the end the supernatural is in a kingdom which is not of this world, and salvation is participation in its life, its gifts, its benefits. I have called the process the transformation of wonder. The spiritual is the wonder-world which the agelong process of religion has revealed. Kant, in a sentence now well-nigh hackneyed, said that two things never failed to fill his soul with wonder—the starry heavens above and the moral law within. Man has grown in his capacity for the second wonder, in his capability for perceiving the wonder of the unseen world of the spirit. Reverence has more and more been elicited by that inner world. There are beauties and terrors of nature that elicit our awe and wonder still, but the wonder of religion has discovered itself more and more in the kingdom possessed by the soul. There were times in the midst of the long process when man, still looking back to the wonder of the material, asked of his spiritual leaders, What sign showest thou ? It is a lingering mark of the primitive, clinging to the material, unable to see that the spiritual can attest its own message, that it is itself the wonder, carrying the sign and seal of the divine within. Jesus answered uncompromisingly : “An evil generation seeketh after a sign, and there shall no sign be given unto it.” In Him we have learned what really is divine in character, and bow in reverence before that which to earlier conceptions appeared a stumbling-block and foolishness. It amounts to a complete transformation of the entire world of man’s religious objects and a corresponding change in his attitude towards that world. The benefit which he seeks in his religion is a salvation not from physical

harm and danger, but from moral waste and spiritual alienation.

Throughout the course of man's religious development, from lowest to highest man's attitude is that of worship. That attitude lies at the basis of the development itself. In concluding this lecture, I would ask you to think of the gifts which this characteristically religious attitude has borne to mankind. It is the attitude of the suppliant, the posture of prayer, the bended knee, the folded hands, the upward look. In it man confesses himself the utter recipient. He acknowledges that which is beyond him. I would suggest that that attitude is itself one of the secrets of that course of development which we have reviewed, that in the character and posture of the utter recipient man does receive and learn. By it he is admitted into things which remain closed to his more active and self-reliant endeavours. Man cannot storm his way to the City of Light. The best and highest is a gift. Man comes to the verge and limit of his bounded experience and his finite capacities, and bows down before the unimaginably great. It is in that attitude of submission and of reception that man has risen above himself. You must have been struck in our analysis of the religious emotions by the place which was accorded by common consent to the emotion of submission or negative self-feeling. Correspondingly we found the element of mystery, of majesty, of utter transcendence and separate sanctity in all man's thought of God. We have seen how the enemies of religion have made these aspects of it a point of attack upon it. The natural man sees in this characteristic attitude and mark of religion something belittling and degrading to man. Experience and history proclaim the reverse to be true. Through worship man

has grown, his life has expanded, his vision has pierced the veil, his spirit has learned to know the wonders of the unseen. There is a sense in which worship is the natural attitude of man before the transcendent. There is no attitude which has so ennobled him. *Not* to bow before that which is worthy of reverence, to feel no compulsion to prostrate ourselves before the mystery and majesty of holiness, to fail to feel our souls commanded by divine goodness, is to be cut off from the source of life's abiding good. For it is in this attitude that our souls are opened. Humility is a religious essential, for it is rooted in the fundamental religious attitude. And humility degrades no man. Humility is not making ourselves small, but measuring ourselves by standards that are big. Humility steals into the soul as we hold converse with the majesty of goodness, and lift our eyes to the pinnacles of truth. To know God is to fall before Him. And to fall before Him is to be lifted above ourselves. "And when I saw" the vision, "I fell upon my face, and I heard a voice of One that spake. And He said unto me, Son of man, stand upon thy feet, and I will speak unto thee."¹ The command is no rebuke to the prostrate prophet. It is the very outcome and result of his adoring reverence. The divine speech has always come to the prostrate. Through worship men have known God, and have been lifted up.

"And thus looking within and around me, I ever renew
(With that stoop of the soul which in bending upraises it too)
The submission of man's nothing-perfect to God's all-complete,
As by each new obeisance in spirit I climb to His feet."²

¹ Ezek. i. 28 ; ii. 1.

² Browning, *Saul*.

LECTURE V

THE INFLUENCE OF SUGGESTION

IN coming to the consideration of suggestion in religious experience we may seem to revert again to aspects of a simpler character than those reviewed in the last lecture. But I think we shall find that our previous study of the nature of the sentiment will be of help to us in understanding the part played by suggestion. And in one respect at least the study of suggestion is more complicated than that of the factors we have already considered, namely, in that it is in a sense a social rather than an individual phenomenon. For it introduces us to a special kind of interaction or interplay between individual minds. This consideration brings forcibly to our notice the fact that religion is in a very real sense a social phenomenon. Indeed, one of the tendencies of modern psychology is to emphasise the social nature of all experience. We are more and more clearly grasping the fact that the isolated individual is a pure fiction. The individual consciousness cannot be effectively studied and a clear account of it rendered if it is regarded as a self-complete unit. The consciousness and the behaviour of the individual cannot be understood when considered out of relation to other individuals. This does not mean that psychology is dissipated in sociology. Rather it indicates that the psychological unit is no longer to be taken to be the isolated individual, but the individual as a member of society. The indi-

vidual consciousness develops in intercourse with other individuals.

After treating of the instincts and emotions as *specific* innate mental tendencies, McDougall passes to the consideration of suggestion and suggestibility as *general* innate tendencies of the mind. He enumerates indeed three such general tendencies, namely, *sympathy*, or more specifically sympathetic induction of the emotions, *suggestion*, and *imitation*. The three are closely related to one another in that they each involve interaction of a somewhat analogous kind between individuals. This aspect of interaction gives them their undoubtedly important place in the psychological investigation of the mental forces which underlie all forms of social life.

Sympathy, in the psychological sense, is sufficiently described by its more specific designation, sympathetic induction of the emotions. It is a direct and innate response to the expression of emotion in others. It would seem to be closely connected with the gregarious instinct, and its effects can be observed in the conduct of all the gregarious animals. Any close and constant observer of animal life will recall numberless examples of it. McDougall instances, among other examples, the spread of fear in a flock or herd. "Many gregarious animals utter when startled a characteristic cry of fear; when this cry is emitted by one member of a flock or herd, it immediately excites the flight-impulse in all of its fellows who are within hearing of it: the whole herd, flock, or covey takes to flight like one individual."¹ The tendency is present also in man, in greater or less strength, according to the relative strength of other elements of consciousness which tend to inhibit it or to give it free play. Among the simpler affective states

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 92.

examples are common. Laughter is notoriously infectious, so also is a mood of gloom. Both fear and curiosity are easily spread. "In short," McDougall sums up, "each of the great primary emotions that has its characteristic and unmistakable bodily expression seems to be capable of being excited by way of this immediate sympathetic response."¹ It would seem, however, and the consideration is one which has a more direct bearing upon our study than those just touched upon, that not only "each of the great primary emotions," but also affective states in general, inclusive of the complex emotions, some of which we have seen to be involved in the religious consciousness, can be thus sympathetically induced. Indeed that specific emotional response to the mysterious and the uncanny in which Otto, as we have seen, has discerned the raw material of the religious consciousness, is peculiarly liable to sympathetic induction.

Similarly, *imitation* is a direct response whereby we repeat the actions which we have seen performed by others. It is of several kinds, but into a discussion of these we do not require to go. It has far less bearing upon our study than either of the other analogous tendencies.

That which is generally accorded the greatest importance in connection with the matter we have in hand is *suggestion*. The existence of suggestion as a fact of consciousness was brought to the notice of the psychologist, in the first instance, by consideration of the phenomena of hypnotism. The main characteristic of the state of hypnosis is the extraordinary readiness of the patient to accept with complete conviction any proposition laid down to him by the agent. But it became

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 95.

evident in the course of investigation that hypnosis was by no means the only instance of the operation of suggestion. It exists in varying degrees in our ordinary intercourse with others, and is one of the most important factors in our mental life.

McDougall defines suggestion as follows: "Suggestion is a process of communication resulting in the acceptance with conviction of the communicated proposition in the absence of logically adequate grounds for its acceptance."¹ The process itself is called suggestion, the condition of mind of the individual who receives the communication is called suggestibility. The operation of the process in our minds is disguised, first, by the fact that it is manifested in very varying degrees, becoming much less marked with the education and growth of the intellectual faculties; second, by the circumstance that in the normal processes whereby propositions are accepted and beliefs are formed, suggestion blends and co-operates with logical processes; third, by the tendency of the mind to rationalise—that is, to elaborate logical reasons for actions, judgments, and beliefs which are in reality adopted without reason; and fourth, by reason of the fact that the means by which the communication is successfully made are often extremely subtle and difficult to detect, and do not necessarily imply the use of the propositional form, or even of language at all.

We have to note three specific kinds of suggestion besides the simple suggestion above defined.

1. *Auto-suggestion* is the form of the process in which the idea suggested is originated by the subject himself. It has been made prominent by the therapeutic use to which the Nancy School and others

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 97.

endeavour to put it, as well as by its extensive employment in the psychological analysis of abnormal states, but its general influence is probably much less than that of hetero-suggestion.

2. *Herd-suggestion* is the suggestion which a member of a group or society is constantly receiving from that group. Dr. Rivers, Mr. Trotter, and others have used this conception with great effect in their investigations into group psychology, and the existence of this kind of suggestion greatly increases the scope of the suggestive influences which bear upon the individual, and mould his entire view of life. To it is largely due the uniformity which tends to characterise the judgment and belief of the members of a community. It is the ground and the main sanction not only of taste and fashion, but of the accepted code of morality. It is a main force in education. Our whole knowledge of the world, until we apply reflective criticism to that knowledge, is shaped in the moulds which it supplies. Its influence may be gauged from the reflection that even when we do begin to "think for ourselves," when the critical faculty is awakened, our ordinary ideas subjected to analysis, and the tasks of science and philosophy begun in earnest, the groundwork of our philosophy, the ideas we thus analyse, the experience which we set out to systematise, is neither more nor less than the corpus of those "common-sense" notions which have been impressed upon us by sheer force of suggestion in the world in which we have grown up. Concomitantly with this process of general suggestion, of course, processes of criticism and investigation are continually going on in the normal mental life, and in course of time their results are taken into the general stock, and become part of the whole view of things, which the group impresses upon the minds of its members, so

that at no time can it be said that the "common sense" view is completely irrational. It is rational in the sense that it thus incorporates the results of past thinking in the view which it transmits. But the manner of its usual transmission is of the irrational¹ kind which we name suggestion. The mass of herd-suggestion is the repository of authority and tradition.

The existence of herd-suggestion brings to light another fact concerning suggestion in general. It may be exercised without a conscious agent. Simple suggestion between individuals *may* be consciously practised by one upon another, but herd-suggestion is very largely operative without any such conscious intention on the part of any one. The conscious intention to produce suggestion is not *necessary* in either case. The necessary condition of it is the innate tendency of the subject's mind to receive the communicated belief. The prime factor is the existence of *suggestibility* as a normal feature of consciousness.

3. The third special variation of suggestion, which I may mention in a word, is the form known as *contra-suggestion*. It is the process opposite in nature to suggestion. It shows itself in a tendency to *reject* without rational grounds a proposition advanced by another person. Thouless remarks that "persons in whom the attitude of contra-suggestion has become habitual are what we call *cranks*."²

The bearing of the facts of suggestion upon every aspect of our social life is manifest. But quite as important are they by reason of their place in any account of our individual experience that is to remain true to

¹ In the third lecture we adopted Otto's usage of the word "rational" as equivalent to "conceptual." We use it here, obviously, as meaning "supported by adequate logical grounds."

² *Op. cit.* p. 23.

the facts. The discovery of the influence of suggestion is one of those considerations which has brought into prominence the social character of the individual experience which I have already referred to, and no better example could be adduced of the powerful working of social factors in the individual mind. The psychological unit, as we have said, is the individual as a member of society. That membership is constitutive of his individual mentality.

It is utterly impossible to account, on individualistic lines, for our mental construction even of the material world in which we live, and psychology has in the past wasted much effort and ingenuity in the futile task. We enter into our social inheritance at the very earliest age at which the mind begins to stir at all. A child of six to-day has a view of the world which in numberless points would have been impossible to a man of sixty in ancient Britain. That view is obviously not the construction of reason—that is to say, not of the child's own reason. It is a view which has been impressed—consciously and unconsciously—upon the child, and which will be the foundation of all his thinking and all his experience in future years. As he grows, that impression will deepen and expand, largely by the same force of individual and collective suggestion, and his ideas of the world will be filled out in detail. A vast amount of that detail he will *never* personally verify, yet he will hold an unshakable and perfectly justifiable conviction of its truth. I myself to this day take on trust the existence of the Pyramids and the Sphinx, as well as the generally held conviction that they are monuments of a vanished antiquity. The case is not essentially different with our moral and spiritual convictions. It could hardly be accepted as a proper defence

of a prosecution for theft that the culprit had never had opportunity to think out for himself the implications for the body politic of free appropriation of other people's goods. The individual may think the matter out for himself or not, according as his interests and his mental necessities compel him to do so, or otherwise, but in any case he is presumed to know that stealing is wrong. And it is in the main a justifiable presumption. Yet it is a judgment accepted for the most part without proof on the simple assurance of the general consensus.

It will be well to review shortly the conditions which predispose the subject to the state of suggestibility. Suggestibility decreases in proportion to the activity and effective organisation of the intellectual powers. Successful suggestion depends upon the depression or inactivity, from one or more of several causes, of the critical faculty. McDougall enumerates four of these main causes. First he classes together "abnormal states of the brain," including conditions of hysteria and hypnosis, as well as normal sleep and fatigue. The suggestibility of such abnormal states, however, is a matter of interest mainly to the pathologist, and has little direct bearing upon our subject. Second come such causes as deficiency of knowledge of the subject concerning which suggestion is made, and lack of organisation in the knowledge possessed. The suggestibility of children is partly due to this cause, and it also accounts for the acceptance by the uneducated of many propositions which are not only received without any logical justification, but which would come into conflict with such knowledge were it present, and so arouse critical opposition. Thirdly, he enumerates the "impressive character of the source from which the suggested proposition is communicated." Suggestion due to this

cause has been named *prestige* suggestion. It plays a very important rôle in many departments of our life, and a variety of it will be considered in our treatment of the place of suggestion in religion. Closely connected with the operation of the latter is that of McDougall's fourth cause, namely "peculiarities of the character and native disposition of the subject."¹ Chief of the last-named peculiarities seems to be the relative strength of the two primary emotions of positive and negative self-feeling or elation and submission. This brings the fourth cause into close relation with the third, into the operation of which those instinctive-emotional tendencies also enter. The relative strength of these two emotions in the natural temperament of the receiver of the suggestion, and the relative proportion in which they are aroused by the personality of the maker of the suggestion, are complementary factors in the situation. Other predisposing factors might be mentioned. Mere contiguity and number would seem to have a suggestive influence, as is seen in the fact of herd-suggestion. We almost invariably show a large degree of conformity to the practice and opinion of our neighbours. And the larger the number of people who hold such an opinion, the greater tends to be its influence over the mind. Similar conformities of opinion and practice are those which are exhibited by the members of a class, a profession, a club, a sect, a party, and so on. Again, repetition would seem to have a peculiarly strong suggestive power akin to that which attaches to numbers, a fact which the publicity manager has fully grasped. The conscious use of the device of reiteration by the suggester may, however, approach toward the limit of hypnotic means. All these pre-

¹ Vide *op. cit.* p. 98.

disposing causes have been duly noted and fully discussed by psychologists.

There remains, however, a most outstanding and strangely neglected cause of suggestible receptivity, which seems to me to be of the very utmost importance for a just understanding of the subject. It is exceedingly simple, but most far-reaching in its bearing upon our estimate of the value of suggestion. I mean simply *the absence of any pressing practical need for criticism*. A proposition is accepted on suggestion, that is without any adequate logical grounds for its acceptance, simply because such logical grounds are not perceived to be necessary. The proposition probably "feels" true, that is to say, it accords with the unconscious and implicit logic of experience and with the *corpus* of knowledge already possessed. Or, short even of that, it presents itself as at least *possible*, non-contradictory of that *corpus* of knowledge so far as it is available at the moment. It passes muster without logical credentials simply because it "chimes" with experience. The general consciousness registers no objection to its being accepted as true. If the same suggester under the same conditions in every respect convey to the same person another proposition which is manifestly absurd, it will have no suggestive power. Even if the second proposition be a plausible one, it will be rejected or at least doubted and inquired into if it raises however vague a feeling of incompatibility with previous convictions. The critical faculty will be roused and the logical reasons demanded. And, in the third place, even if this further proposition be not only plausible, but actually true and well-grounded, its suggestiveness will be arrested in the event of its impinging upon even a groundless and irrational prejudice already lodged in the mind. The

emotional attitude is in that case the inhibiting cause. But in all these cases alike it is the absence of any reason for asking reasons that causes the success of the suggestion ; the presence of any such reason, whether intellectual or emotional, is inhibitory. This seems to me a highly important consideration.

Suggestion is often referred to in tones which seem to imply that propositions which are accepted without logical grounds are false propositions. An unproved proposition is not synonymous with an untrue proposition. A proposition may be accepted simply because there is no evidence of its falsehood and no felt necessity for the logical grounds of its truth. The absence of these grounds does not make the proposition false, nor if the proposition be true does its acceptance without proof make it either useless or pernicious. It is certainly a disadvantage of suggestion that it can transmit falsehood as well as truth, but surely it is well to bear in mind on the contrary that it can convey truth as well as falsehood.

The fact of suggestion constitutes an example of those irrational grounds of belief and action to which I referred in the second lecture as having been brought into strong light by modern psychology. And, as we saw in that lecture, a great deal of our ordinary behaviour and common belief is in this sense irrationally prompted, and is not necessarily on that account morally reprehensible conduct or false belief. In point of fact, the process of suggestion together with its result in the acceptance of a large body of fact and opinion which we do not pause to justify in the courts of logic is, like habit, one of the mechanisms that make life possible. It would be a completely disabling inconvenience to be under an irremediable necessity literally

to "prove all things." Those beliefs which we accept without criticism, and which form the body and material of our experience and of our thought, are largely a deposit of the critical activity of former times, and there is no point in reopening settled questions. Life has more serious occupations than the "flogging of dead horses." There are a sufficient number of open questions, live controversies, and convictions in the process of formation, to occupy most men's intellectual activity to the full. Our beliefs are not normally reopened to question until in some way they start a doubt, until old belief conflicts with new knowledge, or in some such way a cleft arises in experience. It is of inestimable benefit to mankind that it can afford to take so much of the factual basis of experience on trust. We are compelled to do so whether we will or not. The great body of our moral, social, religious, and scientific conceptions have been thrust upon us in childhood and early youth, and we shall not live long enough to probe them all to the bottom even if we do nothing else our life long.

This presents, as I am well aware, only an aspect of the truth. Our settled beliefs incorporate not only the results of the past thinking of our predecessors which we take partially on trust, they incorporate as well a great deal which is the result of *our own* past thinking. The settled questions include a goodly number, let us hope, which we have settled for ourselves, it may be "not without dust and heat." Our education, we may presume, has not been conducted without appeal to reason and intellect. But a great deal remains which we have accepted simply on information and precept. A great deal we still so accept. And so long as it falls into a place in the system of our organised knowledge and

belief, we do not trouble about its passports of conscious and deliberate logical proof.

Before passing on to the demarcation of the specific part played by suggestion in religion, it may be useful to draw attention here to the fact that the induction of a favourable emotional psychosis is among the most potent of all conditions predisposing to suggestion. Sympathy and suggestion are thus very closely connected indeed. Once the emotions appropriate to an idea have been sympathetically induced, the conditions have been rendered highly favourable for the suggestion of the idea in question. *Æsthetic* means may have a high potency in this respect. Crowd suggestibility also very largely operates through the induction of a common emotion which heightens the suggestible receptivity of every member of the crowd.

When we turn to the consideration of the specifically religious consciousness, it is obvious that there as elsewhere, perhaps there more than in most regions of our experience, the facts of suggestion occupy a large place in the building up of the structure of that experience on the cognitive side. It will be evident, therefore, that not only on the affective, but on the cognitive side as well, non-rational processes are largely at work in that experience. Not only so, but as many psychologists have pointed out, the organisation of religion largely consists in a systematisation of the means of suggestion. Such organisation has not been evolved with that end in view, doubtless, but that is very largely its effect.

It forms a great part of the usefulness of a church or religious society, for example, that it forms on the one hand a repository of religious belief, and by its collective influence aids its members in the building up and keeping of the faith, and, on the other hand, that its membership

and fellowship provide the means for the nurturing, maintenance, and propagation of the religious sentiment. There are, further, in the various practices of religious devotion, both social and private, many examples of the use of suggestion in the formation and strengthening both of belief and sentiment. Psychologists of religion have collected many instances of it. All the associations of a church lend themselves to the establishment of a condition of suggestibility. Suggestibility is heightened in each individual by his finding himself one of a congregation of worshippers. Here the emotional crowd-suggestibility operates. Hence without public worship religion would languish. In proportion to the falling away of the people from the practice of public worship, religion has to a certain extent languished. Many men are ready to declare that they can be religious without going to church, but the fact is, in the main, they are not. Again, the solemn music of the service forwards the same end of increasing suggestibility. Hence the feeling of annoyance when music of an unsuitable character is intruded into the service. It violates the feeling of reverence and the attitude of waiting which all else had conspired to forward. Thouless instances further as predisposing to suggestibility such various adjuncts as the wearing of vestments, the monotonous intoning of the words of the service, and the points of light produced by lighted candles, as well as the ejaculations indicating sympathy with the preacher on the part of members of the congregation, common in such meetings as those of the Salvation Army.¹ It is not alleged that these adjuncts are introduced into the service for the purpose of heightening suggestibility, but only that in point of fact they

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 24.

have that effect. It is to be observed, too, that should any of these features be too obtrusive they may so far fail of their normal effect as to induce acute contra-suggestion. I personally experience a marked degree of contra-suggestion from the methods employed in the more hectic type of revivalistic meeting. And many, trained say in the simple unadorned worship of Presbyterianism, have a strong contra-suggestion set up by the ritualism of the Roman or High Anglican service. In both and all such cases it is to be noted that the elements in question partake of the nature of the establishment of semi-hypnotic conditions, inasmuch as they are means of heightening suggestibility considerably over that degree which obtains in simple suggestion. Hypnotic conditions always fail of their effect by contra-suggestion if they arouse criticism by their obtrusiveness.

The preacher also uses methods of suggestion to a greater or less extent in his presentation of his subject to the congregation, often using argument but sparingly, and depending more upon illustration, exhortation, and appeal, on the wealth of associations called up by scriptural language, and in general on the stirring into activity of the emotions co-ordinated in the religious sentiment. In this practice he is following good masters. I do not gather from the records that our Lord made any extensive use of argumentation.

In private devotion also, suggestion plays a large part. Prayer in its various forms, upon its subjective side, exerts a very great auto-suggestive influence. In its meditative form it may approximate to pure auto-suggestion. In its more usual forms of petition, thanksgiving, and adoration, it has a distinct objective reference, but in its effects upon the worshipper it is partly at least auto-suggestive in its nature. This psycho-

logical account of its influence upon the worshipper, however, must not be held to prejudge the question of the reality of its objective reference. It is a well-known fact, which has been called *the problem of worship*, that it exerts its strong suggestive influence upon the worshipper by reason of his belief in God, to whom his prayer is addressed, and from whom the desired gifts are believed to come. Destroy the objective belief, and the subjective efficacy of prayer would be at least very greatly diminished. This is accounted for psychologically by the fact that the mental attitude of prayer, in which the worshipper ceases from self and casts the burden of his desire upon God in the belief that God can bestow upon him what he cannot compass by his own striving, produces in perfection the conditions necessary for the fullest operation of auto-suggestion. Those who, in the interests of therapeutics, have reduced auto-suggestion to a systematic practice, emphasise the necessity for a relaxation of all mental effort. The Nancy School have enunciated a law which they call the law of *reversed effort*, which Baudouin states as follows : "When an idea imposes itself on the mind to such an extent as to give rise to a suggestion, all the conscious efforts which the subject makes in order to counteract this suggestion are not merely without the desired effect, but they actually run counter to the subject's conscious wishes and tend to intensify the suggestion."¹ Hence a voluntary effort to think of and to realise the object of the desired suggestion is found not to be successful because of the induced counter-suggestions of such endeavour, which, by the law of reversed effort, become increasingly strong the more the attempt is persisted in to exclude them. Suspension of all mental effort is thus

¹ *Suggestion and Auto-Suggestion*, p. 116.

the first condition of the practice of successful auto-suggestion. This is precisely the most difficult attainment of such practice, a difficulty which is accentuated by the circumstance that in auto-suggestion one and the same individual is originator and receiver of the suggestion, and it is rather a difficult accomplishment to hold the desired idea in attention as operator while at the same time maintaining an effortless and passive attitude as receiver. In the attitude of prayer all the necessary conditions are produced without these attendant difficulties. The worshipper is not endeavouring to suggest, and hence is in the requisite mental state to receive suggestion. He naturally adopts a passive and receptive attitude, giving up all striving, and adopting an attitude of trustful and confident waiting to receive. His belief in God powerfully suggests that his confidence will be justified in the issue. The ideas of his prayer become realised in his petition, and strengthen his faith.

We must also reflect upon the massive influence exerted by group-suggestion in religion. We have already referred to the influence of the congregation in worship. The larger the congregation, the greater as a rule is its influence, as every preacher especially knows. But beyond that is the vast influence of the great religious society to which the individual belongs. Within that society his religious life has been cradled and nurtured, his religious beliefs have been formed. It very largely conditions not only the beliefs he shall hold, but the very forms of worship which he shall habitually adopt, and the nature of the works in which his faith shall find outward expression. It is the prime factor in religious education. It is exerted first of all through the home, and then through ever-increasing circles of influence as the life comes into touch with the wider

society. The view which it impresses upon the growing consciousness, however, may be taken to be a rational view in the main—one already well-reasoned before being presented on authority—and the fact goes some way, as we have seen in the more general case, to account for the ease of the process whereby it is suggested and assimilated. In the earlier stages of the process, in childhood, when the critical faculty is more or less dormant, a great deal will be accepted on suggestion and without question, although I can assure you even here that any preformed theory as to the complete dormancy of criticism in childhood is liable to occasional shocks. Indeed, the fresh and free intelligence of the child, unhindered by habitude and convention, is apt to raise questions which do not occur to older heads at all, and which are notoriously difficult to meet. It is true, however, that the child-mind is very highly suggestible, and to that fact is largely due the ease and rapidity of early education. But as the mind matures and the critical faculty is aroused, the process of suggestion may not continue to go on so smoothly. Its success under these altered conditions is more or less determined by the fact I have already mentioned, that the view presented by the suggestive process is in the main a rational view. If, at any point, it presents a proposition or idea which does not wear an aspect of reasonableness, the process of suggestion tends to be arrested at that point, and criticism and rational argument intervene to determine the admittance or rejection of that idea in the total view which is to be accepted. This feature of the process, though occurring more readily in the general education of the individual than in his religious education, where the beliefs he is taught are hedged by a reverence which in certain cases may even make them sacrosanct, is

nevertheless exemplified also in growing religious experience, and must by no means be left out of account. At every stage, however, it is essential to bear in mind that the rationality (partial though at any given stage it may be) of the view impressed by suggestion upon the individual is one of the determining factors in the success and continuance of the process of suggestion. The point at which the critical attitude will intervene to inhibit suggestion will vary according to the degree of co-ordination which already exists in the subject's total view of the world, the degree of training which his intellectual powers have received, and the native acuteness of his intelligence. It will thus be very variously determined for different individuals. The point to be noted, however, is the fact that suggestion, potent as it is, is not absolute in its power, but that if a proposition is offered which conflicts with the general body of knowledge and belief already accepted, or with any aspect of it, a perception of inconsistency is experienced which inhibits the suggestion. The critical faculty is called into exercise by the feeling of uneasiness or repugnance set up by the perceived inconsistency, and it may even occur that the presented idea or belief calls a strong contra-suggestibility into play.

From this it follows that the influence of mass-suggestion is operative very largely in conjunction with the reasoning powers. Where conflict arises, questions are asked and reasons are demanded. Intellectual training consists very largely in pushing back the question-point to ever deeper ranges of our experience. But most of us have to be content with asking a particular kind of questions, of specialising, that is to say, our intellectual activity upon some branch or aspect of experience. For the rest, we can but endeavour to

attain as complete a co-ordination of our experience in general as we may. In these circumstances I do not think we can ordinarily expect the religious experience of men to be thoroughly reasoned through. There are times of special religious interest in which such an exercise is more generally conducted than at other times. There have been times in Scotland in which theology was popular. But, apart from such times, other interests are apt to occupy the foreground of attention in the majority of men. This partly accounts for the recurrent charge of irrationality which is brought against religion. But such irrationality is not an essential or peculiar characteristic of religion. It simply means that man's religious experience, like other kinds of experience, may not be, and often is not, fully and consciously rationalised, not that it is inherently incapable of being rationalised. Now these two elements in the total process of assimilation cannot be too strongly emphasised—the essential rationality of the content of the suggested ideas which are received and built up into our total conception of life, and the attendant process of selective and critical reason which normally accompanies and may at any point inhibit the suggestive process. With regard to the first, we have seen that a presented idea or proposition when accepted uncritically on being suggested, is often so accepted because the nature of the proposition does not arouse criticism. The receiver of the suggestion may not examine the proposition so as to subject it to conscious rational appraisement before acceptance, but it already belongs to a system of ideas and propositions cohering in a general view or consensus, into which it has been rationally wrought by others. It possesses an inherent quality of rationality conferred on it by this circumstance. If a proposition is suggested

which does not appear to bear such credentials, we have seen that it arouses suspicion, suggestion is arrested, and criticism ensues. I venture to call this factor the coefficient of rationality in the suggested proposition. We have seen that the coefficient may be estimated with very varying degrees of success according to the equipment and ability of the individual, but it is a factor without which we cannot account for the actual operation of the process. Where the coefficient is high, the proposition tends to pass unchallenged ; where it is low, it is stopped for examination. When we say of normal social suggestion, therefore, that it is an acceptance of propositions from others on inadequate rational grounds, it must be clearly understood that we mean on grounds which the subject of the suggestion does not, in receiving it, consciously rationalise. We must not by any confusion of thought be supposed to mean that the idea is in itself necessarily irrational in the sense of being dissociated from any system of experience, or incapable of being rationally co-ordinated with the experience of the subject receiving it. Propositions received by suggestion may be and often are thus incorporated into the subject's rationally systematised experience. This is the normal process of education. Ideas received by suggestion, from childhood onwards, are continually being incorporated in this way into the rational system. It is the aim of good education to lead the subject to make the suggested experience truly his own by this process of rational incorporation. It is by this process that he outgrows the age of tutelage which is largely dependent upon suggestion, and thus enters into his own experience and develops his own character. In admitting the place of suggestion in religion, therefore, we have by no means been assenting to the judgment

that religion is irrational in its belief. Irrational elements in emotion, instinct, and sentiment underlie and condition its experience, as they do underlie and condition human life and character in general; irrational processes function in the transmission of religious ideas, but these ideas may nevertheless belong to a rational system, and I believe I have shown reason to believe that their acceptance by the individual, by whatsoever means they may be transmitted to him, is largely conditioned by the fact that they do belong to such a system.

This discussion implies and brings to light an ambiguity in the use of the word *irrational* which requires to be clearly marked. When we say that an idea is irrational we may mean that it cannot be incorporated into a rational system, or we may mean that the individual who accepts it has not so incorporated it. We may mean that it is incapable of being rationalised, or that, as a matter of fact, it has not been rationalised. The former is the usage of logic and philosophy. The latter is that of many psychologists. It is essential to be clear as to which we mean when we use the word. "Non-rationalised" might be substituted for the word in the latter meaning. It is all the more necessary to be clear that irrationality in the former sense is not involved in normal processes of simple suggestion, as there are forms of suggestion which do involve it. We have seen that the process of suggestion was first brought under the notice of psychologists by the phenomena of hypnosis. It was afterwards extended over much wider fields. But it must not be supposed that the characteristics of the hypnoidal form of suggestion are repeated in all the other forms so included. It must be clearly recognised that it was a real extension in the

usage of the term which was effected, and that varying characteristics would be found in the varying forms of the process. Now, in the hypnoidal form, truly irrational ideas may be successfully imparted—ideas, that is to say, which are discontinuous with the rest of the patient's experience. The patient will accept the suggestion that he is Julius Cæsar, for example, and comport himself accordingly. This is an irrational idea in the strictest sense. The system of the subject's experience would normally reject it, but in the abnormal condition of hypnosis he accepts it. It is what is technically known as a *dissociated* experience. Similar phenomena occur, in greater or less degree, under conditions which approximate to the hypnoidal, as, for example, under the influence of mob-hysteria. The mass-hysteria of the war produced many examples. Analogous conditions *may* obtain within the religious sphere. Wild revivalistic movements present all the characteristics of mob-hysteria, and hence give rise to similar dissociations. But simple suggestion, under normal conditions, does not produce the acceptance of dissociated ideas. The difference may be expressed by saying that the operation of the coefficient of rationality is suspended under hypnoidal and hysterical conditions. But it seems to me that many psychologists have not clearly observed the difference. Some psychologists of religion especially have committed the fallacy of confusing together hypnoidal with normal suggestion, supposing that normal suggestion could procure the acceptance of ideas irrational in content. The fallacy may take the form of confusing the two meanings already noted of "irrational." The passage from truly hypnoidal to purely normal conditions is, of course, a gradual one, and many of the conditions under which religious ideas are trans-

mitted may approach more or less to the hypnoidal, but most of our religious ideas are assimilated, and most of our beliefs formed and tested in experience under conditions varying but little from the normal conditions of life. I shall deal later with the consequences of this confusion.

Corresponding to the inherent rationality which may be found to characterise even those ideas which we receive by suggestion, we have posited an activity of intelligence operative in the receiving subject, a rational process which continually accompanies and complements the non-rational process. We have seen that its activity normally intervenes when the suggested idea is such as to court question. This implies that in the receptive attitude itself, the rational activity, though dormant, is in a sense present. Otherwise it would be difficult to account for its awakening into activity under the appropriate stimulus of an unsuitable proposition, and for the process of selection among the presented propositions which our account of the process has implied. If our account is correct, it would seem to indicate that there is an implicit judgment involved in our normal acceptance of a suggested idea, and that in this respect also it is not completely non-rational. In any case it is by such rational judgment implicit or explicit that all presented ideas, whether conveyed by suggestion or otherwise, are woven into the texture of our experience, and become our own. They are thus related to our whole system, and without such relation they remain but second-hand and unimportant information, not vital truth. All that is to be of first-class value to us must, whether it be originally mediated to us by suggestion or by reasoning, pass through the crucible of our own experience, be incorporated into the organism of our knowledge, and so become our mental property.

We have already entered upon the second point to which I wished to direct your attention. I have dealt with the large place which suggestion holds in the building of our religious ideas. I would ask you now to note that it has been implied throughout that religion by no means stands alone in this respect. With regard to the examples of individual suggestion which we have discovered in the religious sphere, counterparts can easily be discovered elsewhere. I admit that the adjuncts of public worship which predispose to a suggestive state do make for a certain depression of the critical faculty, and the conditions of preaching are therefore different from those of teaching. So long as these conditions are not exaggerated, they form no ground of complaint, as the attitude of worship is in any case uncritical, and the conditions in question are but aids to worship. But the difference between these conditions and that of ordinary teaching is one after all of degree. We must rid our minds of the absurd idea that religion in this matter stands alone, that it is a peculiarity of religion to be fostered and spread by methods of suggestion. As Thouless has pointed out, even under the conditions obtaining in the university classroom, where the object of the teacher is to show the subject in all its aspects and awaken the individual judgment of the student, methods of suggestion are largely used. The lecturer does not always argue, he very commonly conveys his view of the matter under discussion. If the men seem to have difficulty in accepting the proposition, he states it again more confidently, illustrates it, repeats it until the minds of the students become familiar with it, and they no longer hesitate to accept it. At the present moment I am not arguing. I am simply illustrating, amplifying, and

reiterating the statement that certain persons who advance a proposition contrary to my doctrine are in error, and I am doing so in the hope that before I have done, you will accept that view. Should a lecturer fail in his purpose of impressing his ideas upon the minds of his hearers, he has so far failed as a teacher. All teaching is either suggestive or inefficient.

Our discussion of the phenomena of mass-suggestion has shown that here also religion but offers a special case of a general process. Two special considerations relative to this process now call for attention. The first is this, that so far from religion being in any unique way a product of mass-suggestion, there is actually at the present time a very strong force of mass-suggestion in favour of secularism, so-called rationalism, and irreligion. This operates naturally as a violent contra-suggestion against all religious ideas and beliefs. Religion maintains itself at the present time in the face of heavy battalions of mass-suggestion of a hostile nature. It must have occurred to you how impervious to argument this movement is. It prides itself on argument, it is true, and regards religion with contempt as a relic of the Dark Ages unlit by Reason's lamp. Faith for it is mere credulity, and religious beliefs the joint product of mistake and imposture. But its use of argument is very largely a mere semblance. Arguments which were out of date fifty years ago are still advanced with the same confidence as though they had never been refuted. The truth is that it depends not on argument for its strength, but on an extreme form of individual and mass-suggestion. Its doctrines are taught to the young from their earliest years through suggestion greatly heightened by conditions of highly impassioned sentiment, and no arguments will in future years prevail to shake the

convictions thus formed. Nothing but a complete reversal of the whole life's conviction will suffice to change the mind. Apart from this body of hardened opinion there is a large circle of those who are more or less influenced by the movement. Among the latter are many who are *bona fide* inquirers, and who can bring a free mind to the hearing of argument. But there are many cases in which argument can do nothing to shake what argument has done nothing to produce. It is a movement of mass-suggestion, showing a contempt for reason which could hardly be paralleled in the most obscurantist of churches. It is indeed an example and a warning, displaying with great clearness the effects of a use of the powers of suggestion when unchecked by criticism. I naturally do not introduce the example of such an extreme and essentially unreasonable body of mass-suggestion occurring outside of religion and hostile to it, in any sense as an extenuation of the use of suggestion in religion. Such an example would be extremely ill-chosen. But it not only rules out the idea that religion is exceptional or unique in the use which it makes of suggestive means for the propagation of its scheme of belief and knowledge, it also points to the fact that anti-religious feeling and opinion can make a far more unscrupulous use and a use far less tempered by rational elements of consciousness than *any* religion, at least at the present day, employs.

The second point is this, that great as is the part played by mass-suggestion in religion, that part is balanced by the creative and original nature of a truly spiritual religion. The background of belief is received from the community, but there is a living individuality in true religion which has repeatedly acted as a criticism of, and a protest against, the accepted custom, practice,

and belief of society rather than as a reflection or endorsement of it. The prophets are not creations of their age, they are creators of the age to come. The Christians were not the natural product of the first century. They were the men who turned the world upside-down. We cannot contemplate such facts as these without being driven to ask how comes that individual element there? Surely the account of religion which emphasises only the social suggestive element in it must be a very partial one, offering as it does no explanation of the most striking characteristic of the truly religious spirit.

What then is that characteristic? When we look upon such a religious life as is offered by the examples we have quoted, what are we compelled to regard as most distinctive of it? Is it not the quality or group of qualities which we indicate by saying in popular language that it is a first-hand experience? That is equivalent to denying that it is mediated by others, whether by suggestion or otherwise. It is the man's personal possession. It is an experience of his own, one which he has truly appropriated and co-ordinated with his experience as a whole. It provides, indeed, the co-ordinating principle of all his experience. Now I indicated in my first lecture my acceptance of Schleiermacher's main contention that it is just this very immediacy of experience which is the distinguishing characteristic of a truly spiritual religion. It is the most inward and fundamental experience a man possesses, that which is most of all his own, and which expresses his inmost convictions.

We have already traced the process whereby suggested ideas are taken up into the reasoned system of belief, and thereby appropriated. By this process we saw that the

individual becomes independent of the source of suggestion to an increasing degree. This is a necessary stage towards the possession of an experience which shall be creative and original. This *is* the process on its intellectual side. By it the ideas which have been mediated through suggestion become immediate. They form a system of *appreciated* truth. They have a significance for the individual which no idea held on the strength of mere report can possess. We have *realised* them as we say, and the reality which they have gained is just a new significance derived from their coherence with the meaning of our whole experience.

In this way the system of our religious ideas is built up and our religious world is formed. We have already indicated the powerful nexus of emotion and instinct which is wrought into the fabric of that experience. Our religious ideas are charged with emotion. The motive forces of the instinctive life are linked up with them, and find through the religious experience the path through which they can to best purpose discharge their energies. Our religious experience is a unified and unifying system which gathers in all the powers and faculties of our mind.

While we are thinking of this immediate aspect of religious experience, it may be well to indicate one way in which religion *does* differ somewhat from the general consciousness of the world, and can by reason of the difference make a somewhat peculiar and characteristic use of suggestion. It lies in the fact that there is, as we have seen in a former lecture, something incommunicable in it. All direct immediate experience is thus incommunicable. It is not *directly* communicable. All that we can do, lacking the means and the power to *convey* its experience, is to create the conditions under

which that experience may most readily arise. We can only seek to aid the formation of that state of consciousness in which it will spontaneously appear. In suggestion we are moving in the world of ideas—communicable, capable of formulation and conveyance in words or other symbols from one mind to another. But the process which is most characteristic of inward religion is rather sympathy than suggestion. By the induction of the emotions, that which cannot be formulated or conveyed of religious content may be spontaneously evoked, and the experience started in another consciousness. In worship this process is present, and what is transmitted in common worship is less an idea than an experience in all its emotional quality. Our consideration of suggestion has then led us back again to the point of recognising from a new point of view the manifoldness of religion, its use of all man's powers of feeling and intellect, and its occupation of his entire nature.

In the first lecture I criticised Schleiermacher's conception of religion as pure feeling, while retaining that part of his thesis which maintained it to be an autonomous and immediate experience. If the account which I have been endeavouring to give you of the nature of that experience be true, we see how profoundly significant the latter part of his contention is, just because religious experience is so much fuller and richer in its nature than the first part of his thesis allowed it to be.

LECTURE VI

THE FALLACY OF PSYCHOLOGISM

WE have so far been engaged in the consideration of those aspects of religious experience which have been brought by modern psychology into the forefront of contemporary discussion. The activity of psychology has thrown much light upon the nature and processes of religious experience, and it is my sincere conviction that we are indebted to the psychological investigation for a better understanding of religion. I say so here unreservedly, lest the emphasis, in what follows, upon the dangers and errors of "the psychologists' fallacy" might seem to misprise the work of genuine psychology. It does not require to be said at this date that psychologism is not essentially involved in psychology.

I will now ask you to consider what light our discussion of the nature of these particular aspects of religious experience sheds upon the outstanding question of the objective reference of the latter. With that question we enter upon the consideration of the second part of our subject, which I have called the validity of the witness of religious experience. Can we hope to have, through that experience, a real knowledge of God, of a spiritual Power beyond ourselves and beyond nature, and a real means of relationship with Him. It may be objected *in limine* that our definition of religion has begged that question already. Religion was defined as an experience of God and of our relation-

ship with Him. But it will be remembered that our definition was practically an agreement to take for the subject of our study the actually occurring, concrete fact of religion as universally found in human life. Religion as an actual phenomenon of man's spiritual history is a belief in God and an endeavour to establish relationship with Him. That is what religion understands itself to be, the interpretation which it puts upon its own experience. It is from that belief that the whole nature of religion flows. Our definition, therefore, is a *denotation*. It simply states that the kind of experience we are talking about is the kind of experience which regards itself as in touch with the divine. It is still a legitimate question whether that experience is what it takes itself to be, whether religion does reach a real divine objective, whether religion's interpretation of its own experience is true. I wish to examine this question in the light of what we have discovered concerning its nature. And I think we can perhaps open our way into the subject, by considering some objections which have been taken to that interpretation, from within the study of the nature of religious experience. There are investigators who maintain as a result of that study that the claim of religion to a real objective reference cannot be substantiated. It is denied that religion gives us God. I propose, in the first place, before going on to develop any positive argument for the validity of religion, to examine several forms of this denial. The attack against religion from the ground of an examination of religious experience itself is perhaps the most formidable which apologetic has to meet to-day.

I think, however, that the strength of that attack is due rather to the prestige which the science of psychology at present enjoys, and to the confidence with which

certain psychologists of religion set forth the negative argument, than from the logical security of the argument itself. And although such a line of argument by no means finds unanimous agreement among psychologists themselves, many of whom in a truly scientific spirit show extreme care in the matter of what they are prepared to deny, it gains a considerable degree of somewhat dangerous and meretricious importance from the large amount of diffused and not always very accurate knowledge of the methods and results of psychology in the general mind of the time. Psychology is one of the fashionable interests of the moment, and there is a vague and ill-defined idea abroad among the more or less dilettanti followers of the subject that its results somehow undermine the foundations of religion by the mere fact that it finds religious experience to be naturally explicable. Indeed one often has the feeling, in meeting this line of attack, that one is engaged not so much in rebutting the arguments of professional psychologists as in dissipating the misunderstandings that have arisen in the minds of its amateurs. At the same time it would be manifestly incorrect to attribute this interpretation of the results of psychology to the stupidity or the partial knowledge of the lay mind. It has received sufficient colour of scientific authority from some of the foremost exponents of the subject to merit a careful inquiry into its truth and a reasoned reply to its thesis. It was for this reason that I anticipated in my first lecture that some of the arguments hostile to the truth of religion which we should have to weigh would arise upon the very ground of that psychological investigation which had in other respects shed so much illumination upon the nature of religion.

We must first of all take up the argument which

grounds its objection upon the very fact that religious experience has been successfully subjected to scientific treatment. Psychology and anthropology have conducted a vigorous inquiry into religious phenomena, and have been attended with a certain measure of success in their endeavour to find a natural order and process in those phenomena. It is now contended that these sciences can give a complete explanation of the phenomena in question without reference at all to the religious explanation that they are the results of divine action upon the human consciousness in religious experience, and vouch for a divine agent who is grasped and known in that experience. There are no processes in religious psychology which differ from ordinary processes. Our study of the processes involved in religious experience has abundantly shown this to be true. Psychology analyses the religious experience, and finds nothing in it differing from the ordinary laws and processes exemplified in other parts of our experience. The psychological account of experience is complete in itself without reference to any extra-psychological factor. Like astronomy before it, psychology has "no need for the hypothesis" of God. It may be pointed out that this is exactly the result which one would have expected. Psychology as a science would be discredited if there were any inexplicable surd left in human experience which psychological analysis was unable to reduce. Its analysis and explanation of experience is certainly far from complete, but we are not entitled to demand from a science yet in its infancy that it shall have fully accomplished its task. I do not, therefore, desire to found any argument against this position on the fact that the psychological analysis of religion is by no means complete. I prefer to grant as a theoretical possibility,

though not as an accomplished fact, that psychology is capable of giving a complete and self-contained account of the facts of religious as of all other experience.

So far, there is nothing in this line of argument which ought to cause surprise or to raise misgiving in the mind of any one who has a respectable acquaintance with the history of science. I have mentioned the analogous case of the astronomer's realisation of the autonomy of his science. But there is no particular reason why we should name one of the sciences rather than another. One after another, in the order of their development, the sciences have as it were "come of age" when they realised that their system could be and must be rendered complete within the limits of their own methods and their own hypotheses. The *deus ex machina* is a device of the prescientific ages.

Such a simple and obvious consideration as this would not seem to have any ulterior significance. It is only when it is elevated into a claim to rule out, not merely as irrelevant to psychology but as unreal in fact, anything in the experiences in question which falls outside the psychological "universe of discourse," that fallacy and confusion arise. The fallacy of psychologism is at bottom a claim that that which is an unnecessary hypothesis *for psychology* is an illusion. The idea of God becomes the foremost of all such constructs of human fancy, and is regarded as having no status in reality, because it is an idea which psychology cannot use. Psychology is elevated to the position of arbiter of universal reality. Hence the vaguely disseminated persuasion already referred to that psychology has in some way discredited belief. Let us take a typical statement of this form of the argument from the work of Leuba. "If there were extra-human sources of

knowledge," he says, "and superhuman sources of human power, their existence should, it seems, have become increasingly evident. Yet the converse is apparently true. . . . In religious lives accessible to psychological investigation, nothing requiring the admission of superhuman influences has been found. There is nothing, for example, in the life of the great Spanish mystic whose celebrity is being renewed by contemporary psychologists—not a desire, not a feeling, not a thought, not a vision, not an illumination—that can seriously make us look to transcendent causes."¹ Should it be the case that any of these processes give us access to or knowledge of God, then he argues, "nothing ought to be easier for the psychologist than to show in the life of feeling and thought disturbances not depending on known natural causes."

This whole line of argument is an example of confused thinking remarkable in an investigator of repute. Let us examine its meaning. The very fact that a scientific account can be given of religious processes is made to do service as an argument against their validity. Because the psychological account of these processes can be made a closed and exhaustive account, it is denied that the processes in question can have any further significance. The reality of their reference to God is to be disallowed unless evidence can be shown that that divine reference produces some disturbance in the order of natural law to which they would otherwise be subject.

Now we must emphatically decline to accept the position that whatever is subject to natural law cannot have any reference to God, that the only evidence of God that any aspect of our experience can afford, must

¹ *A Psychological Study of Religion*, p. 272.

be of the nature of a miraculous disturbance. By what course of argument laying any claim to philosophical or scientific respectability can it be maintained that the divine resides only in the abnormal? What have we done when we have explained a mental process psychologically? We have but co-ordinated it with other processes of the same kind, in such a way as to elicit the laws under which such processes can be assembled and ordered, within the psychological "universe of discourse." So far from its being true that "nothing ought to be easier" for the psychologist, if any such process refer to God, "than to show in the life of feeling and thought disturbances not depending on known natural causes," it seems to me quite obvious that on the contrary the religious significance of any such process is one which we should not have expected psychology to detect. Psychology does not, after analysis of the mental processes of the physicist, turn round and declare that as it can explain all these processes without reference to the ether, the objective reference of the physicist's thought to that problematic entity is an hallucination. It recognises that psychology is one thing and physics another, and that thoughts about the ether can be co-ordinated in two different orders, for different purposes—a psychological order and a physical order. If we are to infer a reference to a real divine order from our religious experience, it will not be by reason of any disturbance in that experience itself which lies outwith the scope of psychological law, it will be by way of an interpretation of our psychologically normal religious experience in another order than the psychological.

One has a curious sense here of treading ground over which one has journeyed before. The same question arose in connection with the biological controversy which

raged years ago in the questions then discussed between religion and science. Indeed, over and over again, as each new science has taken possession of its sphere, it has in its youthful enthusiasm claimed to have ejected religion from another region of life. But in each case subsequent reflection has revealed that the pretension means no more than this : that the science in question possesses an order of its own under which it can resume the facts of its field without the aid of any theological hypothesis. When Laplace declared that he had no need of the hypothesis of God, he was really making a statement not concerning the reality of the Divine Being, but concerning the necessary limitations of the science of astronomy. Biology in turn, and now psychology, have asserted rights over their own territory, rights which we are compelled to allow, but which extend only to the limits of their subject-matter.

It is a foolish method of apologetic to cling tenaciously to the theological occupation of fields which do not require a theological hypothesis, instead of vindicating the existence and rights of religion and theology within their own province. It leads to the misleading conception too often adopted by both friends and foes of religion, that religion can live only in the gradually closing gaps in our scientific knowledge. The autonomy of the different sciences within their respective provinces must be completely granted. The claim to extend the powers of any particular science to the adjudication of questions of reality and value beyond its scope is a youthful exuberance which time and experience rectify. In the particular case in question we have merely a repetition of a well-known but violently fallacious transference to a special science of the duties and prerogatives of philosophy. Psychology as a special science, dealing

only with the interrelations of mental processes among themselves, cannot pronounce upon the question of the reference of any particular experience to a reality beyond the psychological system. If psychology usurps the right to pronounce upon such a trans-subjective reference, from examination of the effects of such a reference upon the psychological series of phenomena, its pronouncement is bound to be a negative one, for its method provides it with no apparatus for the detection of such a reference. The argument is seldom if ever drawn out in logical form, because, if it were, its statement would be its refutation. The statement must take some such form as this. First, the only proof which psychology can admit of a communication between the human consciousness and a divine object must take the form of a mental process or occurrence which is *sui generis*, which cannot be described in terms of known mental process, or ranged with other such processes under known psychological law. That is to say, psychologically considered, it must be miraculous. Secondly, no such process is discoverable. Therefore the reference of the religious consciousness to a reality beyond itself cannot be proved by psychology. But the argument does not stop there. We must proceed all the way to the conclusion which has been drawn. Further, therefore, we must argue, what cannot be proved by psychology does not exist. Therefore the trans-subjective reference of religious experience is an illusion.

Now the former of these two syllogisms I do not intend to question. I will only say that to admit its major premise that psychology can only detect the divine by the presence of abnormal and inexplicable process is to admit that psychology possesses no adequate apparatus for the task it here assumes. I do not think

that it is a wise procedure on the part of the apologist, however, to challenge the truth of that premise, and to take up the attitude that as psychology has not completely explicated our experience, there is still room for the operation of divine forces.¹ This is a procedure which has been repeatedly adopted by apologetic and always with unfortunate results. It founds the claim to divine operation upon the *lacunæ* in human knowledge, and as these *lacunæ* are gradually closed up by advancing scientific discovery, the standing room of religion is correspondingly reduced. Religion begins to present the aspect of a forlorn hope, fighting every inch of the way to a foredoomed end. The plight of religion in such case is similar to that of some aboriginal race retreating before an all-conquering horde of invaders, losing tract after tract of its territory, until the defenders driven to the depths of their native fastnesses make a last desperate stand, prolonged it may be for years, but with little hope of any end but extinction. Is the task of apologetics worth while under such conditions as these? Must our defence needs be a retreat, however well fought? Need the apologist wear the aspect of one who would save as much as possible from the wreck? There is no necessity for the apologist to take up his station in the last ditch. There is no reason why our defence should be a retreat. If it is, we have

¹ There is a trace of such procedure in an otherwise excellent little book, entitled *Christian Experience and Psychological Process*, by Ruth Rouse and Crichton Miller, who seek to found an argument on what they call "the unexplained residue" remaining in consciousness over and above that of which psychology can give an account. Such a line of argument must at least be very carefully stated lest it be made to appear to grant the fallacious assumption of Leuba that only the miraculous can be divine. The content of the religious experience is unique and cannot be grasped and rendered in its uniqueness by any psychological account of it, as has been amply shown by Otto.

taken up wrong ground to start with, and must abandon it. We must cease to seek for God in the fissures of human knowledge. God is not an occasional interpolation in human experience, he is the meaning of it all. This whole situation is surely created by a false statement of the question in the first instance. If we allow the question for apologetic to be stated in the form : Can we show the inability of psychology to give a satisfactory account of some of the facts of religious experience, and so leave room for the action of God ? we are committed to some such conduct of the defence as I have outlined. But the statement of the question has in that case already involved the important assumption that the divine is discoverable only in the breakdown of the natural, an assumption which only requires to be clearly stated to be discarded.

But it is in the latter of the two syllogisms in which I have stated this attack that its real fallacy lies. There the psychologist makes the assumption that his science *can* adjudicate upon ultimate truth. If psychology can find no need for a reference to God in religious experience, then there is no such reference. If this argument is to obtain at all, then the ground taken up in it is far too narrow. If it hold against our experience of God, it ought to hold equally against our experience of our fellows. There seems no reason why it should not hold against our whole knowledge of the objective world. Psychology claims to resume *all* the processes of our mental life under its laws. If the psychological systematisation of those processes precludes any other interpretation of them, then all objective meaning goes together. We are solipsists. We are shut into a closed circle of mentalism. Our very percepts must be illusions. J. B. Pratt illustrates this in an apt parable.

“ Let us imagine the human organism always played upon by light ; or let us picture the human race as living always in conditions such as those that now obtain in the north arctic regions during summer. Let us suppose, moreover, that the majority of men are blind and that only a few see. When, now, the eyes of one of these seers are open, or he is not in some way shading his retina, he will be constantly receiving light sensations. In investigating these very interesting experiences your strict psychologist, who is seeking to frame an exact scientific account of the psychic life of one of those unusual individuals, would, of course, correlate the light sensations with raised eyelids, and their cessation with closed eyes. Light sensations, he would say, are the invariable accompaniment of open eyes ; they are, in fact, a ‘ function ’ of open eyes. The principle of single difference could be applied with exactitude to show that the opening of the eyes was the cause of the light sensations, and fully explained them (in the psychological sense)—no reference being needed to the sun or the ether waves or any other outer source. The naïve seer, innocent of the ways of science, might indeed insist that he saw the *sun*, and not merely his own sensations ; but the psychologist would assure him that he mistook his sensations for something objective, that, in fact, he was substituting interpretation for description, and that the only verifiable and scientific fact was his sensations of light. These, he would add, were fully described, generalized, and therefore explained, by the scientific law correlating them with a certain condition of the organism—namely, raised eyelids, stimulated retina, afferent impulse in the optic nerves, and stimulation of the visual centres in the occipital lobes. If the naïve seer were still unsatisfied, the psychologist could challenge

him to see light with his eyes shut or to fail to see it with them open, or to point out a single element in his experience not accounted for by the psychological formula.

"Both seer and scientist would be right. The psychological explanation would be complete (in its own way and within its self-imposed limits), and it would be vain to seek to prove the objective existence of the sun by breaking down the psychological correlation of light sensation and organic condition. And yet it would be true that the seer saw the sun." ¹

Pratt's comment upon and interpretation of his parable sum up the view which I have been endeavouring to advance, and seem to me to conclude the argument. "May it, then, perhaps be," he asks, "that the mystics are the seers of our world, and that whenever they open the eyes of their souls, the Eternal Light pours in; and that though we blind ones learnedly describe, generalize, and explain their experience by regular psychological laws which take account only of the psycho-physical organism, still the light is really there and the mystic apprehends it directly, even as he says? This question is not for psychological discussion. But I think we can say at least this much: that while the psychology of religion must have a free hand, and while it is hopeless to look to it for a proof of anything transcendent, nothing that it can say should prevent the religious man, who wishes to be perfectly loyal to logic and loyal to truth, from seeing in his own spiritual experiences the genuine influence of a living God." ²

Having disposed of the attempt to reduce religion to illusion in consideration of the mere fact of its processes being amenable to psychological treatment, let

¹ *The Religious Consciousness*, pp. 457-458.

² *Op. cit.* p. 458.

us pass to review some other forms of the attack directed against religion, which purport to be drawn from a study of its own nature. We have first to consider the argument that religion must abandon its claim to objectivity on account of the part played by auto-suggestion and hetero-suggestion in the formation and transmission of religious belief. That part we have admitted to be a large one. It is argued that it condemns religious belief on the ground that it is held and propagated not by reasonable conviction but by the irrational force of suggestion. Belief is held in being by psychological causes not by logical reasons.

We must first remove a confusion already referred to, which I believe adds much plausibility to this argument in many minds. Suggestion is looked upon as essentially a mode of *delusion*. Auto-suggestion to this way of thinking is a method of self-deception. Hetero-suggestion is a means of practising the same deceit upon others. Mass-suggestion, probably confused often with mob-hysteria, is thought of as a means of fixing a blind and unreasoning belief in the minds of the individuals constituting a society, after the type of the mono-ideism of the impassioned mob. This whole manner of regarding suggestion is, of course, entirely away from the facts. There is no necessary connection between suggestion and delusion. An idea unfurnished with adequate logical grounds is an entirely different thing from a delusion. The imprinting of such an idea upon our own minds or upon the minds of others is far removed from deceit. The fact of the truth or falsity of the idea is another question altogether, and has to be discussed on its merits in the individual case. Even in hypnosis, the question whether the idea implanted in such a condition be a delusion or not, depends not on its being implanted

under hypnotic conditions, not on its being conveyed by suggestion, but on the nature of the idea implanted. Auto-suggestion and hetero-suggestion are both regarded by psychologists as a process of the education of the unconscious, and even hypnosis and auto-hypnosis and their related mental states are but the conditions under which the suggestive processes may be in certain instances most successfully carried out. It is possible to argue that their usefulness has strict limits, and that too great a use of them lays the subject unduly open to suggestive influence, whether good or bad, but to look upon the whole process as one of delusion is an entirely false view of the facts. Our discussion of the process of suggestion has indeed shown it to be a perfectly normal and universal process. Suggestion and auto-suggestion are, in fact, in constant operation in implanting true ideas in the mind as well as false.

But, apart from this, it may be contended that the large part which suggestion plays in the formation of religious belief at least makes that belief suspect. Faith must be built upon a sure logical foundation if it is to win our intellectual respect. This objection need not delay us long. Its main point has already been answered in the account we have given of the actual operation of the process of suggestion in normal experience. We found that that process was throughout co-operative with processes of reason, and that the critical faculty, as education proceeded, was roused into activity in the normal adult consciousness by the presentation of an idea which did not "fit in" to the reasoned structure of experience. The conditions are not largely different in normal religious education.

Together with this question of the place of suggestion we may take two related matters. In the first

place we have to bear in mind that the similar mental tendency of sympathy (in the psychological sense) as well as that of suggestion is in operation in religious experience, and is in some ways of even greater importance than the latter. Suggestion conveys ideas, and its operation in religion is therefore within the sphere of the transference of religious ideas. But how often has it been pointed out that religion is something more than the ideas in which it is sought to convey it, and that that something is difficult if not impossible to state in words? A man may possess all the religious ideas of his neighbours or of his church—conveyed to his mind by suggestion or otherwise—and may one day experience a great awakening, as many so placed have done, which reveals to him that his “ideas” have not constituted the essence of religion at all. The ideas have been communicated in words and propositions—whether by suggestion or otherwise—but the real experience is his own possession, not conveyed to him by word of any other, not communicable by him in direct statement to any other. It is the difference, familiar in philosophical discussion, between “knowledge of” and “knowledge about,” between direct experience and mediated knowledge. Now this direct experience, though not communicable in propositions, as ideas are, is *in some sense* communicable. The prophet, with a great personal experience as his inspiration, does strike the world as *par excellence* the man with a *message*, that is to say, the man who does communicate with abounding force and power that which he has himself seen so clearly. And he does so not by clear and cogent presentation of his ideas only to the intelligence of his hearers or readers. He often protests in the course of his message that it cannot be so conveyed. It is

what we call the inspiration of his message that is contagious, and fires his hearers with a conviction like his own. But he is first and foremost a communicator. He evokes in others an experience similar to his own. Now what is his "inspiration," the quality that propagates his experience in other minds, the contagion of his conviction? It is to a great degree the kindling in others of the emotions by which his own experience is fired. An "inspiring" teacher or preacher induces his emotions in the minds of those to whom he speaks. *The only means of communicating an immediate, direct experience is by this method of direct induction.* Words cannot do it, except in so far as they are charged with that emotional quality which will start similar emotion in others.

Now religious experience is of that direct kind. Even its fundamental cognitive datum, as we found in reviewing Otto's analysis of it in the third lecture, is embedded in, and qualified by, a distinctive emotional psychosis, which is shown to be incapable of direct expression, but only communicable by analogy and suggestion. For example, in the very act of indicating the nature of that experience, even in an essay in scientific introspection, such as Otto's work is, it is found necessary to enlist the reader's *sympathy*—to make the attempt to induce in his mind the experience sought to be conveyed, or by the same method of direct induction of the emotion in question to enable him to recall such experiences of his own. This is simply a modification of the method of the prophet and preacher already referred to. And the point for us to note is that in the nature of the case there is no other possible method. An immediate experience cannot be conveyed by description. The description is always a description of it, but never itself. It never grasps its

intimate and unique *quale*. And the description is successful or unsuccessful according as its words succeed or fail in arousing the emotional state in which the experience is to be discovered. In the communication of direct experience the artist succeeds where the scientist fails, because the former so uses words as to create that sympathy which transmits more than the words themselves convey.

It is, therefore, sympathy rather than suggestion in the stricter sense which is of fundamental importance in religion. Suggestion in that stricter sense, namely, as the conveyance of ideas, is also present, but, even so, it is the experience which lies behind and is indirectly expressed in the ideas which is of value. It is as these ideas are incorporated into experience that they become religious ideas at all. That incorporation into experiences means that however the ideas may have been conveyed, even though it be by the mass-suggestion of a community or a church, they become individualised, wrought into the personal experience of the recipient so that they become his own. The manner of their communication becomes irrelevant, they are now the recipient's own ideas, corresponding to the experience which they endeavour to express.

Now it will hardly be seriously contended that an experience of this direct kind, which can only be "felt" but cannot be conveyed by description, is vitiated or discounted by the fact that it can be and is conveyed by sympathetic induction. The reality and significance of an experience cannot suffer any disparagement from the fact that there is a means by which it can be communicated though the means of propositional statement be unavailable. If we are to use the term suggestion as characteristic of religious communication, it must be

in the larger sense in which it includes sympathetic induction of immediate experience. Some psychologists have shown a strange lapse into that intellectualist strain which modern psychology has so largely corrected, when they have sought to display religion as a creation of suggested "ideas," as the acceptance "without adequate logical grounds" of a series of propositions impressed by mass-suggestion in the religious community, by crowd-suggestion in public worship, and by auto-suggestion in private prayer and meditation. It is not the "propositions" and the "ideas" either of public worship or of private prayer which are of the essential nature of these spiritual exercises. The worshipper seeks to win or to renew an experience. If the preacher uses methods of suggestion, it is in the main in the larger sense of the word which might be more accurately and adequately called methods of sympathetically evoking the religious experience. So long as those methods are of a normal and not a hypnoidal type, they are unchallengeably legitimate. Similarly, in private prayer, the worshipper is not dealing with "ideas" and "propositions." He seeks to cultivate an experience. In either case the attitude of receptivity through which the experience is made possible cannot be held to invalidate the experience, or in any way to divest it of meaning and worth. The nature of the mental attitude through which the experience is conveyed and received cannot prejudge the question as to the reality of that which is experienced. That remains a further question.

The realisation of the part played in religious communication by emotional sympathy as against irrational suggestion in conceptual or propositional form, therefore, while it expands the area over which suggestive tendencies operate in religion, at the same time weakens the force

of the objection to religion which has been based on the existence of these suggestive tendencies. For such sympathetic induction whereby first-hand experience can be aroused in others, though it cannot be intellectually conveyed, is a perfectly respectable and legitimate means of communication between individuals.

The second related matter which I wish here to include in the discussion is simply that of the large place which emotion has been found to play in religion. That, too, has been regarded by some as a basis for attack upon the reality of the religious object and the truth of religion. Here again vague and confused thinking are in evidence. In the first place, attention may again be drawn to the fact that modern psychology has emphasised the large place of the instinctive-emotional tendencies in experience in general, not only in religious experience. The objection against religion on this score, therefore, if logically carried to its conclusion, would be far too comprehensive in its sweep. No one, I think, will deliberately take up the attitude that the facts which modern psychology has revealed regarding human consciousness and behaviour, condemn that consciousness and behaviour to universal worthlessness. The result of such an attitude would be not to discredit human life in general, but to discredit the psychology which had given such an account of that life as to reduce it to imbecility. If, on the other hand, the objection be so far modified as to declare only that it is the greater part which emotion plays in religion than elsewhere that is important, we can, even granting the premise, point out that an argument which now depends simply upon greater or less degree is emptied of all its force. A greater or less emotional content does not in any way affect the question of the objective reality of the object which

calls forth the emotion. And if, finally, it be argued that religion is a *purely* emotional manifestation, the objector is delivered completely into our hands on psychological grounds alone. For, in the first place, there is *no* purely emotional manifestation, every emotional state having necessarily a cognitive, as well as an affective element. And, in the second place, any analysis of religion which can command intelligent respect discovers its content to be varied and full to a degree which simply stultifies the objection in question. Whatever else the content of religion may include, it includes at least a cognition. That cognition may be proved to be in error, but it cannot be simply asserted to be non-existent.

It is important to take into account the objections which have been raised to the validity of religious experience on the grounds of the presence in that experience of a large emotional element, and also of the presence in it of a considerable suggestive tendency, because both are closely associated with the attempt, already discussed, to disparage religion as having been shown to be purely subjective, by reason of the very fact of its being successfully accounted for on psychological grounds. Both of the former objections, that is to say, are used for the support of that psychologism which seeks to dissipate religion in pure subjectivity. But the fact that religion dwells in and satisfies man's emotional nature, tends to prove its depth rather than its shallowness, tends to the presumption of its fundamental truth rather than its falsity. The fact that religion satisfies our emotional need does not prove it to be a *mere* emotional satisfaction. It does not show that its object is incapable of incorporation into a reasoned structure of reality with the rest of our experience.

The satisfaction of emotional and instinctive needs

is indeed a prominent motive in religion, as well as the building up of a system which will satisfy the intellect, but the respective proportions of these various motives in the various parts of our experience is a matter of degree and emphasis. And in any case we have seen no reason, in our discussion of the instincts and emotions, to assume that their claims are irreconcilable with those of reason, that a belief that is satisfactory to them is *ipso facto* false to truth, and that a cleft exists in human nature between the emotions and the reason. We are entitled to assume that man's nature can be unified in his belief, until the contrary is made evident. So that if, in religious experience, a suggested idea be accepted because of the emotional satisfaction which it offers, it may still be capable of incorporation in a reasoned structure of belief. And even if such an idea be highly satisfactory to the religious sentiment, it still tends in many cases to be arrested rather than received by suggestion if it is much out of accord with the general belief of the individual.

With particular regard to the objection based upon suggestion, we have found that ideas received through suggestion are in the main accepted because they do not raise any necessary criticism. We have to take into account the facts that they already belong to a reasoned system accepted alike by the originator and the receiver of the suggestion, and only when cause arises for the modification of that reasoned system does reason inhibit the perfectly natural and legitimate action of suggestion, and also that reason is in continual co-operation with the processes of suggestiveness in the individual, and his personal construction of the world of his experience is partly based on the receipts of suggestion and partly on the operation of

reason. And again, religion is in no worse case in any of these respects than the general consciousness is.

But, further, it is impossible to maintain even though our religious ideas were more entirely transmitted by suggestion than they are, that they are or can be the *creation* of suggestion. Suggestion cannot create beliefs, it cannot originate ideas. It is a method of conveyance. In auto-suggestion the suggested idea is taken from the body of our experience. It must be already formed there before we can use the auto-suggestive method in impressing it upon our minds. It is already content of our experience. Auto-suggestion is not a magical power creating ideas out of nothing. It is only by a looseness of thought that any one can talk as if the ideas which auto-suggestion conveys were of its own creation. The same holds true of hetero-suggestion and mass-suggestion. The ideas conveyed in them are already some one's ideas. The beliefs they transmit belong to the stock of already formed beliefs. We must look for their origin elsewhere. And in a discussion of their truth it is of more importance to determine that origin, and the place they occupy in the system to which they belong, than to inquire into the process whereby they have found lodgment in our minds.

The attempt, therefore, to evacuate religion of objective truth by use of the suggestion-hypothesis breaks down. It would require, in the first place, to assert that the process of religious experience on its cognitive side was one of *pure* suggestion, and we have found this to be an untrue account of it. And, in the second place, if it were purely a process of suggestion, no explanation would be possible of the *initiation* of religious experience, as suggestion does not initiate but only transmits.

The attempt to resolve religion into a product of the mind, entirely subjective in its nature, having failed, let us now shortly examine the closely related attempt to reduce it to a purely social phenomenon, finding its outward reference not in the knowledge of God which religion supposes itself to possess, but in the human society from the forces of which it takes its rise. We have here to consider the suggestion that as society gave rise to religion, man should give up any idea of a supernatural reference, and recognise society as the real object to which his religious experience refers. The consideration of this theory is directly suggested by the fact that Leuba, whose attempt to subjectify religion we have already considered, has revived also this positivistic interpretation of religion. It is extremely interesting to discover this metaphysical interest behind his former strictures upon the reality of the reference of religion to God. Where a scientist elevates his science and its methods into a criterion of reality and usurps the task of philosophy, it is not usually because he has simply mistaken the ground of his science. There is always a metaphysical interest in the background. Leuba's metaphysics is a revival of Positivism. The latter he repudiates in its old form, clearly recognising that actual humanity simply does not afford an object to which religion can attach itself. Humanity, as actually existent, does not evoke the religious sentiment. But "there is no question but that humanity idealised and conceived as a manifestation of Creative Energy, possesses surpassing qualifications for a source of religious inspiration."¹

Here the writer exhibits a desire to have it both ways—to substitute humanity for God as Positivism

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 335.

did, and yet to get rid of the unsatisfactoriness of humanity as such a substitute, by "idealising" it and conceiving it as a "manifestation of Creative Energy." The fact is that the proposed object of religious experience does not fit the part, and entirely fails to account for the rise or the existence of religion as we find it, and it has to be disguised in such vague and abstract terms as will make it look as like as possible to the idea of God which it displaces. The entire religious life is a product of the idea of God and varies as that idea varies, and any other idea substituted for it refuses the rôle. As Waterhouse judges: "If it were true that the source of religious experience were the community, it seems strange that neither in theory nor practice is it possible to induce mankind to accept the community in any form as the natural object of worship. The hypothesis must be held to be insufficient. It represents neither the *prima facie* nor the historical interpretation of the facts, nor yet the view of those whose knowledge of religious experience is personal. It occurred to none as the explanation of their religious experience until it was invented in the academy. Its origin seems to be in a bias against the supernatural, and not in a reading of the facts of religious experience. It virtually identifies the patriotic and the religious sentiments despite their historical differentiation, but offers no reason adequate for such a reversal of normal judgment. In short, the problem of the reference of religious experience may be dissolved in this manner, but it cannot be said to have been solved." ¹

There remains the effort of Durkheim and his collaborators of *l'Année Sociologique* to establish the entirely sociological nature of religion. For them, too, the forces

¹ *Op. cit.* pp. 123-124.

which produce religion are exclusively social. This attitude produces a false simplification of the facts of religious experience, in that it naturally fails to recognise any type of religion but that which is traditional in its nature. It fails altogether to account for the element of originality and creativeness which characterises the best and most spiritual religious experience. Further, the account of religion given by saying it is an expression of the social nature of man, is again meant as a rival explanation of its experience to that which religion itself puts forward, that it is an experience of God. The objective reference is again precluded.¹ Here the theory joins hands with the thought of many followers of the psycho-analytic school, that religion is the fruit of man's desire. It is a "projection" of the human mind. It need not be for that reason purely subjective. It cannot represent God, but it represents the nature of man, for out of that nature it has sprung, and to that nature it gives expression. This attitude is not new, but it is reinforced by much modern thinking on the subject. It is akin to the position of Feuerbach. Indeed, the latter thinker has given it classical expression. "The instinct from which religion arises is the instinct for happiness. Man believes in God not only because he has imagination and feeling, but also because he has the instinct for happiness. He believes in a blessed being not only because he has a conception of blessedness, but because he himself would be blessed: he believes in a perfect being because he himself wishes to be perfect: he believes in an immortal being because he himself desires immortality."²

¹ The theories of Leuba and Durkheim are admirably treated by Waterhouse, *op. cit.* ch. viii.

² Feuerbach, *Werke*, Bd. viii. pp. 257-258. Quoted by Rouse and Miller, *Christian Experience and Psychological Processes*, pp. 5-6.

Man, according to such a way of thought, has created God in his own image. The reference of religion to God is but a disguise. The reference is to man's own nature out of which religion has sprung: "The gods are *libido*."¹ It is relevant, in view of the latter statement, to point out that religion offers a means of sublimation of the *libido* which is recognised by almost all psycho-analysts to be extremely satisfactory. The fixation of the *libido* upon a religious object differs in its results most markedly from its fixation upon a mere fantasy-construct. It is permanent, and it presents none of the features of morbidity. May we not argue that this fact in itself points to a difference in kind between the religious sublimation and that which is directed to the fantasy-construct? May it not be due to the fact that the religious object is real? But, apart from that consideration, which I offer by the way, suppose we accept Jung's statement: "The gods are *libido*," in the broad sense in which Jung uses the term, in contradistinction to Freud's limited and specialised meaning. There is a very real sense in which God is our desire. To deny the statement would be to deny part of the inmost significance of religion. It satisfies the affective nature, and fulfils man's deepest desires. It is even possible to argue that out of these desires it has sprung. I would only point out, as against those who would make desire the end of religion because it is concerned in its beginning, who, because religion expresses man's desire, can find no God to whom religious experience refers other than a personification of human desire, that such a solution is another attempt to confine the whole issue to psychological considerations, and that psychology cannot settle the question of ultimate reference.

¹ Jung, quoted by Waterhouse, *op. cit.* p. 127.

Surely the further question must be asked and answered : Does that desire and its satisfaction teach us anything with regard to reality ? Is it not a curious, almost a perverse assumption, that that which most deeply satisfies our emotional nature and our conative impulses, must *ipso facto* be false in truth ? Philosophy is repeatedly called upon to make the endeavour to rationalise aspects of experience which are not of an intellectual nature, and surely the matter in hand is an important case of that duty. Every line of our inquiry converges on the conviction that psychology raises in its discussion of religious experience a problem which it is itself powerless to bring to an issue. It is a philosophical and theological problem which we carry forward for consideration in the remaining lectures of our course.

We cannot, if we are to substantiate religion in a reasonable system with the rest of our life and thought, avoid the ontological discussion. Psychology does not take us to the end of the way, neither does it bar our progress to the remaining stages of our journey. And in that passage to the further consideration of the truth of religion, we must, I think, again recognise that it is a step in which a fundamental faith is involved. No one has yet categorically silenced the argument of Feuerbach, and just as little can we rebut that of his modern followers. If a thinker deliberately refuses to take the step of assuming that desire and reason are not hopelessly at strife, then there is lacking that common ground with him which alone makes argument possible. We must assume that that which satisfies man's deepest emotional nature in its highest expression is not out of accord with the nature of things. If it be called mere "fantasy-construct," then there is an end to argument. But he who so names it makes an assumption as we do.

It is a matter of choosing postulates. These postulates, like all others, are tried in the very course of the experience and thought which are based upon them. In the validation of religion we must ask the question how the postulate of faith fares in the course of experience. Is religion's assumption concerning itself borne out by the experience which it underlies? The postulate of religious faith is that there is a real Divine who meets with man in his search and his desire.

LECTURE VII

RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE AND ITS VERIFICATION

WE found in the course of the last lecture that the psychology of religion led us to the consideration of problems which that science could not solve. These problems centred round the question of the validity of the objective reference of religious experience. Religion has consistently interpreted its experience as referring to a real Divine Being, with whom communion is possible and is actively sought. Religion has always believed that God is, and that He is the rewarder of them that diligently seek Him. And, moreover, this consistent objectivity is of the very essence of religion. Religion would cease with the disappearance of the faith that it is in touch with a divine reality. Something else might occupy its place, but that something else would not be religion as we know it, and as it has been manifested in every age and place. Religion as a concrete fact of human history we have already seen good reason to define by this very reference to God. It has been manifest throughout our discussion how religious experience takes its essential character from the presence in it of such a reference. It is not, therefore, a true account of the place of belief which regards it as something superadded to religious experience, extraneous and unnecessary to the latter. Belief in God is implicit in religious experience as such. Whether or not it is consciously accepted or explicitly

stated as an article of faith, the belief in a Divine Being or a divine order is implied in the religious attitude and postulated in the religious endeavour. That being so, it may seem strange that the psychological inquiry into the nature of religion should anywhere have issued in an attempt to dissipate that objective reference in pure subjectivity. For though the validity of the objective reference of any experience is a question that belongs to ontology, psychology must observe and record the fact of objectivity, and recognise the consequences of that fact within experience itself, if it is to give a true account of its subject-matter. And I do not think it has been recognised with sufficient clearness in some quarters that to reduce this objective reference of religion to a resultant of subjective feelings and desires is to reduce the study of religion to a branch of pathological psychology. I do not think that some thinkers have entirely realised how bold a step it is to dissipate a universal manifestation of human life into hallucination and self-deception. It is safe to prophesy that such an enterprise will meet with no strong degree of general acceptance among thinking men, unless it brings forward an exceedingly well-proven case.

It must at least be clearly observed that the very existence of religion depends upon the overthrow of the contention in question. It is not a matter of minor importance to religion, upon which we are engaged. Religious experience as such is founded in the conviction that our experience reaches God. There is no pretension that our human experience completely compasses the divine. The fulness of the divine reality may be conceived as beyond the scope of our finite experience, and yet that experience may still be regarded as placing us in touch with that reality, and indeed

as progressively comprehensive of it. But religion as a fact of any serious significance for human life vanishes with the establishment of the thesis that the order of divine reality, with which religious experience believes itself to be in communication, is nothing but an apotheosis of human desire. Religion continues to demand serious consideration only on condition of the substantial truth of its interpretation of its own experience.

We have dealt with several forms of the denial of that interpretation coming from psychological and sociological schools of thought. And we have found that these denials are invalidated by the fact that they are attempts from within these sciences to solve problems with which they possess no proper means of dealing. The science of religion in its various branches raises questions for philosophy and theology.

We must pass now to consider the question of the status which may be accorded to religion from a philosophical point of view. What is the relation of the religious consciousness to a reality with which it regards itself as being in touch?

Waterhouse, in his recent work already referred to, has developed a massive argument for the serious philosophical consideration of the meaning of religion—an argument to the general lines and the outcome of which I would direct your attention.¹ It seeks to bring into clear light the essential postulate of religion, and to develop its philosophical significance. It is a postulate which is involved in the religious attitude itself, and is manifested throughout the entire range of religious experience from the lowest to the highest. The signi-

¹ *Op. cit.* pt. ii. The argument should be studied at length in order to get the impression of the breadth of its sweep. Only its general direction can be indicated here, and it is weakened by condensation.

ficant feature of all religion he takes to be the belief in the possibility of a divine-human relationship, and the endeavour to find such a relationship. It is to this universal characteristic that mankind has owed the chief stimulus to progress. It is a superficial view which, looking upon retrogression, superstition, and credulity, has regarded religion as retarding progress. The belief in a higher spiritual order and the search for it, have led to the development of man's highest powers, and have been main factors in his mental evolution. The universality and persistence of the religious attitude and endeavour, throughout every stage of culture, is in itself a fact of very great significance. This fact alone, and its result in the evolution of man's capacities, make it impossible to regard religion as a mere epiphenomenon, a by-product of the development of human experience. "It must be recognised as one of the main factors that have made that experience what it now is." It is under this aspect that Waterhouse justly claims for religious experience the right to philosophical consideration. A fact of such far-reaching importance may not be overlooked or ignored. "Religion," he says, "appears as one of those forces by which man has lived ; it indicates that human experience has spiritual as well as physical needs. What is impressive in the lowliest forms of religion is that at a stage when man was so deeply marked with 'the clay of the pit from whence he was digged,' when the instinctive reactions and animal interests predominated in his life, he should have displayed any capability for, and leaning to, things psychical. There is a universality, and a kind of inevitability in the story of the religion of mankind that yields us an unavoidable impression that whatever be the conditions under which the human race appeared and developed,

amongst them was a force that works in a spiritual direction." And again, "All we know of reality comes through our experience, and all philosophy must assume that our experience is capable of expressing to us the nature of reality. Must we not, therefore, consider the suggestion that this process within human experience may be an indication of the character of reality?"¹ And in offering this experience to philosophy for its consideration, we must place in the foreground that universal characteristic, which has also been the main-spring of religious power, its belief in a divine-human relationship.

Taking the earlier forms of religion for illustration, the author points out the inevitable relation between religion in primitive life and the forces of nature by which man's life seemed to be threatened. His desire for security in the midst of the unknown powers which appeared to operate around him found expression in his religion. "He was thus impelled by very practical grounds towards some attempt to safeguard himself. The only method open to him was that of postulating, and finding out whether his postulate worked. One postulate was that by magic he could control the forces that surrounded him. Another was that he could conciliate them. Very slowly and irregularly the latter postulate gained ground, and led gradually towards a different conception of the character of super-human power. To-day, amongst civilised peoples, the magical postulate lingers in the dark amongst superstitions; the religious postulate has come into the light as faith in God: but behind all forms of religion, as contrasted with magic, from the lowest to the highest, there is this in common—all postulate that the super-

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 143.

human order is approachable, conciliable, that it is possible to establish a harmonious relation with it. The very persistence of religion indicates that mankind has believed the postulate to be true.”¹

This is the essence of the contention of Waterhouse, that religion in all its forms is grounded in a common postulate, and that that postulate from its intrinsic importance and from the universal distribution of religion, is of such a nature as to merit the close consideration of philosophy. The argument seems to me a valid and a powerful one. The statement of it is perhaps in one respect somewhat unguarded. To say that “the only method open” to primitive man “was that of postulating, and finding out whether his postulate worked,” is to import a deliberateness of experimental endeavour into man’s early religious attitude which can by no means have been present. Such a conception would confuse religion with science, and attribute a scientific temper to the primitive consciousness which does not emerge until a comparatively late stage of mental development. The religious attitude was almost certainly adopted on far other than experimental grounds, and Waterhouse has, in a passage already quoted, indicated the wonder of the fact that it should have been adopted at that stage at all. I think it most likely that it was adopted and maintained because of the presence of that original numinous element in human experience, to which Otto has drawn attention. But the real point of the argument of Waterhouse is that the adoption of the religious attitude did *imply* a postulate, and that that postulate has in point of fact justified itself in man’s growing religious experience, while rival postulates such as that underlying magic have failed to

¹ *Op. cit.* pp. 144-145.

substantiate themselves. Other rival postulates of later origin have equally proved in-serviceable as a basis for life. They have failed to pass the test of experience in which the religious postulate wins its growing verification.¹ The persistence of religion is evidence that in general the postulate *did* work. In the process of religious development which we sketched in an earlier lecture, we observed how the religious idea developed into the thought of a gracious God. In the higher forms of religion we see the completion and perfection of the religious postulate in the idea of a God who is love, a postulate foreshadowed, however dimly, in the direction of the thought of early man towards a tribal deity who might be persuaded to be kind if the right means of approach could be found. All religious experience, therefore, is founded upon, implies, and growingly verifies a common postulate, that it is possible to establish a harmonious relationship with the superhuman order. What we are here concerned with then, is not the vindication of the view-point of any special religion in its conception of God, but the philosophical justification of the attitude of religion as such. In its more developed forms the religious postulate can be seen to be a postulate concerning the nature of reality—the

¹ "Let us try to imagine the consequences to human development if the attitude of Pessimism or Fatalism, instead of religion, had been characteristic of the human race. The one implies the temper of sullenness, the other that of indifference, towards existence. If progress is a good, it is a good made possible by that belief which is the core of religion—that reality is responsive to human endeavour seeking for human well-being. But progress would be impossible to a really pessimistic or fatalistic humanity, and the 'life-urge,' or what Bergson calls 'the ascending wave,' would be checked in human evolution, not only by the 'descending wave' of matter, but by a mental attitude at variance with the essential conditions of development. It appears that the religious postulate is a precondition of human evolution in its higher stages." *Op. cit.* pp. 196–197. Cf. also pp. 185–186.

postulate namely of "a harmony between existence and value, a response on the part of the universe to human search for that which is good." The postulate in its most general terms is that "there is within reality that which is sympathetic to human values."¹

Now it is obvious that this postulate cannot be ignored or discredited by science or philosophy on the simple ground of its being a postulate, for science and philosophy are alike grounded upon a postulate of an exactly analogous kind. Systematised experience of any sort would be impossible except for such fundamental postulates. The religious attitude implies the assumption that reality responds to our desire for good, just as the philosophical attitude implies the assumption that reality responds to rational thought. Now we are as much entitled to assume that the universe is not bad, as we are to assume that it is not mad. We must make an assumption of some kind in order to live at all, and it cannot be held *a priori* unreasonable to assume that the universe is respectable, that it is not alien to the highest values we know. In this aspect the fundamental postulate of religion appears as that assumption of faith which the attitude of Feuerbach disallows, the assumption, namely, that our highest human values—those desires from which Feuerbach declares that human gods are made—are endorsed by the nature of reality. It is, in fact, in that assumption, consciously or unconsciously adopted, that all human progress has been achieved.

And further, postulation implies and finds its complement in verification. It does not stand by itself, remaining a mere assumption throughout the course of experience. It is either verified or discredited by our

¹ *Op. cit.* pp. 145-146.

experience itself, and a hypothesis which fails to validate itself in the course of that experience is left behind. We have seen how the postulate of magic gradually disappeared, until now it is represented only by the lingering dregs of superstition, while that of religion has persisted, and raised mankind to ever higher conceptions of God and good. And in the reasoned and detailed statement of religious belief which is theology, as well as in all other realms of human thought, the progress of knowledge and experience has continually replaced inadequate with more adequate hypotheses. No creed is argued out of existence; it is outgrown and superseded by a fuller expression of the truth.

The realisation of the fact, therefore, that the religious attitude implies a fundamental postulate raises at once the question of verification. In what way is the religious postulate verified in experience? Here we find ourselves in deeper waters, for we have at once on our hands the problems of the nature of verification, and, necessarily, of the nature of knowledge itself. We must take up the latter first, as essential to the understanding of the former. It will not be necessary for our purpose, however, to canvass the severer problems of general epistemology. In inquiring into the character of religious knowledge, it is to be borne in mind that that knowledge develops along the same lines and by means of the same processes as our general knowledge. It is one of the advantages which we have gained from our psychological study, that we have ascertained that the processes of religious experience are not fundamentally different from those involved in the rest of our experience. The same observation applies to religious knowledge. It follows that the long controversy between faith and knowledge involves and is due to a mis-

statement of the question. Faith is not a miraculous way of knowing. Our religious knowledge is strictly analogous in character to our knowledge of the world, except in the one particular that it refers to a realm of objects which are not grounded in sense experience. It would, therefore, be in much closer conformity with fact to state a contrast of faith and sense, than one of faith and knowledge.

Now a distinction has been repeatedly drawn between two manners of knowledge—discursive knowledge and knowledge of acquaintance. We are, I think, indebted to Bergson for his clear drawing of the distinction once again, and for his apportioning of the former to the intellect and the latter to intuition. Whether or not we agree with him entirely in his description of intuition and the part it plays in knowledge, there is no better general term for the process of immediate awareness, the direct holding in knowledge, which is indicated by the phrase, “knowledge of acquaintance.” It is, of course, in the nature of the case, impossible to describe knowledge of acquaintance. The recurring difficulty of describing an “experience” of our own, resides in the fact that we have to translate a knowledge of acquaintance into a knowledge of description, and the latter always leaves out all that makes up the real nature of the former. Acquaintance is incommunicable in the nature of the case. The knowledge of acquaintance is as directly held in consciousness as a sense presentation, which is a special case of it. This is the kind of knowledge we are talking about when we talk about experience. It is what we usually mean by knowledge when we talk about knowledge in a general way. It is the kind of knowledge which makes up our experience of the world, upon the basis of which all our sciences and

philosophies, with their discursive knowledge, are built up. It is the texture of the body of our experience on its cognitive side. It matters not how the knowledge may first have been mediated to us, it is woven into our experience as it is thus taken into the clasp of direct apprehension.

It is not claimed that this type of knowledge, because of its direct and immediate nature, is infallible. The claim that human experience is infallible would be a new claim. To err is, notoriously, human. Yet, though not infallible, it is not untrustworthy, else all knowledge is impossible. All the discursive thought of our science and philosophy proceeds upon the assumption of the trustworthiness of experience, and falls to the ground with the collapse of that assumption. The trustworthiness of experience is another of the basal postulates. Our sense perception is itself liable to error, yet it is the necessary foundation of our knowledge of the world. We believe that error can be detected by tests supplied by experience itself. Error is an incident, and does not affect the question of the trustworthiness of experience.

Our religious knowledge, like the rest of our experience, is of the kind we have been describing. Religious experience on its cognitive side is an immediate familiarity with its object—a knowledge of acquaintance. This statement makes no assumption as to its being acquired in any unique way, or through any specific religious faculty of faith. In point of fact, we have already seen that it is largely imparted through processes of social communication. But the nature of our tenure of it is not affected by the mode of our introduction to it. If it has entered into our experience, and thus become more than a second-hand belief, it is

held in direct possession by the mind. So far from marking off religious knowledge as in any way the miraculous product of a unique religious faculty, this characteristic, as we have seen, proclaims its community of process with the rest of our experience. Religious experience knows God in a way quite analogous to that in which in social experience we know our friends—by personal acquaintance.

It may be well at this point to endeavour to clear up the nature of *intuition* as a form of knowledge. The term is somewhat suspect, partly from the uncertainty and ambiguity of usage which is very manifest in regard to it. From our description of religious knowledge, however, it becomes almost a necessary term. There is no more convenient term for the direct *kind* of apprehension which we have seen to be characteristic of religious experience. At the same time I have, I hope, made it abundantly clear that in using the term we are not setting up any claim to a supernatural gift of avouchment operating in the exercise of religious faith to convey an unchallengeable and sacrosanct religious knowledge. Intuition is not an epistemological miracle. There cannot be supposed to be any psychological mystery about it. If it be accepted as a fact, and we are not without philosophical support for its acceptance, we have simply to inquire what its psychological nature is.

How is its direct contact with its object to be construed? Are we to describe it as a *simple* intuition? Let us, in the meantime, accept the designation intuition as a convenience, rejecting the term “simple” as a question-begging epithet. The term intuition will then connote immediacy of experience; whether it is a faculty of a simple nature or not is a matter for discussion.

For the difficulty which must be recognised in this way of presenting the matter, is the recurring difficulty of "placing" this function of intuition in the psychological field. Are we to assume it as an additional element of consciousness, a simple and irreducible mental function to be placed alongside the other ultimates of thought, feeling, and will? Or in what terms of known psychological functions are we to describe it?

Bergson, in setting forth his doctrine of intuition, has started from the old distinction already referred to between two kinds of knowing; between direct knowledge *of*, and indirect knowledge *about*. In the latter we know the object from without, by accumulation of detail, or by closeness of investigation. In the former we know it, as it were, *from within*. This is the true and the direct knowledge. It may not always be possible, but the other can never take its place. The direct or *inside* knowledge he calls intuition, and he describes it as "the kind of *intellectual sympathy*, by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible." The opposite of intuition is *analysis*, which is "the operation which reduces the object to elements already known, that is, to elements common both to it and other objects."¹

The account of intuition given here corresponds very closely to the conception we have reached of direct apprehension in religious knowledge. And it will be very generally agreed that there is something in consciousness to which this description applies. The two different kinds of knowledge have always been recognised, and it is a commonplace that the distinction between them is more or less ingrained in language. It

¹ Bergson, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 6.

is when we ask a psychological account of intuition that the difficulty arises. *What* is intuition? Is it a new and unique mode of experience? Is it a psychological ultimate? Bergson says in the passage from which we have already quoted: "Intuition, if intuition is possible, is a simple act."¹ And indeed the simple act of knowledge, even of sense knowledge, is of this intuitional nature. The primary apprehension of the numinous would have to be recognised as being of a similar kind. The elementary data of experience are all given in this manner. Intuition in this sense is at the very foundations of all knowledge.

But the difficulty arises when we apply the term intuition to the apprehension of more complex objects of knowledge such as those presented in religious faith. I am inclined to the view that in the case of religious knowledge of this order, the central and inclusive intuition by which we apprehend the divine personality which is over against us is not a psychological simple but the most highly complex and all-inclusive mental energy of which our souls are capable. It is an exercise of apprehension which occupies the whole self. It is an act which knits the entire personality together into a single apperceptive organ. The simplicity which belongs to it is not the simplicity of an isolated mental faculty, but that of a united personality gathered up into a comprehensive act of *rapport*. This state is not always equally complete, possibly is never quite complete, but, according to the degree of its completeness, is our intuition perfect. A high state of insight or of communion fuses the powers of the mind together into a higher gift of understanding.

And again, in so far as we can speak of an intuition

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 7.

of specific truths of religion, we should regard it in conformity with this view as a kind of *recognition*. The specific truth would then be religiously known when it was "apperceived" into a unity which is our religious world. It would be recognised as belonging to our total apprehension of the divine.

Once admitted as a possibility, and there seems to be no insuperable difficulty in the way of the admission, this conception of the nature of religious intuition gives promise of being an extremely useful hypothesis, as a factor in the elucidation of the psychology and epistemology of faith. It would require a detailed working out in order to test its tenability and usefulness to the full—an undertaking which lies outwith the scope of the present work. But at the outset, at least, the theory gives an explanation of religious knowledge which obviates the difficulties of the simple-intuition theory, and at the same time attempts to take account of the distinction between mediate and immediate knowledge.

Further, the theory might do service in explicating the relation between the objective and subjective elements in religious belief, the historical and the spiritual elements in the content of faith, the objective datum which forms an element in all religion, and the personal response of the individual spirit. True faith must ever be determined by these two co-ordinates. In the theory put forward here, the subjective element of the individual and personal response to the truth is not likely to be overlooked. The very nature of religious apprehension, on this rendering of it, constitutes it a function of the entire spiritual life. The given reality is truly made part of the soul who religiously apprehends it. The *saving* nature of religious truth can find no

better expression. But the objective side must be as strongly insisted upon. All the higher religions are historical religions—Christianity pre-eminently so. The objects of its faith are historically posited, and it is through the channels of history that they are mediated to the individual. Only by co-ordinating the individual experience with these objective realities of the faith can the vagaries of mysticism and subjectivism be avoided. These historical and objective contents of faith, being historical and objective, are naturally apprehended by the ordinary way of intellectual cognition. But they are then taken up by the religious consciousness and incorporated in the world of faith, and thus belong to both orders of knowledge. Hence the necessity we have insisted upon that distinct as are the two kinds of knowledge, they are not opposed.

I do not wish to be supposed in all this to have in any way disparaged discursive, intellectual, or scientific knowledge. It has enormously added to the range of human consciousness by giving man command over realms of knowledge inaccessible to direct experience. Nor can we even, as we have seen, draw any hard and fast line between the two. That they interact and influence one another is certain. A great deal of our presently possessed experience is the result and gift of such discursive thought.

But even more than that requires to be pointed out. We have to be reminded that in every realm the process whereby knowledge is advanced and increased is not entirely a discursive process. The direct intuitional mode of knowledge is characteristic of the process of discovery, the discursive mode of the process of explanation and exposition. There are, therefore, running through all knowledge two elements which we would

do well to mark. In the first place, psychology has recently concentrated upon the demonstration of the fundamentally conative element in consciousness. It is necessary to remember the conative element which exists in the process of knowledge itself. The process of knowledge is as much an expression of purposive activity as is any other direction of human interest. It is a process of trying to know. Hence the empirical nature of all our objective knowledge. This characteristic involves, in the second place, the intuitive element in the process. Knowledge comes as a result of experiment, and the experiment which constitutes a try at truth is an intuition. Scientists have not infrequently confessed that the process of discovery which has revealed even some of the larger generalisations of scientific theory, while they have come in the midst of a course of discursive reasoning, have come as flashes of insight, not as results of ratiocination. Here again, therefore, even scientific thought and the knowledge of faith have this in common. Every advance of knowledge implies an anticipation or postulation of that which is not yet known, and a subsequent filling out and verification of the postulate in experience. The truth of a discovery is not guaranteed by the flash of insight and the inward conviction of the experience in which it is revealed, but by the capability which it subsequently displays of illuminating and systematising our experience. The difference, therefore, between faith and scientific knowledge is not so great as has often been assumed. We might perhaps express it, in one aspect at least, in this way: that whereas the attitude of faith *implies* a postulate concerning reality, scientific and philosophic thought *consciously lay down* a hypothesis which is essentially of a postulatory

nature. In either case, it is to experience that appeal must be made for vindication.

It may be asked, if religious knowledge is thus analogous with our general knowledge, how comes it that its truths command so much less general assent than those of the latter? If it is so entirely similar in nature, and depends equally upon experiential verification, whence comes its failure to establish an equal degree of certitude? There can be no doubt whatsoever that the continual demand made upon faith to vindicate itself turns upon this characteristic difference, that our knowledge of the world of sense experience, and of the world of science built upon sense experience, presents an aspect of inevitability, a compulsion to belief, that is not presented by the object-world of religious faith. We accept the world of sense experience as an obvious and incontrovertible evidence and verification of the postulates both of common sense and scientific thinking in a manner which has no analogy in religious experience.

The fact is undoubted: the explanation is not far to seek. The facts of sense experience lie nearer to the essential conditions and needs of our physical existence, and are ingrained in our physical and mental constitution. We cannot live at all without entering into the consensus of acceptance. We dare not deny them, we dare not even momentarily forget them. If we do so we shall run our heads against some stone-wall experience that shall very speedily bring us into line with common conviction. If we step out of an express train, neglectful or contemptuous of our own inertia, we shall assuredly receive the reward of our folly. Now, even if we assert religion to be an essential part of a full and complete human life, we cannot say in anything like the same sense that it is essential to our continuing

to live at all. Hence it does not receive the daily, nay, the momentary, verification received by the objects of sense experience. This nearness to the needs of physical existence is the basis of common certitude. The further we remove from it in the plane of experience, the less our immediate certitude becomes. The larger generalisations of science and philosophy command much less certitude than the practical truths of common sense. Religious truth stands in the same case. It is not necessary for existence. It is only necessary for religious life, and that fuller stature of spiritual manhood which that life has created, fostered, and maintained. Hence the high degree of inward certitude possessed by earnest souls who have determinedly lived that life. In their life of habitual commerce with the realities of the spiritual life, experience has vindicated the postulates of faith.¹

In religious experience, therefore, the element of conation is strongly marked. In its higher reaches, the religious life is not a life we must needs live, determined for us by the necessities of mere existence. It is a search for good which we may decline to follow or which we may dare to choose. There is an element of decision in it which every evangelist emphasises. Especially when that stage of religious progress is reached wherein the conception of God lays a high ethical demand upon his worshipper, the element of choice is emphasised by the circumstance that the full following of the ideal of good involved implies a willing denial of many aspects of experience which lie nearer to man's physical and instinctive nature. It is in this sense that "the natural man receiveth not the things of the spirit of God." In these circumstances the choice of the higher spiritual

¹ Cf. Waterhouse, *op. cit.* pp. 164-166.

good may appear in the light of a hazard in which all is staked upon the reality of the good that is sought.

The verification that we shall expect of the postulate involved in such a choice is not a verification which shall bear a constraining conviction embodied in the general consensus of all mankind, but a realisation on the part of those who trust their lives to the truth of the postulate that their experience endorses its truth. Reality does not reject their postulate. On the contrary, that postulate illumines their experience, and thereby receives its cumulative confirmation. It is in a land of promise that by faith they sojourn, and in their growing experience the promise is increasingly fulfilled. They are called to go out into a place which *afterward* they receive for an inheritance.

Do not let it be argued that because it is not a universal mode of experience admitting of a verification which it is impossible to overlook or to deny, that therefore it is of a purely subjective nature, finding no sure ground in the structure of reality. We must refuse to allow the question of certitude to be confused with the question of truth. The nature of reality cannot be decided by universal suffrage. In science and philosophy we insist that the truth of an hypothesis be estimated, not by an appeal to everyman's notion of its credibility, but by a consensus of experience on the part of those who have earned a right to judge. Religious knowledge similarly bases its claim to credence upon the verification afforded to its postulate in the experience of those who put it to the test of life. The persistence of the religious attitude testifies to the fact that reality has been found to respond to that postulate, that it has introduced not confusion, but order, strength, and peace into the experience which has been guided by it. Re-

ligion has helped men to live. Its postulate that human good finds a place in ultimate reality is required to make life tolerable. It may be denied that that is a logical reason for the acceptance of its validity. But if there is any such thing as moral certainty, surely it is exemplified here. And we should be loath to accede to the suggestion that moral certainty can give no indication of the nature of the real. Much merit has often been claimed for an unfaltering acceptance in the name of scientific candour of negative conclusions concerning cherished beliefs. Let us remember that there are aspects of human good, the reality of which it is disloyalty to doubt. It is well indeed to keep an open and unprejudiced mind which shall be willing to receive all the new truth which man's scientific quest may reveal. But it is well also to hold fast to that which is good, to recognise the claim exercised upon us by the highest values as yet revealed to us, and to realise that the noble sentiment in which these best things are enshrined in the hearts of all men of goodwill is not an accident but an index of their reality and spiritual compulsion.

This process of verification within experience itself may seem to some a rather inconclusive one, inasmuch as it can hardly be expected to bear conviction to the mind of any one who has not first had the experience. But this is but to say again that a postulate can only be tested by acceptance and use. And it cannot be urged that religion must first demonstrate its logical soundness before its postulate is accepted. There can be no *a priori* demonstration of a postulate. The logic of empirical verification is a perfectly well recognised process in scientific and philosophical practice. And, further, it is not incumbent upon us to furnish an abstract demonstration of the credentials of a common form of

experience such as the religious. It is an undubitably occurring form of experience, an existent content of consciousness, a fact of life. We are entitled to accept experience as being in accordance with reality until it is demonstrated to be otherwise. It is the duty of philosophy to demonstrate the significance of experience, or alternatively to demonstrate the insignificance for reality of any particular experience which it rejects. It cannot simply assume the latter and arbitrarily select the areas of experience which it shall accept as significant for reality. Any form of experience which is not inconsistent with experience as a whole has a right to regard in this respect, and even any alleged inconsistency requires to be very carefully examined lest the objection be specious. The onus of disproof is most distinct. As Waterhouse puts it: "The religious consciousness itself testifies unequivocally that its object is existent. This is the hypothesis 'in possession.' The question is whether philosophical inquiry can judge this evidence to be consistent with a critical conception of reality. The demand is sometimes made that religious experience offer proof of its assertion. But that is a proceeding logic text-books label '*ignoratio elenchi*.' Upon none of the established beliefs of mankind can there be any *onus probandi*. Logically and historically, belief precedes disbelief. The testimony of religion comes as near as anything can come to being world-wide witness. The burden, therefore, is one of disproof."¹ This is an exceedingly important consideration, and it gives a high status to that process of progressive verification in actual life to which we have referred. In that process beliefs are formed, tested, modified to suit the exigencies of experience, and in-

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 151.

corporated into experience itself. It is in that real process of verification by living that our vital beliefs are created and maintained. The beliefs so formed and held, constituting the object-world of experience, are the only possible subject-matter and raw material of all our philosophy and objective science. Science and philosophy are indeed but efforts to make more explicit, accurate, and comprehensive the process of conception and judgment which is implicit in and inseparable from the process of experience itself. Prior to the task of philosophy, the concepts and judgments embodied in religious belief have as clear a right as any other human beliefs to philosophic consideration. They are formed in the living converse of religious experience, and the testimony of that experience to the reality of the objects which they enfold and declare can neither be rejected off-hand nor asked for *a priori* proof of their credentials. They are *there*. They are in actual being, just as all human beliefs are. They are posited by religious experience in a precisely analogous way to that in which all objects of all experience are posited. They will vanish as other beliefs have vanished if and when living human experience rejects them as discordant, or philosophy decisively dissociates them from the synoptic view of reality which it is its task to elicit from experience. But their unchallengeable place in human experience demands for them serious consideration.

Again, it may seem that the process of verification outlined in this lecture is an extremely general one—too general and abstract to substantiate belief in the objects of religious faith as any existent religion holds them. It accepts as the fundamental postulate of religion a general philosophical tenet, namely that the highest human values have a foundation in reality,

and it seeks to demonstrate that that postulate is verified in experience inasmuch as it is essential to the best human life and is, in fact, the spring of human progress. It does not indeed profess to do more than to extract the postulate in question as indicating the philosophical significance underlying all religious faith, and so to make the religious attitude available as a contribution to philosophy. It may seem therefore to do little towards substantiating the reality of the actual objects of living religious faith. Its postulate is after all as much a philosophical as a religious postulate. It is the postulate of all humanistic philosophy, not of religion alone. It may be said to be the foundation tenet of philosophical idealism. Religion may arise against it, as it has done against many another attempt to philosophise its content, and may declare that the God of its experience is other than a philosophical postulate. The fundamental postulate of religion, it may declare, is something more concrete than this. It asserts the possibility of real communion with a real God, a possibility and a reality of which this proffered postulate is but a philosophical implicate.

One can but confess the truth of the contention. Philosophy is not religion and cannot reproduce the characteristic content of the latter. And yet the argument which we have here outlined is not without value to religion. The very fact that religion may be philosophically represented as a "conservation of values" is a fact of some significance for the question of the truth of religion. For it means that the fundamentals of living religion, the thought of God and the experience of communion, with all that these imply, have in truth been the main bearers and creators of those moral and spiritual values which have refined and ennobled human

life. In the later stages of development, when these values have become consolidated and ensured, men may attempt to cultivate them without religious aid, but in doing so they kick away the ladder whereby mankind has climbed to those heights, for it is incontrovertibly through religion that all these high values have been won and kept. Surely it is not beside the mark to argue that if philosophy can accept these spiritual values as contributions to its scheme of reality, those objects of religious faith and experience through which such values have been revealed are real objects. The faith which grasps them is more than human fancy, the experience which enfolds them is in its measure a "path-way to reality."

Let us take as an example man's ethical advancement. Let us consider but two outstanding facts of that advancement—the invariable connection in the higher reaches of religious development between religion and ethics, and the historical fact of the leadership of religion in man's ethical pilgrimage. Regarding the former, though religion and ethics are distinct activities, their connection is so close as to have led many times to their confusion. Religion is not even "morality touched with emotion." Our study of the nature of its experience must have displayed it to be something entirely other than this description would make it. Schleiermacher successfully contended against the mistake of treating it as the mere "handmaid to morality." And yet religion has shown an extraordinary capacity for incorporating the moral ideal and reinforcing the latter with its sanctions. The highest religions are ethical religions, and the degree to which a religion has succeeded in ethicising its content may be taken as an index of its development. One of the most

outstanding and significant periods in man's spiritual history is that of the movement of Old Testament prophecy, in the course of which an ethical conception of God was discovered and secured to mankind. The Christian religion still further consolidates the union, so much so that with practical unanimity mankind, to the degree of its moral enlightenment, endorses the Christian ethic as the highest moral ideal, and many who would fain reject on other grounds the theological ideas of historical Christianity are constrained to confess the compulsion of its ethical ideals and the power of its moral inspiration. The influence of the higher religions, and especially of the Christian religion, in the reinforcement of morality can hardly be exaggerated; it is more than the mere lending of religious sanctions to the dictates of morality. It is, as we have already seen, the incorporation of the highest moral ideas within the system of the powerful religious sentiment, so that religion and ethics grow together into a dominant and creative spiritual dynamic. The moral ideas are transformed in the process so that they become not only ethical but religious in character. We have seen that the ideas of *holiness*, in its full ethicised connotation, and *sin*, are distinctively religious ideas—they are the ideas of morally good and morally evil, heightened and transformed by their relation to the idea of God.¹

¹ "Almost everywhere we find the numinous attracting and appropriating meanings derived from social and individual ideals of obligation, justice, and goodness. These become the 'will' of the numen, and the numen their guardian, ordainer, and author. More and more these ideas come to enter into the very essence of the numen, and charge the term with ethical content. 'Holy' becomes 'good,' and 'good' from that very fact in turn becomes 'holy,' 'sacrosanct,' until there results a thenceforth indissoluble synthesis of the two elements, and the final outcome is thus the fuller, more complex, sense of 'holy,' in which it is at once *good* and *sacrosanct*. The greatest distinction of the religion of ancient Israel, at least from Amos onwards, is precisely the intimate coalescence of both

But, in the second place, this coalescence of religion and morality has issued historically in the moral leadership of religion. Not only does religion absorb or incorporate the moral ideal, it expands, enriches, and inspires it. Not only does religion reach its own highest levels in becoming ethicised, it inspires mankind to moral advance and achievement. Just because religion is much more than the mere "handmaid" of morality, it inspires morality to its own highest fulfilment. We have referred to the prophetic movement in Israel, and it is the glory of that movement to have led not only a religious advance in the achievement of an ethical idea of God but an ethical advance as well. The purification and ennoblement of man's moral ideals has ever since proceeded largely from religious inspiration. The great names of the faithful have been the names of the moral leaders of mankind. The prophets of the divine have been the revealers of moral truth. "Through faith" men have "wrought righteousness." To take the supreme instance, Jesus Christ is in His Person at once the greatest revelation of the divine in man's spiritual history, and the unchallengeable moral Leader of mankind. And the faith that centres in Him remains to this day the source of the world's highest moral inspiration.

That religion, and specifically the Christian religion, should be the chief creator and bearer of such moral and spiritual values is a fact of the spiritual life the significance of which does not end there. The religious experience in which these values have been discovered and by which they have been conserved and developed, elements. No God is like the God of Israel; for He is the absolutely Holy One (=perfectly good). And, on the other hand, no law is like Jahveh's Law, for it is not merely good, but also at the same time 'holy' (=sacrosanct)." *Otto, op. cit.* pp. 114-115.

produces in them high credentials for its validity. The objects of that faith are such as to attract to themselves and to elicit and develop within their system such values. That the objects of religious faith are unreal is a proposition which involves the greatest achievements of the human spirit in a common ruin with that faith itself. Not man's religious experience only but all his highest spiritual possessions are reduced to subjective illusion together. Religion is too closely involved in man's life to be lightly accounted a trick of fancy. The verification of the fundamental reality of the kingdom of faith takes place in the entire reach and sweep of man's spiritual life. By its fruits in that life religious faith is known and vindicated. I am content to rest the issue of the question regarding the validity of religious experience upon the indispensable values which have found in it their source.

I have throughout this discussion accepted religion on the level which corresponds to that in our general experience usually called common sense. I have spoken of the general religious experience, and I have done so deliberately in order to bring out the fact that on that level religion by its very nature implies a fundamental postulate which it does not explicitly and reflectively formulate, but which is nevertheless present in its essential attitude. But on that level the process of verification is necessarily a very general one, and consists we may say mainly in the fact that that postulate makes sense of our spiritual experience. It brings satisfaction to those needs which only the religious experience does satisfy. In the strength of its character has grown to forms of power and beauty, and the noblest ideals of humanity have become not fantasies in which the human spirit finds refuge from the realities

of life, but themselves realities toward which that spirit reaches and grows.

But it cannot be denied that in the final stages of that process of verification we must call reflective thought to our aid and pass over into theology and philosophy of religion, just as the general process of verification in our experience at large carries us over into that effort of systematisation which is science and philosophy. Philosophy has been called a more than usually determined effort to think things out. And the moment a question arises concerning the consistency of our religious beliefs one with another, or with the evidence of our general experience, or with the conclusions we have based upon that evidence, the tasks of theology and philosophy are inevitably laid upon us. There is no other court of appeal. We are committed to earnest inquiry. That inquiry is not necessary to the possession of the realities of religion, for many deeply religious people have neither the opportunity nor perhaps the ability to pursue and to solve its problems, and to many the intellectual necessity does not present itself. But when it does it must be accepted, and we must not set up the dictates of religious experience as if they were sacrosanct and independent of inquiry. If the view I have set before you is correct, the deliverances of that experience are amply able to justify themselves to reasonable thought. That justification is part of the task of theology. Some of the theological considerations which arise from our study will be dealt with in the concluding lecture.

LECTURE VIII

THE TASK OF THEOLOGY

ONE of our main concerns, in the interests both of religion and theology, must be to find a satisfactory relation between the two. We have, in the course of this study, been endeavouring to determine the nature and the truth of religious experience, and we cannot quit such a subject without some attempt to assess its bearing upon theology. For we have found that the process of verification, which is incorporated in experience itself, issues ultimately in the tasks and processes of reflective thought, and that when the question of the truth of religious experience is seriously raised, the duty of reflection upon that experience becomes inevitable.

There is a further reason for considering the task of theology in relation to the line of study which we have been following. For there is a certain tendency to the disparagement of theology in the common mind of our time, and not the least of the contributing causes of such a tendency are the attention given to religious experience as distinct from theology in current lines of thought, and the emphasis in the study of that experience upon the element of feeling and other "non-rational" elements. The discovery that religion does not consist in the systems of dogma in which men have sought to systematise its beliefs, that it is not a construction of rational thought, and has survived the

passing away of many such systems, has not unnaturally led to a certain depression of the esteem in which theology is held, and indeed to the express belief that theology is an unnecessary and vicious rationalisation of religion. What, men are inclined to ask, is the real usefulness of these systems of dogma from the bonds of which true religion has so often had to fight its escape, which have so continually and so conspicuously failed to grasp the true spirit of religion that the latter has lived only as it has abandoned them ?

The distaste for theology is rooted thus in a certain despair of the possibility of its task. That task is the explication of the implicit affirmations of religious faith and experience, and the relation of these beliefs one to another, and to the whole body of knowledge. It seeks to systematise the cognitive side of religion. It is the culminating effort of that process of rationalisation which is continually and inevitably going on within religious experience itself. But there is a sense in which this comprehensive task becomes more and more strenuous and complex. As religious experience itself grows in complexity, the elucidation of its implications for thought becomes a larger task. And as our scientific and philosophical knowledge accumulates, the relation of our religious knowledge to this expanding body of thought presents an increasingly intricate problem. The old answers to the old questions no longer serve, and new questions are constantly arising which still further antiquate the old systems, and it seems as if any finality of theological belief were impossible, and any attempt to reach a lasting and satisfactory solution of theological questions were vain.

To this mood the modern psychological presentation of religion as an experience of a fundamentally emotional

and non-rational character comes as something of a relief. It appears to dispense religion from the rational tasks of theology, and set it free to develop along its own lines, not wasting its substance and falsifying its nature in an effort which is futile because out of accord with its own true character. Theology tends to be regarded as an aberration and a blunder. Such a line of thought is somewhat firmly grounded in popular opinion at the present time. Many are prepared to endorse the Christian ethic, and to extend sympathy at least to what they regard as the untheological simplicities of the Christian faith, while they are only irritated and repelled by the systems of dogma which they regard as having overlaid and misrepresented the essential nature of religion.

We may admit that there is a certain truth in the double indictment that theology has, on the one hand, shown a great propensity for getting out of date and out of touch with the living and advancing thought of mankind, and that, on the other hand, it has sometimes erred in tending to substitute its own rational construction of belief for the living faith and experience which it seeks to resume in thought, but which it cannot replace. But, in spite of the measure of truth contained in the indictment, I have no hesitation in describing the attitude towards theology which it displays as thoroughly mistaken. There are several considerations of the utmost importance which it leaves out of account, and to these we shall come immediately. But before we do so, it is to be noted at the outset that there is a certain element of unreasonableness in the indictment itself. In the first place, the desire for definiteness and finality, such as theology has never yet achieved, is really in direct contradiction to the second part of the con-

tention, namely, that theology tends to falsify religion by over-rationalising it. But, apart from that, the demand for finality is an impossible one. While human thought continues to live, there will never be a final theology any more than a final science or philosophy. This affords no occasion for the despair of thought, but rather good reason for hope concerning it. It is true that science, though boasting no finality in its results, has shown a definiteness and progressiveness of achievement beyond that which theology has ever displayed. But, even here, the fact that theology has less definite and assured result to show for its labours than some branches of science have, is purely a matter of comparison, of more and less. It is no matter of absolute failure on the part of theology to achieve its object. The lack of result in theology can very easily be exaggerated. There are thoughts of God, and theological constructions of religious experience, which the progress of theological thought itself has definitely antiquated and rendered no longer tenable. Why such milestones upon the way of thought should be regarded in the theological sphere alone, as examples of the futility of theology in the past rather than as marks of its progress, is a little difficult to understand. And even if the non-success of theology in the reaching of definite results were very much more marked than it is, the consideration would not be wholly relevant. It would provide no argument for the discontinuance of the theological effort as such, unless it could be shown that that effort was necessarily futile.

As for finality of result that is not to be looked for. As experience grows, thought must advance to compass it. The demand for and the expectation of any sort of finality have been falsely induced by the fact that certain

findings of science have remained so long unchallenged as to present to the short view of a few generations the appearance of a final expression of truth. I take some encouragement from the discoveries of Einstein in physical science. The law of gravitation has seemed the very type of settled and unalterable scientific result. I do not pretend to understand the details and intricacies of Einstein's theory. I suppose there are comparatively few living who do. But a scientist accounted, by those who have a right to judge, to be not only a sane, but a brilliant investigator has promulgated a hypothesis which calls in question the adequacy of the Newtonian hypothesis. And there are other examples in recent physical science, of long-standing ideas which have been set aside by advancing study. The semblance of scientific finality and absoluteness has departed for a time, relativity is the password of the hour, science and philosophy have received a new stimulus, and perhaps even theology may take new heart. For the atomic theory and the laws of motion are now as distinctly dated as the Athanasian Creed.

But the indictment of theology which we are considering, and the despair of its task on which that indictment is founded, leave out of account certain important considerations to which we must now return.

(1) It is necessary to recall, in the first place, the fact that the account of religion which makes it a matter of pure feeling, or of any purely non-rational process, has been found in the course of our study to be a false account. It is entirely inadequate to the facts of experience. It is a great matter to have been reminded as we have been by the whole modern movement in the study of religion, that religion is not an intellectual construction, but that it casts its roots deep into the

emotional nature. But the clear recognition that religious experience goes deeper than any intellectual expression of it, does not cut it off from the intellectual life. We have in the course of our study discovered the rational interacting with the non-rational elements in the most intimate way, within that experience itself. We have found rational ideas growing in clearness and in massiveness as experience developed in complexity and refinement. We have seen such ideas figuring as the centre around which the emotions were gathered and systematised in the religious sentiment. Apart from ideas, it is impossible to reach any coherent account of the very religious experience which is claimed to be a purely emotional one. Deeply emotional it is, purely emotional it is not. It is impossible to give any account of religion that makes sense of it or that adequately describes it, without taking into that account the fact of religious thought.

(2) Closely connected with this consideration is the further one that we have found it to be of the very essence of religion to regard its experience as true, and the object of that experience as real. It has never been content to be a matter of feeling alone. It has consistently held a belief and exercised a faith. And belief we have found to be not a by-product, nor an accident, nor an afterthought, but always a central and an essential feature of religion. As Hocking says: "Religion has never yet been able to take itself as a matter of feeling."¹ Its own chief concern has always been with its truth. Its intensest and most dynamic emotions would vanish with the cessation of its faith. Its characteristic activities would cease with the same paralytic stroke. Now the beliefs of religion are formed largely

¹ W. E. Hocking, *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, p. 57.

in the matrix of its emotional experience, they are the expression of man's desires and hopes and purposes rather than the outcome of his intellectual speculation, they are the result not of intellectual curiosity, but of the deepest necessities of his being. But that is only to say that religious belief does not *spring from* theology. It constitutes no ground for denying that religious belief must *issue* in theology. I do not see on what ground the latter proposition can possibly be denied. An experience which invariably centres in beliefs, which exists in all its emotional intensity only upon the condition that its conviction remains unshaken, which maintains its characteristic existence just so long as it can maintain its fundamental truth, is in the long run committed to intellectual expression.

(3) It is not too much then to maintain, in the third place, that theology is the natural and inevitable outcome of religion itself. Religious experience presses forward toward the theological task. Theology is not diverse from religious experience, but continuous with it. It cannot take the place of experience, but it can take its place in that experience, and it is the inevitable outcome and issue of that experience. Theology does not superimpose upon a non-rational experience a rational construction which is alien to it. Religion, by virtue of its essential belief, is already thoughtful, and theology but takes that thought seriously, and presses forward to the task of its systematic expression. The process of verification which we have seen to be active in religious experience itself reaches a point when it becomes necessary to take all the problems raised by that experience and to endeavour whether or not they can be reasonably constructed into a world of thought.

The final appeal must be made to the court of reason, and theology comes into being.

(4) All this is borne out by the history of religion. If religion were purely a matter of feeling, a non-rational phenomenon to which rational expression could only do violence, the history of religious thought would become unintelligible. The fact of history is that religious life and religious thought are bound together in an invariable and inevitable connection. As we observed in the first lecture, a vigorous religious experience theologises vigorously. Theology appears historically as a legitimate and necessary religious activity, an extension of man's religious life into the reaches of thought. As Hocking again says: "I will go so far as to say this: That he who sees in the output of theory and doctrine in religion only a natural blunder, the prophet's misunderstanding of his own psychology, does quite as completely renounce all insight into history as if he held to that older explanation of religion by intentional priestly deception and priestly craft. Unless the idea in religion has some necessary and central function, we are wholly without explanation for this lavish and persistent yield of 'revealed truth.' . . .

"And when we say that it is a declining religion which prizes the subtleties of theology, we must make a distinction between one kind of thinking and another. . . . Clever and intricate theology does usually mean trivial religion; but mighty religion and mighty strokes of speculation have always gone together. Something like a religious impulse is needed to sustain the flight of powerful and far-reaching thought; and presumably the converse is also true, that a religious impulse must exhibit its force in some fundamental cognitive achievement." ¹

¹ *Op. cit.* pp. 58-59.

As a matter of fact, religion clamours for expression in terms of thought, and the more vigorous its life the more impressive is its theological product. Theology is indeed a religious necessity, and it is impossible to draw any firm and clear line of demarcation between the more strenuous and determined pursuits of theology and the ordinary thought-process which is embedded in religious experience itself in the form of those religious ideas around which we have seen that experience to gather. It is unfortunate that any preachers or leaders of religion should ever have lent their voices, perhaps with some thought of conciliating the temper of the time, to the common disparagement of theology. For it is impossible to be a preacher of religion at all and to avoid some sort of theology—good or bad, clear or nebulous. Once you essay the task of religious expression, you are more or less committed to theology, the only question is with what degree of seriousness you are to follow its pursuit.

It is in view of such considerations as these that I have endeavoured throughout our study of religion to bear in mind that while we give due attention to the potent factors in the religious experience which mark it as something other than a merely intellectual process, we should at the same time guard ourselves against any conception of religion which should set it in antagonism to theology. The concrete and empirical definition of religious experience from which we set out already had this in view. We refused to accept a definition of religion which should confine it to the life of feeling, and so set up a partition which should sever it from the intellectual life, and make the persistent phenomenon of the existence of theology nothing but a blunder and a falsification. The distinction between religion and

theology should be plain from the whole account of religion which has occupied these lectures. But to distinguish clearly between religion and theology is not to sever them one from another. It remains true that a theology is not a religion, and to apprehend the objects of religion in a thought-system is not to possess them in the intimate apprehension of religious experience. For that reason a theology is dead without a true religion behind it. A real theology is an expression of an experience. The relation between religion and theology must be kept in mind, even when they are most clearly recognised as entirely disparate spheres. To deprecate theology is to disserve religion. Religion and theology are not hostile, but mutually helpful activities of the spirit. Indeed it is, after all, but the truth, that theology is *part* of religion, just as more generally philosophy is part of life.

Intellect alone cannot apprehend religious reality as such, but this is not to assert that we can have *no* reasoned knowledge of it. We must here make an all-important distinction. We might put it thus : that the intellect cannot apprehend that reality religiously. When we turn from direct experience to argument or description, we may still have before us the same object, but we are living in another sphere. We have passed from religion to theology. Intellect can deal with *religious matters*, but it cannot take the place of religious apprehension. When we say, therefore, that religious reality is irreducible to propositional form, we do not deny the possibility of a theology, we but state the indubitable truth that a theology is not a religion. Reduce religious truth as well as may be to a reasoned system and the result may be the perfect equivalent of all but that which made the truth specifically religious.

In rendering an intellectual account of an experience which is fundamentally of a different character theology does not stand alone. Philosophy has, in many instances, to address itself to a similar task, systematising and elucidating reaches of experience such as those of the ethical and social life which are rooted as deeply as religion itself in the non-intellectual elements of experience.

The task of theology then is to give systematised intellectual expression to the reality which religion posits as its object, and to relate that reality to the world of our thought. The study of the nature of religion which we have conducted cannot be without influence upon our conception of the aim and method of theology. The objective content of the religious experience is theology's subject-matter. It is an attempt to elucidate and systematise that content. *It is the science of God and of the divine-human relationship.*

Now this implies a certain conception of the scope and intention of theology, as well as of the method which that intention will dictate. *Theology becomes the science of religious experience from the side of its objective reference*, as the psychology and history of religion are the sciences of the same experience upon their subjective side. We saw in the last lecture how the religious attitude by its very nature implied a postulate which religious experience increasingly verifies by reason of the fact that in that experience the postulate works. The continuance of religious experience would prove impossible if its implicit assumption were false. But it proves increasingly possible to those who earnestly adopt the religious attitude. Now the postulate we were considering in this connection was an implicit one. We were not dealing with theology as a conscious

effort toward systematic ordering of religious experience, but with that experience itself on the plane corresponding to that which in general experience we call common sense. We found that the postulate involved had great philosophical significance, but it is not consciously posited for a philosophical purpose, it is the condition of our having any religious experience at all. But we found that the court of appeal in which its claim to truth must be settled is that of experience, which alone can verify or invalidate it.

Nor when we turn to theology, which is the conscious and reasoned effort to systematise our objective religious experience, to order our world of religious reality, can there be any other court of appeal. True, there is the appeal to the self-consistency of our system part with part, but surely it is after all but a small part of our theological aim to rid our theological ideas of inconsistency. If theology is to be vital, it must be an *expression* of our religious life. It must be true to the real content of our religious experience. The purpose of theology must be to make that experience more luminous by ordering its concepts. Theology ought to give us a better idea of God—better because more fully developed and more highly articulated. This is the secret of the reflex action of a true and living theology upon the religious consciousness which it seeks to represent in thought.

This means that just as we found the religious experience to contain an unconscious, or at least an unplanned, process of verification, of an experimental nature, so, too, theology must be experimental or empirical in its aim and method. It must be based upon, and it must refer to, religious experience. By appeal to that experience it is ultimately tried. In

point of fact, it is by the dictates of that tribunal that any theology is antiquated and superseded. That which the religious sense of men rejects cannot continue as a tenet of any living theology, that which the religious sense endorses cannot but come into its own.

The trend of theology towards a growing recognition of its own necessarily empirical nature, its close relation to religious experience, is a well-marked feature of its modern development. Yet the principle has not been at all times clearly recognised, for long periods it was not dreamt of, and even to-day entirely diverse conceptions of the nature and function of theology are prevalent.

I. There is a well-marked type of theology which we may call traditionalistic, which takes as its task the elucidation of a given body of doctrine regarded as derived from some authoritative source. That source may be very variously conceived. It may, as in the Roman communion, be the Church. With traditionalistic Protestantism it may be the corpus of written Scripture. It may even be the individual teacher, in the manner in which some more liberal-seeming theologians accept the teaching of Jesus, or that of the apostles concerning Jesus, as the repository of authoritative truth. But in every case the principle is the same. The aim of the theologian who so conceives his science is to conserve as much as he possibly can of the authoritative teaching of his source. Conformity with the written word or with the authoritative body of doctrine is the standard of truth and the only process of verification open to him. This conception of the nature of theology may be combined either with an entirely uncritical acceptance of the authority, or with a more or less critical attitude towards it. It is astonishing how critical that attitude may be, and yet

be found in close conjunction with a theology, the method of which is entirely dogmatic and traditional. Much less of the doctrine of the source is then available, but it is held that what remains is the more secure, and is sufficient for the purposes of theology.

1. This theological method, however, can hardly be held satisfactory. In the actual result it is after all a principle of judgment derived from religious experience which pronounces upon its results. It fails, that is, to be consistently traditionalistic and dogmatic, and thus to carry out the principle of its method in a thorough-going fashion. No matter how closely it may keep to the interpretation of its source, if its results are rejected by the religious experience of the community to which it seeks to commend them, then it cannot permanently impose them. That is to say, only those contents of its source which possess a religious value for the life of the present will be available to it. Religious experience, that is to say, exercises its normative influence whether the avowed aim and method of theology allow it or not. It is not possible to be completely and consistently dogmatic.

2. As criticism of the source and the above-described selective influence of experience make certain aspects of the traditional teaching impossible, it is necessary to deduct these elements from the originally accepted content. The subject-matter of theology, the body of available religious truth, assumes the aspect of a dwindling residuum. The disturbing suspicion is aroused, that subtraction is not a process that can go on for ever. Nothing could be more damaging to religious certainty. Traditionalistic theology is always nervous. Theological dogmatism has never welcomed new truth. It has always feared and hated it, and that attitude is inherent in its method.

II. Another conception of theology's task and method which stands over against the theology of experience is that which we may call the speculative or rationalistic. It appears in many forms, but a general principle of method runs through them all. Starting with premises which it conceives to be such as all reasonable beings *must* admit, it attempts to deduce rationally from these premises positive religious conclusions regarding God's being and nature. It aims, therefore, not at being a systematisation of actually occurring religious experience, but at being an external corroboration of that experience. Its method deliberately avoids the convictions of religious experience. We have already observed and accounted for the comparatively small measure of general assent which such truly religious convictions can command. They are, therefore, the very kind of premises of which this type of theology cannot in the nature of the case make any use. It must proceed from indubitable and universally accepted truths. This type of theology, however, also proves unsatisfactory in several ways.

1. Its natural and inevitable result, a result bound up with its method, is the emasculation of the content of religion. The most essential religious ideas, the doctrines most indispensable to the religious consciousness and most characteristic of religion in its historic forms tend to vanish from it. These are the very doctrines which, in the nature of the case, it cannot prove from the sort of premises to which, on principle, it confines itself, and, as it cannot prove them, it naturally dispenses with them. We cannot well expect a different result. You will get no more out of the theological mill than you put into it. If you refuse to consider religious ideas at the start of the process, you will assuredly not discover them at the

end. It is a curiously futile but amazingly recurrent effort of human ingenuity to endeavour to produce religious conclusions from the logical manipulation of non-religious premises. If the premises are such as all men must accept, whether religious or not, they are *ipso facto* not concerned with religious truth, and no amount of syllogistic juggling will ever make them yield religious truth as their conclusion.

2. The second criticism we might make upon speculative theology in many of its forms is that its doctrinal content, though impoverished, is in many instances fuller than it ought to be. It contains more than its premises can properly be allowed to vouch. The more positive in religious content its conclusions are, the more extended the flank which it presents to this criticism. Whence come the illegitimate results which largely give this type of theology its plausibility? They have been surreptitiously and fallaciously introduced at some point in the argument. What is their source? They are derived from the religious experience of the theologian or of the community in which he lives, or from some body of traditional doctrine. We are back, either at the traditionalistic conception, or face to face once more with a religious experience whose claims will not be denied. If it cannot enter at the door, it will climb up some other way.

III. The theology of experience, in its several forms, is characteristic of the modern period. It takes its rise from Schleiermacher's firm grounding of theology in the consciousness of the Christian community. Its method and criterion have been mingled in various degrees with the traditionalistic and rationalistic types in many theologians, and its principles as a specific form of theology can hardly be said to be definitely and completely worked

out even yet. But the attention increasingly given to the study of religion as an experience tends more and more to reflect itself in the methods of theology. While making its appeal to experience, theology must not forsake some kind of norm which shall save it from the caprices of individualism. Schleiermacher found that norm in the consciousness of the Christian community. Theology must, in a sense, continue and give precision to that process of verification which we have already found active in religious experience itself.¹ Yet it must achieve a real objectivity of treatment if it is to remain a theology. The problem of a theology of experience is to remain true to its experiential nature while evolving an objective standard.

There is no theological idea which has been so thoroughly modified by being reviewed in the light of the nature of religious experience than that of *revelation*. Neither the idea of authority nor that of revelation can be dispensed with by an experiential theology, greatly as it may have to modify them for its own use. The idea of revelation which naturally flows from such a line of study as that with which we have been engaged is therefore typical of the influence upon theology of that study, and may be selected in illustration of it. Schleiermacher's interest in the study of religion, and his knowledge of the immediate nature of its experience, led him to a conception of revelation which was one of the vitalising influences which recreated modern theology. For it follows from his conception of religion that revelation, in which God communicates Himself to men,

¹ Professor D. C. Mackintosh has written a work, entitled *Theology as an Empirical Science*, from which much help has been derived in the foregoing paragraphs. His idea of a thoroughgoing empirical method in theology is one that is in many ways attractive, and his presentation of its possibilities is suggestive.

cannot be in any sense a bestowing of knowledge. The content of revelation cannot be a body of objective truth. Revelation is indeed bound up with the religious experience as such. It is not only concerned with religion, it *is* religion. It is identical with the religious experience itself. Revelation is through the religious consciousness, and can only be apprehended by the religious man. The content of revelation then cannot be doctrine, but rather the personality of the Being who holds communion with us in religious experience. A body of doctrine does not require a supernatural origin. Doctrine can, therefore, be regarded as supernatural only in a secondary sense, as containing a description or setting forth of the Divine Personality who enters into relation with us in the religious experience. The real revelation is not doctrinal but experiential, not theological but religious, in character.

This is a conception of revelation which the whole course of modern theology has tended to endorse. It is characteristic of that tendency to bind up theology with religion in this way. The conception of revelation as a given body of intellectual or doctrinal truth tended to separate theology from real religion, and so to make theology barren and unreal. The conception now before us recognises that theology must start from, and continually return to, experience, and find there its subject-matter and its inspiration. Revelation provides theology with its data, and revelation, upon this conception of it, is itself experience. The data of experimental theology are the contents of religious experience, the deliverances of religious apperception, the facts of the spiritual life.

Such a vital conception of the nature of revelation is an essential idea to the theology of experience. We have seen that religious experience throughout

has reference to a God who not only may be sought of men, but who rewards the search. It is of His very nature that man can find communion with Him. That is to say, the God it knows is a God who reveals Himself. The conception of revelation is bound up with and implied in that idea of God and that definition of religion which we have had before us throughout our study. And the doctrine of revelation implied is that which makes revelation an occurrence of experience, an actuality of the religious life.

But over against this conception of revelation, and in contrast to it, we are accustomed to think of revelation not only as a process in experience, but as a result, a record of things revealed, a body of truth delivered and conveyed in a definite form. This is the conception of revelation implied in, and necessary to, the traditionalistic type of theology already referred to. It requires a definite authority, a source of truth, a repository of doctrine. Revelation is this corpus of the truth, the record of the faith once delivered to the saints. Theology becomes a process of interpreting and elucidating this source. A revelation which consists in experience can have no meaning for such a theology. Revelation ceases to be personal. The theory leaves no room for the conception of growth. It is essentially a finished and unalterable record of delivered truth. It is a much more definite and a much more easily handled conception than the other. The modern spirit has rejected it not so much because of any logical fault in it, as because of its inadequacy to the real nature of religion and theology. It has ceased to satisfy, simply because it does not meet the facts of the spiritual life.

As the theology we are considering, however, substitutes the living religious experience itself for the

authoritative deliverances derived from the religion of the past, as the source and medium of revelation, what, we may ask, does it do with these authorities? It is quite obvious to the most cursory acquaintance with the experiential type of theology that it does not simply discard and disregard the old authorities. It may be said, indeed, that it has for them a quite peculiar regard, that the ancient sources of revelation—whether it be in the historic church, the ancient Scriptures, or the great personalities of religious history—receive a new power and exercise a new inspiration when viewed in the light of the experiential conception of revelation. What then is, to take an example, the doctrine of Scripture to which this conception points? Holy Scripture becomes *a record of experience*—and a record of unexampled and classic importance. Scripture is regarded not as a closed body of revealed truth, but as a record of revelation given in the experience of those who received and passed it on, and continuing to live and propagate itself in the experience of others through the inspiration which it continues to exercise. It finds our experience, because it is experience in the first place. It inspires, because it is inspired. The Bible, as an unparalleled record of religious experience, has remained a creator of religious experience in others. On any theory of revelation the Christian Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments must take their place among the most valuable data of theology. Where else have we a record of a national religious consciousness comparable with that which is revealed in the Pentateuch and the historical books of the Old Testament? Where else the urge of a divine message like that which was felt and spoken by the prophets? And at last there was spoken in Jesus Christ a Word of God which must remain

the central fact not only of Christian experience but of the spiritual history of mankind. There resides, indeed, in this fuller and more living conception of Scripture, as experiential in its nature, not only the possibility of a better appreciation of its power and enduring inspiration, but also of a firmer ground for the recognition of the essentials of the Christian faith as the consummation of all revelation of the divine. I cannot go further into the matter of the idea of Scripture which is conformable with the immediacy of religious experience, but enough has been said to show that Scripture, as a source of religious inspiration, is not depressed but enhanced by a full recognition of its experiential nature. And the same, it may be said in a word, is true of the other ancient sources of revelation. The authority of Jesus, the authority of the apostles, and the authority of the Church have each a meaning for the theology of experience, and a meaning not curtailed but infinitely expanded and vitalised by the recognition that that authority does not dwell in the final promulgation of a body of doctrine, but in the fact of a spiritual life and experience which repeats itself in the experience of those who come within the influence of its inspiration.

The conception of revelation just outlined is determinative for theology. It grounds the latter firmly in experience. Experience becomes its source and its continual test. One aspect of theology's task is seen to be the continuation of the process of verification already dealt with. It seeks to make that process more accurate and more exhaustive. And like that process, its test is in experience itself. Theology receives its justification in the light which it throws upon experience, and the capability of its results for incorporation into experience. We have seen how religious

ideas are embedded in experience and are inseparable from it. Such ideas have been clarified and largely created by theological activity. The test of theology is that its resultant ideas should not only be intellectually tenable in a reasoned system, but that they should also be serviceable to experience in the manner here indicated.

It cannot be part of my duty, in the very closing stages of my task, to indicate even generally the lines of such a theological endeavour. The account given of revelation serves to indicate its temper and method. I have essayed the task of relating my subject to theology at all, simply because of the necessity of showing that the prominence accorded to experience, and especially to its non-intellectual factors, by no means dispenses us from the task of theology, but that, on the contrary, experience itself presses forward to its intellectual expression. The intellect cannot compass the fulness of its reality, but in that fulness the intellect takes its necessary place. Experience itself displays an irrepressible impulse to seek a reasonable faith.

INDEX

I. SUBJECTS

Acquaintance, knowledge of, 204.

Admiration, 39 ff.

Animism, 70, 78.

Apologetic, 6, 91, 124, 173.

Assent, 212.

Auto-suggestion, 139, 150 ff.

Awe, 42, 47 ff., 69, 72.

Character, 111, 117, 124.

"Complex," 39.

Conation, 32, 211, 213.

Conversion, 122.

Creature-consciousness, 60, 65, 68.

Creeds, 21 ff.

Dependence, feeling of, 8, 11, 59 ff.

Emotion, 27, 33, 36, 46, 185, 193.

Emotions, complex, 38.

„ primary, 37.

Faith, 92, 127, 193.

Fear, 42, 46, 69.

„ of God, 69.

Herd-suggestion, *vide* Mass-suggestion.

Holy, 57 ff.

Instinct, 27, 36, 44.

„ definition of, 36.

Intellectualism, 14, 15 ff., 29.

Intuition, 10, 32, 206 ff.

Mass-suggestion, 140, 152, 161.

Mysterious, 75 ff.

Mysticism, 79, 110.

Non-rational, *vide* Rational.

"Numinous" element, 56 ff., 98.

„ as "wholly other,"
76.

„ energy of, 74.

„ experience, positive
content of, 77, 81.

„ fascination of, 80.

„ ineffable nature of,
68.

„ overpoweringness of,
74.

„ value of, 83.

Other-worldliness, 119.

Philosophy of religion, 5, 15 ff.

Positivism, 189.

Postulate, religious, 199 ff.

Prejudice, 27.

Psycho-analytic school, 39, 191.

Psychologism, 170 ff.

Psychology, 2, 5, 26, 30, 35, 84, 97,
166 ff.

Rational and non-rational elements
in experience, 13-14, 27 ff., 56, 88,
98, 146, 157, 228.

Reason, 27 ff., 33-34, 111 ff.

Relation with God, 47.

Religion and ethics, 8, 12 ff., 219 ff.

„ and philosophy, 8, 12 ff.,
16 ff.

„ as inward experience, 12.

„ autonomy of, 8, 12 ff.

„ genesis of, 46 ff., 63, 70.

„ history of, 40 ff., 51, 131.

- Religion, social character of, 51, 136, 189 ff.
 „ truth of, 2 ff., 20, 50, 83 ff., 229 ff.
 Religious development, 95 ff.
 „ experience, complexity of, 9 ff.
 „ experience, definition of, 7-8, 17, 18 ff.
 „ instinct, 44, 94.
 „ thought, 21 ff., 230 ff.
 Revelation, 35, 240 ff.
 Reverence, 42.
 Reversed effort, law of, 151.
 Science and religion, 51, 71, 78.
 Scripture, 243.
 Sentiment, 38, 93 ff.
 „ definition of, 99.
 „ laws of operation of, 115 ff.
 Suggestion, 138 ff., 179 ff.
 Sympathy, 137, 181 ff.
 Theology, 21 ff., 224 ff.
 „ experiential, 239.
 „ speculative, 238.
 „ task of, 225, 234.
 „ traditionalistic, 230.
 Verification, 20, 203, 214 ff.
 Wonder, 30, 32, 37, 42, 47, 76, 131.
 Worship, 134, 151.

II. AUTHORS

- Baudouin, C., 151.
 Bergson, 204, 207.
 Davidson, A. B., 58.
 Durkheim, 22 ff., 191.
 Feuerbach, 191, 202.
 Harvey, J. W., 56.
 Hocking, W. E., 228, 231.
 James, W., 1, 32, 66.
 Jung, 192.
 Leuba, 170, 189.
 McDougall, 36, 38, 39, 40, 48, 62, 64, 72, 76, 99, 137.
 Mackintosh, D. C., 240.
 Nietzsche, 120.
 Otto, R., 56 ff., 98, 106 ff., 182, 220.
 Pratt, J. B., 176 ff.
 Rouse, R., and Miller, C., 175, 191.
 Schleiermacher, 7 ff., 59 ff., 63.
 Shand, A. F., 36, 38, 100, 115 ff.
 Smith, G. A., 86.
 Spencer, H., 100.
 Thouless, R. H., 19, 103, 109, 141.
 Waterhouse, E. S., 22 ff., 190, 197 ff., 213, 216.
 Wright, W. K., 103, 122.

